Concluding the Sydney siege inquest
Man Haron Monis took 18 people who had been going about their ordinary business hostage inside the Lindt cafe two and a half years ago. The inquest opened six weeks later. Public hearings were held from 25 May to 5 June 2015, 17 August 2015 to 4 September 2015, and 21 March to 17 August 2016. 118 witnesses gave evidence, including 15 experts.
Today, with the publication of his 500-page report, the NSW state coroner Michael Barnes finalised his recommendations and findings resulting from the 18-month-long proceedings. He praised the bravery of those who responded to the “horrendous events”, and extended his condolences to the families of Katrina Dawson and Tori Johnson.
He also accepted the view of an international expert that the siege “would have challenged any police force in the world”.
If any aspects of the force’s best efforts were not quite good enough, this report attempts to identify how and why. However, it will not and should not be used to blame particular officers for outcomes beyond their control ...
When critiquing the police response, it is important to remember that right from the outset, 18 lives were imperilled.”
That said, Barnes identified deficiencies in the response, among them:
- The “contain and negotiate” police response to the siege failed.
- Commanders underestimated the threat Monis posed.
- There was some confusion around the lines of command.
- Negotiators had received little, if any, specialist training about how to deal with terrorists and did not explore options to communicate with Monis.
- The consultant psychiatrist made erroneous and unrealistic assessments of what was occurring in the stronghold, and permitted to go beyond his area of expertise to give advice about Islamic terrorism
- Commanders dismissal of a deliberate action strategy was based on flawed advice.
But, Barnes found, Monis “undertook the siege in a controlled, planned and methodical manner”. Whether or not he had any direct contact with Islamic State, the siege was a terrorist incident.
“I cannot stress too heavily that the deaths and injuries that occurred as a result of the siege were not the fault of police. All the blame for those rests on Man Monis.
“He created the intensely dangerous situation. He maliciously executed Tori Johnson. He barricaded himself in a corner of the cafe, and his actions forced police to enter the cafe in circumstances where the risk of hostages being wounded or killed was very high.
“Monis deserves to be the sole focus of our denunciation and condemnation.”
With that, we conclude our coverage of the inquest into the Sydney siege. Thank you for following today and over the past 18 months.
Updated
Louisa Hope, a survivor of the Lindt cafe, has said it is “wonderful” that the inquest is over.
“As we all try and negotiate living in this new age of terror, we all need to consider new things in new ways. As a community we all come together and support our police. There are things to be reviewed and considered and it’s nothing to be afraid of.”
“It’s really a wonderful thing that this is over now, it’s been a very stressful time ... and getting back to normal will be lovely.”
#sydneysiege hostage Louisa Hope: it's 'a wonderful thing' that this inquest is over and we can move on. https://t.co/iASy0Zd72H pic.twitter.com/AHSCvkfe4Z
— Sky News Australia (@SkyNewsAust) May 24, 2017
She also “gave a little shout-out” to Tony King of the NSW Police Association outside the court this afternoon. King had criticised the inquest as being unfairly adversarial towards police.
#sydneysiege hostage Louisa Hope: it's to necessary for us to critically analyse all our govt departments. MORE: https://t.co/iASy0Zd72H pic.twitter.com/kaEQ5FANYk
— Sky News Australia (@SkyNewsAust) May 24, 2017
“I was concerned for him when I saw him on Monday as he reflected on feeling the pressure of what might be discussed at the report here at the inquest. What I’d like to say about that is we don’t at all feel that the police are under attack or unnecessarily harassed, I hope. I’d like to encourage him ...
“I’d just like to say that, when it comes to something like the coroner’s report, it is necessary that we have critical analysis around all of our institutions and government analysis and critical analysis is not necessarily criticism.”
The clip below shows the size of the media pack at the court.
Former Lindt siege hostage Louisa Hope addresses media following inquest @newscomauHQ #lindtsiege #sydneysiege #lindtinquest pic.twitter.com/mZ77viWMlW
— Megan Palin (@Megan_Palin) May 24, 2017
Thomas Zinn, Tori Johnson’s partner, has said during the course of the 18-month coronial inquest “one shocking discovery followed the next”.
“Soon it became apparent that we were not simply fighting for the truth of the circumstances of Tori and Katrina’s deaths. Rather, we were confronted with systematic failures of various authorities who, at times, were confused, ill-informed, unprepared and under resourced to deal with Monis.
