Here's the story, somewhat simplified, from a case now labeled Breskin v. Blattberg (D. Mass.) (I had filed an amicus brief opposing pseudonymity, as part of my general opposition to pseudonymity in defamation cases, see, e.g., Roe v. Smith):
- Son v. mother federal lawsuit threatened: Blattberg accuses his mother, Breskin (a psychologist), of having sexually abused him 30 years ago, when he was 4 to 7 years old. The son claims he "did not remember the abuse until 2024." The son's lawyer sends a demand letter to the mother, threatening to sue, with a draft Complaint attached. They apparently agree that the son's lawsuit won't be filed until the end of February. (Again, remember that these are just the son's claims; nothing has been proved.)
- Mother v. son state lawsuit filed first, pseudonymously, and under seal: In late February, the mother gets to the courthouse first, by suing the son in Massachusetts state court for defamation over his sexual assault allegations, which the mother says the son had made to third parties (including her mother and other relatives). She claims the son is trying to extort her, and has long "suffered from serious and severe mental illness." The case is filed as Doe v. Doe . The same day, the mother asks that the Complaint be sealed (impounded, in Massachusetts terminology), and the Massachusetts court agrees immediately:
After review, the court treats the current motion as an ex parte motion to impound under MA R Impound P Rule 3. The court finds that immediate and irreparable injury may result if the motion is not allowed. See MA R Impound P Rule 3(a). Nevertheless, under the Rule, an interested party must have an opportunity to be heard in opposition within ten days of this order. MA R Impound P Rule 3(a).
- Son v. mother federal lawsuit filed, mother v. son removed to federal court: The next day after the mother sues, the son sues the mother in federal court (there's apparently diversity jurisdiction), using the caption Blattberg v. Breskin . The day after, he removes the mother's Doe v. Doe case to federal court, as he's entitled to do because he and his mother are citizens of different states.
- Mother's motion to dismiss and seal son v. mother lawsuit, and to proceed pseudonymously on the strength of the pseudonymous mother v. son lawsuit: Four days after the son sues, the mother moves to dismiss the son's federal case, on the grounds that she "previously filed a prior pending action against the Plaintiff arising from the same alleged facts and causes of action." She also moves to seal the son's federal case, and seeks a protective order "against any additional disclosure of the parties' identities." Judge Richard Stearns (D. Mass.) shows at least temporary openness to this; he declines to dismiss the case, but consolidates the mother's and son's now-federal cases, and rules ,
[I]n light of the Impoundment Order issued in the previously filed state-court action involving the same parties which has been removed here and is now pending before Magistrate Judge Donald Cabell, this court will provisionally seal the Complaint and this motion. The court will revisit the issue in sixty days when the procedural posture of these cases will be sorted out.
- Denial of pseudonymity for the consolidated lawsuit: Finally, a week ago, Judge Stearns' denies pseudonymity and largely unseals the case (except for one affidavit), which is now called Breskin v. Blattberg (and will contain, consolidated, both the mother's defamation claims and son's sexual assault now-counterclaims):
Although there is a strong presumption against litigants proceeding anonymously, the First Circuit has identified four general categories of cases in which party anonymity may nonetheless be warranted:(1) cases in which disclosure of the would-be Doe's identity would "cause him unusually severe harm"; (2) "cases in which identifying the would-be Doe would harm 'innocent non-parties'"; (3) "cases in which anonymity is necessary to forestall a chilling effect on future litigants who may be similarly situated"; and (4) "suits that are bound up with a prior proceeding made confidential by law." Doe v. Town of Lisbon, 78 F.4th 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2023), quoting Doe v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 46 F.4th 61, 71 (1st Cir. 2022). Plaintiff contends that she satisfies each paradigm.
The court does not agree. As to the first paradigm, she has not shown that her distress, although no doubt severe, is unusually so for a defamation plaintiff.
As to the second paradigm, the court does not see how allegations against plaintiff would make plaintiff's mother more vulnerable or impact former clients with whom the treatment relationship has ceased. [The mother had argued that the son's "allegations will likely have a rippling and destructive effect on innocent third parties such as [the mother's] former patients and current community of bereavement group members, none of whom are parties to this litigation, and all of whom may well question her and their relationship with her in the face of such public and scandalous lies. Encountering allegations like those made by [the son] will imperil the trust, stability, and well-being of the many people who have in the past counted on [the mother's] professional advice and counsel" -EV]
As to the third paradigm, the court does not credit the suggestion that publicizing plaintiff's name will have a chilling effect on future defamation plaintiffs. Because the point of a defamation suit is to prove the falsity of allegations like those made by defendant here, similarly situated defendants will still be motivated to pursue litigation.
Finally, as to the fourth paradigm, plaintiff does not sufficiently identify which "prior proceeding" upon which she relies. If she intended it to be the state court action consolidated with this action, that proceeding is ongoing, not prior. In any event, a plaintiff cannot rely on the ruling of the state court, which applies a broader standard than federal court, to justify proceeding pseudonymously in federal court. [In an earlier order, the judge noted that, "anonymity in federal court is governed by the standard set forth in [Doe v. MIT], rather than any state court procedural rule which may have underlain the prior grant of impoundment." -EV]
In denying the motion, the court does not mean to downplay plaintiff's understandable desire to maintain as much privacy as possible in this sad family dispute. The court is merely constrained by the narrow approach taken by the First Circuit (and other Circuits) to anonymous pleadings.
This ultimate outcome quite correct to me. I can understand, of course, why the mother would want to proceed this way, and if the son is indeed trying to extort money from her through false assertions, I can sympathize with her preferences. But of course it's not clear who's telling the truth here—and presumably if the mother have prevailed here, the same trick could have been used by a wide range of defendants to seal cases against them (whether sexual assault cases or other cases).
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