US President Donald Trump has approved a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that could allow the kingdom to enrich uranium on its own soil, according to two people familiar with the matter, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The deal marks a significant break from decades of US non-proliferation policy in the Gulf.
The agreement would run for 30 years and involve American firms in building out Saudi Arabia's civilian nuclear sector. It would not, however, require Riyadh to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, the toughest available inspection standard — a departure from the US-UAE 'gold standard' agreement.
Why the 10-Year Enrichment Ban May Not Be What It Seems
Initial reports of the deal's approval state that the agreement bars Saudi Arabia from developing its own enrichment technology or buying it from other countries for a decade, and that any facility would be built by American firms without transferring sensitive technology to the kingdom, according to those same sources.
The safeguards agreement would be bilateral — between Washington and Riyadh — rather than incorporating the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which grants inspectors wider powers to verify that nuclear material is not diverted for military use.
Energy Secretary Chris Wright signalled the direction of the deal in October 2025, saying the two countries had 'come together on a deal for civil nuclear cooperation' and pledged to 'bring American nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia and keep a firm commitment to nonproliferation'.
To say this is an alarming development is an understatement.
— Jon Hoffman (@Hoffman8Jon) July 22, 2026
Trump’s decision to approve a civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia is antithetical to American interests. There is no strategic incentive for Washington to enter such an accord with Riyadh.
The prospect of a… https://t.co/HrTw4mSuH7
The 'Gold Standard' Saudi Is Sidestepping
Back in 2009, the United Arab Emirates signed a so-called '123 agreement' with Washington before opening its Barakah nuclear plant, agreeing not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel, a model non-proliferation experts have called the 'gold standard'.
Geopolitical analyst Michael Horowitz said the Saudi agreement would be 'very consequential' because it falls short of that standard and does not include the Additional Protocol, both measures designed to stop a civilian programme sliding into a military one. He said the goal appeared to be securing US backing for a deal that 'doesn't fully exclude a pathway to a nuclear programme'.
Andrea Stricker, deputy director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Nonproliferation Program, urged Congress to block the agreement, warning that failing to do so risked 'watering down safeguards' and 'setting negative precedents for other states'.
Congress Holds the Final Say on US Nuclear Policy Shift
Any civilian nuclear cooperation pact must go to Congress for review, and lawmakers would need a two-thirds majority to block it and override a presidential veto.
The Trump administration had let the deal languish for months over concerns tied to the ongoing US-Iran conflict and the risk of congressional disapproval. Saudi Arabia has previously said it would pursue a nuclear weapon if Iran ever acquired one, though Tehran maintains its own nuclear programme is peaceful.
The deal lands in the middle of an active US military campaign framed around stopping Iran's nuclear ambitions, so any move that eases Saudi Arabia's own path to enrichment invites direct comparison and scrutiny. For readers, the outcome in Congress over the coming weeks will determine whether this becomes one of the most consequential shifts in US nuclear policy in the Gulf in a generation, or whether lawmakers force the administration back to a tighter standard.
For decades, US non-proliferation policy in the Gulf has rested on a simple premise: no enrichment without the toughest inspections. The Trump administration's Saudi deal would overturn that premise. Whether Congress allows it to stand will determine whether the region's next nuclear race has already begun.