“While we have been shocked by these failures, I would like to make clear that our family has high regard and respect for the officers who put their lives at risk after waiting so long for orders to act, and we acknowledge the grief and trauma that they have experienced.”
Speaking outside the coronial inquest, Zinn said “the pain deep in our hearts from losing Tori is as strong now as it was in December 2014”.
“Everyone who knew Tori would agree that we lost a guardian angel that night.”
A summary of the coroner’s findings from my colleague, Ben Doherty:
Police should have stormed the Lindt cafe as soon as Man Haron Monis began shooting, state coroner Michael Barnes has found in his inquiry into the Sydney siege: in the 10 minutes they delayed, hostage Tori Johnson was forced to kneel on the floor and was murdered by the gunman.
Islamist extremist Man Monis, brandishing a shotgun and claiming he was an Isis operative with explosives in his backpack, took 18 people hostage inside the Lindt cafe on the morning of 15 December 2014.
Seventeen hours later, just after 2am, with negotiations having foundered and his behaviour growing increasingly erratic, Monis fired his first shot, in the direction of escaping hostages.
The coroner said that action should have been the cue to police to forcibly end the siege, which the new New South Wales commissioner of police agreed with.
Delivering his findings from the 18-month inquest into the siege deaths, Barnes said: “I conclude that after a brief period to allow officers to gather information, an emergency action should have been initiated following the first shot of Monis at 2.03am.
“That made it clear there was little to no chance of resolving the siege and those within the cafe were at an extreme risk of harm. The 10 minutes that lapsed without decisive action by police was too long.
“Tori Johnson was executed in the meantime, before the decision to entered the cafe was made.”
The full statement from Gladys Berejiklian.
NSW Premier @GladysB statement on the Lindt Café Siege Inquest #sydneysiege pic.twitter.com/ljFHd2Lmh3
— Political Alert (@political_alert) May 24, 2017
Mick Fuller, who was the first commander at the siege, said on 2GB Barnes had made some very valid comments about the police negotiations and early intervention when dealing with terror incidents: “[We] hadn’t faced a similar event to this.”
He said other countries were still learning from the Sydney siege, and that “prevention and disruption” were key.
With regard to Monis being out on bail, Fuller said police provided a brief of evidence.
“We are a mature, honest and transparent organisation, and our highs and lows of Lindt cafe are there and it’s up to me to not just be sorry for the loss of the two lives but to make sure that we’re in the best place to protect the people of NSW.”
Fuller had earlier told ABC that police were getting “poor advice” during the siege when Tori Johnson was placed on his knees in a position of execution.
“At that time I can only assume they felt they were in a cycle of contained negotiation and were hoping that was their best outcome. They were getting poor advice from people that lead them to commit to something which turned out to be the wrong strategy at the time.”
Updated
The Lindt cafe inquest: by the numbers
Michael Barnes’ 495-page report of findings and recommendations is now online. It reflects the exhaustiveness of the 18-month inquest:
- 36 police officers were part of Strike Force Verum, the team assembled to assist Barnes in his investigation
- It completed 10,776 investigative tasks and took 1,130 statements as at 8 May 2017
- The assisting solicitor sent or received approximately 24,000 emails relating to the inquest
- The first sitting day of court was 29 January 2015
- A total of 110 sitting days in open court were held
- 118 witnesses (103 evidence, 15 expert) appeared across all public hearing segments
- 691 members of the public were recorded to have attended (some attended on multiple occasions)
- 118 journalists were registered to attend
- The transcript across all public sitting days totalled 8,124 pages
- The brief of evidence approximately totalled 68,399 pages
Updated
The NSW police commissioner, Mick Fuller, has conceded armed officers should have stormed the Lindt cafe earlier to rescue the hostages from the Sydney siege in December 2014.
The new commissioner acknowledged it was a mistake to wait but said there had still been “great hope” that police could negotiate a way in without loss of life.
“In hindsight, as with everything, we know we should have gone in earlier,” he told ABC’s Four Corners in a pre-recorded interview released after the NSW coroner, Michael Barnes, delivered his findings on Wednesday into the terror incident.
“It does not guarantee there will not be a loss of life ... but clearly a deliberate action is a much more professional action and a lower risk in terms of emergency action.”
