Negotiations to end more than 40 years of conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK) have taken on a concrete dimension. On May 12, two months after the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, wrote a letter in which he called on the group to lay down its arms, it has announced it will disband.
The PKK, which has been fighting for greater Kurdish rights and autonomy, has outlined several conditions it views as essential for it to dissolve. It insists that Öcalan lead and direct the peace process, that the right to democratic politics in Turkey is recognised, and that the group is given solid legal guarantees.
On the one hand, there seems to be great longing for peace between Turkey and the PKK. This has been evidenced by the positive reactions to the PKK’s statement both nationally and internationally.
Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said the PKK’s disengagement with terror had opened “the doors of a new era in every area, namely strengthening politics and democratic capacity”.
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However, there is also scepticism. Turkey views the peace process very differently from the Kurds, referring to it as part of the government’s “terror-free Turkey” initiative. The Kurdish movement has instead adopted the title of Öcalan’s February letter, “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”.
Many also see Erdoğan’s willingness to resolve the Kurdish issue as a political maneuver by the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP). Positioning itself as the party that ended decades of “terror” at the hands of the PKK would allow the AKP to consolidate its hold on power.
But, notwithstanding this, there are clear reasons for both the Turkish state and the PKK to come to the negotiating table now. One of the leading reasons is the changing geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East.
In late 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime was toppled in Syria and the country was subsequently taken over by Islamist militants. Iran’s influence has also been weakened following the collapse of parts of its regional proxy network, notably Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and, most recently, the Houthis in Yemen.
Israel, meanwhile, is continuing its war in Gaza. And it has intensified its military operations in Syria, particularly near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, alongside open expressions of support for Syria’s Druze religous communities.
At the same time, Donald Trump has returned to the White House and reopened the door to dialogue with Iran over its nuclear programme. The region’s politics are being reshaped, and leaders across the Middle East are repositioning themselves accordingly.
For the PKK and its broader political base, a peace process with Turkey offers a pathway to equal citizenship, democratic participation and long-term legitimacy for Kurds in the Middle East after nearly a century of struggle.
This was signalled by the Kurdish National Conference in April 2025. The conference, which was attended by different Kurdish parties and organisations, highlighted the importance of strategic coordination among Kurds in the region.
For Turkey, peace with the PKK now would further reduce a weakened Iran’s ability to project power westward. Some groups suspected of being affiliated with the PKK, such as the Sinjar Resistance Units in northern Iraq, have been indirectly supported by Iran.
Turkey’s handling of the PKK conflict and the broader Kurdish issue has also often complicated its engagement with the west. For example, human rights groups have accused Turkey of allowing the Syrian National Army (a coalition of armed groups in northern Syria) to act with impunity against Kurdish civilians in areas outside its control.
This has created friction in Turkey’s diplomatic outreach to the US and Europe. By addressing the longstanding Kurdish issue, Ankara could lay the groundwork for more stable relations with the west. These relations are particularly important now as Turkey is looking to take an increasingly key role in European security.
It is serving as a mediator in negotiations to end the Ukraine war. And Erdoğan has even offered to host direct talks between the Ukrainian president, Volodymr Zelensky, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, in Istanbul.
Bumpy road ahead
The PKK’s dissolution will not guarantee peace in Turkey. The Kurdish people expect equal citizenship and the end the government’s practice of removing elected mayors and replacing them with state-appointed trustees.
They also demand the release of political prisoners and reforms to Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws, which critics say are frequently used to suppress dissent. These issues will be discussed in parliament over the coming days, with talks on a new constitution expected to take place in the autumn.
The negotiations will not be simple. The Kurds have been persistently labelled as rebels, traitors and terrorists since the beginning of the Turkish republic in 1923. It will not be easy to change entrenched opinions overnight.
Özgür Özel, the leader of Turkey’s main opposition Republican People’s party (CHP), has emphasised the importance of resolving the Kurdish issue peacefully and democratically. But it is not clear whether his views reflect those of his supporter base and Turkish society more broadly.
Turkey must be further democratised to give the peace process a greater chance of success. The nation’s vibrant civil society currently operates under intense pressure from the state. Giving it more of a voice will help bring Turkey’s deeply divided society together.
It is always difficult – if not impossible – to make predictions about the future when it comes to Middle Eastern politics. However, a new balance is being established in the Middle East, and in this new balance very different players have to sit at the same table.
Pinar Dinc is the principal investigator of the ECO-Syria project, which receives funding from the Strategic Research Area: The Middle East in the Contemporary World (MECW) at the Centre for Advanced Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University, Sweden.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