Fuller told Sydney radio station 2GB after the findings were handed down that police had learned from the siege two-and-a-half years ago.
“We will certainly look closely at the 45 recommendations, with a view of making sure we’re in a better place,” he said.
“That’s why we (NSW police) need to evolve because, unfortunately, the terrorists evolve as well.”
Fuller assumed command of NSW police in March this year. He was first commander during the Lindt cafe siege.
Updated
The coroner’s report includes testimonies of Dawson’s and Johnson’s characters by their family members. Barnes called them “touching” and encouraged people to read them to get a sense of their tragically unrealised potential.
Impossible to read this part of the coroner's report and not cry.
— Bevan Shields (@BevanShields) May 24, 2017
Thomas Zinn writes about his partner, victim Tori Johnson #sydneysiege pic.twitter.com/LPvtJdA4ld
In this statement, Johnson’s partner of 13 years, Thomas Zinn, writes of the dreams they’d had as a couple of moving to the country, building a house and getting a dog:
“That simple. We already had found the meaning of our life – our love for each other.”
Johnson dreamed of becoming an architect and had started to build a model for their future house. “It is still sitting in our living room. He had told me it would have a huge surprise and he obviously could not tell me what it was – I will never know what he meant.”
Updated
The NSW premier, Gladys Berejiklian, has responded to the completion of the inquest into the deaths arising from the siege, calling it “an important step along the path to recovery”.
In a statement, she acknowledged the difficulty of the process for the families, and commended the bravery of police and first responders to the incident that “devastated” the state.
“We will also never forget the ordeal suffered by the surviving hostages. The outpouring of grief that saw a sea of flowers grow in Martin Place is still palpable.”
She said the state government would “take the lessons learned” and thoroughly review the findings.
Updated
Systemic improvements to authorities’ ability to respond to future terrorist events would do nothing to alleviate the grieving for Dawson and Johnson, said Barnes. “I am powerless in that regard,” he said.
He then presented the following findings:
- Tori Johnson, the first fatality of the Sydney siege, died immediately on Tuesday 16 December from a gunshot wound to the head.
- Man Haron Monis died from multiple gunshot wounds when police returned fire after having stormed the cafe.
- Katrina Dawson died in the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital from mortal wounds sustained by ricocheting bullets as she sought safety on the floor.
“Those are my findings. I authorise the publication of the report that I have prepared. I close this inquest.”
Updated
Barnes said commentary that the Australian Defence Force should have assumed responsibility for the siege was “simplistic and unrealistic”. The threshold for armed domestic action was set appropriately and not met in the case of the Lindt cafe siege.
He did find basis for concern about impediments in information sharing between particularly state and federal authorities.
For example, the Australian Psychological Society’s code of ethics did not permit psychologists to disclose information to law enforcement and security agencies about “generalised threats of violence or harm”.
He recommended that this be relaxed and that NSW state privacy laws that set a “very high threshold” to Asio’s rights to request information be reviewed.
Updated
The families of Johnson and Dawson have criticised communication they received from police as the siege was unfolding and they responded to news that their loved ones were being held hostage. Those complaints were upheld by Barnes, who found police’s liaison with family to have been in many ways inadequate in minimising their understandable distress.
The family reception centre was inappropriately situated and inadequately equipped. Hostages’ families were given “inappropriate and inadequate briefing”. Dawson’s family was singled out for having been “in some respects treated inappropriately”, with information about her death “unduly delayed”.
Barnes recommended that NSW police come up with a comprehensive policy as to family liaison within such high-risk situations.
Barnes: Dawson's death a 'terrible accident'
Barnes acknowledged the difficulty of the decision to storm the cafe, “one no commander would want to face”, but found issues with the police’s escalation of the situation.
Police waited 10 minutes to storm the cafe after Monis fired his first shot at 2.03am, even though, at that point, it was clear there was “little to no chance” of resolving the siege and hostages were at extreme risk of harm.
There were also “unnecessary” devices deployed, with the 11 flash-bangs thrown in the cafe producing 99 explosions that were “counter-productive”.
The use of firearms by TOU officers storming the cafe was lawful and reasonable, he found, but “tragic” as it were the fragments of police bullets that struck and killed Katrina Dawson.
“[Officers] did not fire indiscriminately or excessively. ... The officers could not have seen her or done anything to enhance the safety consistent with their primary imperative to incapacitate Monis. Her death was a terrible accident which occurred after Monis had left the officers with no option other than to storm the cafe.”
Updated
Barnes found that police commanders’ conclusion that a deliberate action was not warranted was based on flawed advice that Monis did not pose a significant threat and that the mood inside the cafe was calm. The testimony of hostages to the inquest unequivocally contradicted this.
Jarrod Morton-Hoffman spoke to Four Corners about his terrifying ordeal as Monis’ mouthpiece when the gunman, rattled by the proximity of police to the cafe early on in the siege, ordered him to call 000 to tell them to keep their distance.
That harrowing call was played on Four Corners:
He’s going to shoot someone. ... Please, please, very quickly, two minutes or he’s shooting someone. He has a gun pointed at someone right now.
Louisa Hope, held at gunpoint, remembered being “really convinced this was going to be it for me”.
Monis made moves again to shoot Hope when three hostages escaped from the cafe and he thought police had stormed the stronghold. Morton-Hoffman told him: “The police didn’t break in, they just ran out.”
“His quick thinking just to tell the truth about what actually happened, I think really saved my life,” said Hope.
One of the three escaped hostages, Paolo Vassallo, told Four Corners he told tactical police: “What are you guys doing? He is going to kill someone.”
All three were interviewed at length by police. Vassallo said they told them Monis was working for Isis and was prepared to kill.
They should have used that as an opportunity to get information about what was happening inside the cafe , and they didn’t – they just simply didn’t. They didn’t pass on the information. It kills me, it really does.
Updated
On the possibility of a deliberate action by police, Barnes referred to evidence of senior Tactical Operations Unit officers and UK policing experts that it would have been less risky than the emergency action police opted for instead.
On three occasions of the night of 15 December, officers seeking approval for a DA plan were knocked back by their superiors. Simon Chesterman, the British police expert, said he was unable to see any “rational basis” for those decisions.
Barnes said evidence at the inquest had pointed to a DA increasing police’s chances of taking the hostage taker by surprise. “That said, it bears repeating, all forced entries entail a very considerable risk.”
He said commanders’ reluctance to consider a DA were reasonable especially given the possibility Monis had a bomb could not be discounted. But they were lulled into a false sense of security by the advice of experts, negotiators and the consultant psychiatrist that the situation was calm and that Monis was “merely grandstanding”.
“As the day wore on and the identity of the hostage taker, his crimes and his psychopathology became known, they undoubtedly took comfort from the fact that although Monis had made threats of violence, nobody in the stronghold had been killed or injured.
“It is now appears they were wrong to do so.”
The primary trigger set by police to initiate their emergency action – the death or serious injury of a hostage – was much criticised by hostages and victims’ families, but Barnes found it to be appropriate when taken in tandem with the lower threshold of secondary trigger: the “imminent or immediate threat” of death or serious injury.
He said questions remained as to whether the EA should have been activated when the lower threshold was met, but the evidence of police forward commanders suggested they did not have the necessary guidance to make the call.
“I conclude that the commanders had insufficient guidance to help them assess whether the secondary, intangible trigger – the imminent risk of Monis’ killing or injuring a hostage – had escalated to a point where it outweighed the risk associated with a forced entry.”
The possibility that Monis was carrying a bomb “effectively negated” their ability to apply the secondary trigger, Barnes said.
He recommended that the Australia New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency and the Australia New Zealand Counterterrorism Committee review their guidelines for the deployment of police to high-risk situations to give commanders more guidance as to how to assess imminent or immediate risk.
Summary of findings
Siege response
- The “contain and negotiate” police response to the siege failed.
- Police commanders underestimated the risk siege taker Man Haron Monis posed.
- There was some confusion around the lines of command.
Involvement of top cops
- There is nothing to suggest senior officers Jeff Loy or Cath Burn inappropriately interfered in the siege response.
- It was unwise of then Commissioner Andrew Scipione to make a suggestion an online video be deleted without discussing it with relevant officers of informing himself of the consequences.
Adequacy of attempted negotiations
- No progress was made whatsoever during the siege.
- Negotiators received little, if any, specialist training about how to deal with terrorists.
Consultant psychiatrist
- The consultant psychiatrist’s role in the siege was “suboptimal”.
- He made erroneous and unrealistic assessments of what was occurring in the stronghold.
- He gave ambiguous advice.
- He was permitted to go beyond his area of expertise to give advice about Islamic terrorism.
Sniper issues
- Snipers should not be criticised for not taking a shot at Monis as they could not have safely resolved the siege.
- Snipers and commanders believed police did not have lawful authority to shoot Monis because they believed he did not pose an imminent danger to hostages.
- This was an unduly restrictive view of their powers.
- Special powers available to police responding to terror incidents should include more clearly defined rights to use force.
Nature and timing of forced entry into the cafe
- Initiating a deliberate action to storm the cafe before Monis made clear his intention to kill anybody would have posed unavoidable risks.
- The fact that a deliberate action would have involved risk does not necessarily mean it should not have been approved, authorised and initiated.
- By entering the stronghold at a time of their choosing, tactical police would have increased their chances of surprising the hostage taker and fast reducing the risk to hostages.
- Commanders had good reason to conclude a deliberate action was not warranted, even though that assessment was based on flawed advice.
- The reluctance to initiate a deliberate action that could have led to the deaths of Monis and the hostages was understandable based on the information commanders were given.
Updated
On the role of the two snipers positioned in Martin Place, Barnes said there was ambiguity over their ability to act. Though they were armed and equipped in accordance with standards, that was nonetheless insufficient because of the challenges of the “unique situation”.
The snipers could not have shot Monis without “unacceptable risks” to hostages. The glass of the windows at which they were positioned was later found to have been too thick and hard to shoot through.
Even had this not been the case, said Barnes, there was only one possible opportunity to shoot Monis before he killed Tori Johnson: a 10-minute period commencing at about 7.38pm.
Part of a person was visible through one of the windows overlooking Martin Place, but the snipers positioned in the Westpac building were not convinced that it was Monis, nor that shooting him would not endanger any hostages.
The snipers should not be criticised for not taking a shot at Monis. They could not have safely resolved the siege.
Updated
Barnes found that negotiators with the NSW police force received “little, if any” specialist training in how to deal with terrorists, and recommended that this be addressed.
He said information was broadcast by media that had the potential to compromise hostages’ safety and undermine police negotiations – not deliberately, but because there was “no comprehensive arrangement” for communicating the risks to journalists.
“There was no evidence that any media outlet would not refrain from publishing material if it knew that doing so could compromise the police response to an ongoing terrorist incidents.”
Barnes recommended that the police commissioner seek an agreement with news media to confer over publishing specific material in an ongoing high-risk situation.
Barnes has just concluded handing down his report at the John Maddison Tower in Sydney. My colleague Ben Doherty is at the scene for response from victims’ families and surviving hostages – we will bring those to you as soon as possible.
In the meantime, I’ll continue going over Barnes’ dense and comprehensive findings and recommendations.
Updated
Barnes says the consultant psychiatrist called in by police on the afternoon of the siege overstepped his advisory role, in part because of an absence of relevant policy. There was a lack of understanding of the appropriate limits by all concerned:
“The consultant psychiatrist’s role at the siege was suboptimal. He was giving advice about tactics. He made erroneous and unrealistic assessments of what was occurring in the stronghold. He gave ambiguous advice. And he was permitted to go beyond his area of expertise to give advice about Islamic terrorism.”
He said the role of any psychological adviser called in to assist in such a situation needed to be more clearly defined, and bolstered by a “more diverse panel of experts” so as to reduce the likelihood of individuals’ “expanding their role” and giving advice outside their area of expertise.
Barnes: Johnson killed as police wavered over strategy
Barnes has discussed police consideration of a “deliberate action” strategy that would have allowed them to enter the stronghold at a time of their choosing, as opposed to the “emergency action” taken in response to action by the terrorist.
Barnes said a “DA” should have been given more consideration and initiated. “By entering the stronghold at a time of their choosing, tactical police increased their chances of surprising the hostage taker and fast reducing the risk to hostages. This approach is safer for the tactical police and safer for the hostages.
“That said, it bears repeating, all forced entries entail very considerable risk.”
There was also a fatal delay in executing the EA, he said. Police should have entered the cafe as soon as Monis fired his first shot at 2.03am, not 10 minutes later as they did.
“That made it clear there was little to no chance of resolving the siege, and those within the cafe were at an extreme risk of harm.
“The 10 minutes that lapsed without decisive action by police was too long. Tori Johnson was executed in the meantime before the decision to entered the cafe was made.”
Updated
Two snipers set up across Martin Place from the siege did not fire at Monis because they felt they were not legally permitted, Barnes says.
“Throughout the siege, the snipers and the police commanders believed that police did not have lawful authority to shoot Monis because they conceded he did not pose an imminent or immediate danger to the hostages.
“That was, in my opinion, an unduly restrictive view of their powers, and an underestimation of the risk the hostages face.”
Hostages couldn’t talk to police negotiators, Barnes has found.
“Eight calls by hostages to a number they had been told would connect them with a negotiator were not answered. An unknown number of calls were also diverted to other telephones within the police forward command post. This was a significant failure in a basic component of siege management.”
Barnes: Police's negotiation strategy failed
Barnes says the police force’s primary strategy to “contain and negotiate” was appropriate: “Sadly, it failed.”
He said negotiators failed to adequately pursue opportunities to engage with Monis, not through “any lack of diligence and commitment”, but because their practice lacked the “sophistication necessary to generate options”. This, he conceded, was likely due to a lack of experience.
Barnes said it was “entirely appropriate” for police to refuse Monis’ demands to be broadcast on radio, but options could have been explored.
“A compromise could have been explored, such as an offer to let a released hostage read a statement prepared by Monis and vetted by police. The opportunity to use this and to foster engagement with Monis was not sufficiently considered.”
Police could have also communicated better with hostages. The failure to do so increased their sense of abandonment, he said.
Barnes said negotiators failed to undertake such assessments and no procedures in place to do so. He recommended that the NSW police force conduct a review of negotiators’ training and accreditation and “consider drawing on international experience”.
As the siege unfolded, deputy commissioner Catherine Burn had spoken confidently of the police negotiators, which she said were “world class”.
Barnes says the command system “generally worked well” during the response to the siege, with the transition out of first response, and later from a routine high-risk situation to a terrorist incident, both going ahead as planned. Some uncertainty about reporting lines has been addressed by recommendations.
The role of senior executive officers of the police force came under some scrutiny in the inquest, with then police commissioner Andrew Scipione, deputy commissioner Catherine Burn, and then acting deputy commissioner Jeffrey Lloyd called on to give evidence to that end.
Barnes says there is a “clear dividing line” between executive officers’ responsibility to “manage upwards and outwards”, and that of operational incident commanders to respond to a specific terrorist incident.
“It is not [executive officers’] role to second-guess operational decisions because they will almost never have enough information to safely do so unless some glaring error or omission comes to their attention.”
Barnes found no evidence of inappropriate operational involvement by Lloyd or Burn.
Of the text messages deleted by Burn, Barnes said they contained “nothing of significance”, though it would have been preferable for them retained.
He said it was “probably unwise” for Lloyd to send an email suggesting that a YouTube video be deleted, as it could have been reasonably construed as a direction about an operational matter.
“It is plain that no harm was done by the former commissioner’s email, but it does illustrate the type of risks that can arise from executive involvement in operational matters.”
Coroner’s finding: Siege was a terrorist incident
Experts on terrorism, radicalisation and the Islamic State gave evidence that informed Barnes’ finding on whether or not the Lindt cafe siege was a terrorist incident.
It remains unclear whether he had had any direct contact with Isis “to prosecute its bloodthirsty agenda”, Barnes says, or capitalised on its reputation to “bolster his impact in pursuit of his own ends”.
“Either way, he adopted extreme violence with a view to influencing public opinion concerning Australia’s involvement in armed conflict in the Middle East. That clearly brings his crimes within the accepted definition of terrorism. The siege was a terrorist incident.”
Monis had pledged allegiance to Isis in November 2014, the month before the siege, in response to its call for “lone wolves” to align themselves with its agenda through independent attacks.
Updated
Barnes has referenced omissions in information-sharing between authorities that led to Monis being granted bail. He said the decision to do so was reasonable “in view of the limited information provided”, but called for those gaps in communication, and particularly barriers to accessing details of commonwealth offences by state agencies, to be addressed.
“Barriers to the free exchange of criminal history information among national and state-based law enforcement and prosecuting authorities have the potential to adversely impact upon the effectiveness of those agencies, as occurred in this case.”
Barnes has recommended that the Law Safety Council develop a mechanism to ensure police and prosecutors across all jurisdictions can access all relevant information on criminal history, including bail.
Updated
Coroner's finding: Monis knew what he was doing
Barnes has accepted the evidence of an “eminent psychiatrist” who reviewed Monis’ medical records that he knew what he was doing when he took hostages.
Monis was “not suffering from a diagnosable, categorical psychiatric disorder that deprived him of the capacity to understand the nature of what he was doing when he staged the siege”, says Barnes:
“He was not psychotic, although he almost certainly had a severe personality disorder. Monis undertook the siege in a controlled, planned and methodical manner, marked by deliberation and choice.”
Updated
Barnes seems at pains to convey the seriousness of the situation that police were responding to.
If any aspects of the force’s best efforts were not quite good enough, this report attempts to identify how and why. However, it will not and should not be used to blame particular officers for outcomes beyond their control ...
When critiquing the police response, it is important to remember that right from the outset, 18 lives were imperilled.”
The inquest was not a commission of inquiry into counterterrorism or siege management in general, and as such Barnes’ report cannot presume to prescribe what should happen in all future sieges or terrorist attacks, he says.
Though it highlights deficiencies in the response, Barnes stresses that only Monis was to blame for the deaths and injuries that occurred as a result of the siege:
All of the blame for those rests on the shoulders of Man Monis. He created the intensely dangerous situation. He maliciously executed Tori Johnson ... Monis deserves to be the sole focus of our condemnation.”
Barnes’ report contains 45 recommendations directed at commonwealth and state ministers, Australian and international policing organisations, the NSW police force and the NSW DPP.
His key findings include:
- Monis’ state of mental health at the time of the siege
- The decision to grant him bail
- Whether or not the siege was a terrorist incident
- The involvement of the executive members of the police force and the siege response
- The adequacy of the attempted negotiations
- The nature and timing of the forced entry into the stronghold
- Family liaison
- And the involvement of commonwealth agencies.
Updated
Barnes has acknowledged that the police response was governed by the mistaken belief that Monis was armed with a bomb.
How this understanding came about was reported on by Four Corners. One of the first officers to arrive at the scene of the Lindt cafe reported having seen a curled wire coming out of Monis’ backpack, an observation that shaped the entire operation.
A tactical officer known as Officer B told the inquest that he had been told by an escaped hostage that wires were visible out of Monis’ backpack. Paolo Vassallo – one of the three who managed to flee from the cafe before the siege ended in gunfire – denied this aggressively.
“That never came up in any conversation at all, believe me. I never saw any wires at the time.”
Barnes has said initial efforts to clear the area around the cafe on Martin Place were swift and effective, and commended the officers who stormed the stronghold: “[They] knew Monis was armed with a gun he would almost certainly use against them ...
“The bravery of these officers inspires all. It is difficult to appreciate or even describe.”
But if the inquest is to to be effective in crystallising lessons for the future, Barnes says, deficiencies in the response to the siege must be identified, “no matter how comfortable and distasteful critiquing the performance of such brave men may be”.
Dozens of lives hung on commanders’ decisions over those 17 hours, he said, and they have since come under intense scrutiny: “Those commanders must live with the outcome of their decisions, the likes of which their critics will never need to make.”
Updated
Barnes: Hostages endured 'torture' from Monis, a 'vicious maniac'
Barnes has begun by observing the “terrible distress” caused by the “horrendous events” in the Lindt cafe, most grievously the deaths of Tori Johnson and Katrina Dawson.
He extended his condolences to their families and encouraged people to read “touching” testimonials put forward as to their character. “They had their lives truly curtailed by a vicious crime but their undoubted potential could be realised.”
Barnes has also recognised the bravery of the surviving hostages, whose testimonies were vital to the inquest’s proceedings.
The terror they endured could fairly be described as torture. Monis oscillated between feigning regard for their welfare and threatening to blow them apart ... They had entered a familiar environment, only to find it transformed into a prison run by a vicious maniac. Public recognition of their suffering and the extraordinary courage some demonstrated is warranted.”
NSW Police Deputy Commissioner Dave Hudson arrives at the #sydneysiege inquest - He's head of counter-terrorism pic.twitter.com/8Czpoon89P
— Andrew Griffits (@andrewgriffits) May 24, 2017
NSW State Coroner Michael Barnes has just entered the court room. You can watch him hand down his findings live on the coroner’s court website. A digital finding of the report will be posted online at about 11.30am.
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Beyond the ODPP’s decision to grant Monis bail, the inquest’s focus has been on the police response to the siege. The evidence put forward has been held up as evidence of police’s incompetence by the families of Katrina Dawson and Tori Johnson in particular. Indeed, the NSW Police Association felt moved to publicly defend police before “the history of the Lindt cafe siege is written as a story of a botched police operation” – to an extent, prejudging Barnes’ findings.
A particular sticking point, as revealed in the Four Corners report, was the decision made by police not to enter the so-called “stronghold” until a hostage was killed or seriously injured, according to the approved “Emergency Action” plan.
Angus Dawson, Katrina Dawson’s brother, said the fact that the level was set at the death or serious injury of a hostage was “staggering”.
“These are people they should be protecting, they shouldn’t wait for them to be impacted in any way,” said Jane Dawson, Katrina’s mother. “They should be saving them from death or serious injury.”
It was also condemned by surviving hostages.
“The first time I heard that evidence, I was sitting calmly in the court room and inside my head was exploding with ‘That can’t possibly be the case’,” said Louise Hope, visibly tearful on Four Corners. “Just, really? There’s no explanation I can make that can fully express how shocking that news was for me.”
The inquest revealed that officers had sought approval for a “Deliberate Action” plan that would allow them to respond preemptively, should the opportunity to do so arise – but on three occasions on the night of 15 December, they were knocked back by their superiors.
Simon Chesterman, a British police expert who gave testimony, said he was unable to see any “rational basis” for these decisions. As a police commander, he said, he would have been “absolutely screaming out” for a DA to be in place.
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Prime minister Malcolm Turnbull has observed the timing of today’s coroner’s report in commenting on the threat posed to Australia by terrorism on the ABC.
The threat level remains unchanged at probable in the wake of the attack in Manchester, said Turnbull, though security arrangements for mass gatherings in Australia were under constant review.
He said intelligence services had halted a dozen major terrorist plots since September 2014, with 63 people arrested. “This is a constantly evolving, it’s a dynamic environment … We must be more agile than our enemies. So we have to learn from every incident ...
“Today, the coroner’s report on the Lindt cafe siege will be handed down and this is a moment too to reflect on the tragic loss of life there, of Tori Johnson and Katrina Dawson ... And again our heartfelt sympathies, condolences and prayers go to their families.”
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The fact Monis was on bail at the time of the siege was on Monday pointed to as “the fundamental driver of the deaths” resulting from the Lindt cafe siege by the NSW Police Association. Its acting president, Tony King, took issue with what he saw as the unfair targeting of police during the inquest “grandstanding” lawyers, particularly when the ODPP and bail decisions were shielded from scrutiny.
“This smacks of a double standard between the treatment of the legal fraternity and police officers,” he wrote in a post on the blogging site Medium in which he defended the police operation during the siege.
In Four Corners’ special report on Monday night, Monis’ lawyer, Manny Conditsis, said even he was surprised that Monis was granted bail in December 2013 after being charged with accessory to murder. “I told him his prospects were not good.”
Sandy Dawson, Katrina Dawson’s father, said the ODPP’s decision not to detain Monis was “extraordinary” and echoed King’s complaints about the apparent lack of transparency during the inquest and “very heavily redacted” documents put forward as evidence.
“You had people from the DPP in the witness box: ‘I don’t recall, I don’t recall, I don’t recall’. It was just extraordinary.”
NSW coroner Michael Barnes is due to report on his findings at 10am. Arguably the most important question he must answer is why Monis, with his criminal history, was on bail and free to take hostages.
Monis became known to police and Asio after arriving in Australia from Iran in 1996, but at the time of the siege in December 2014 had been assessed as posing no risk to national security.
He was accused of sexual assaults dating back as far as 2002 in relation to a “spiritual healing” business he had run in Burwood. In September 2013, he was convicted of sending offensive letters between 2007 and 2009 to the families of seven Australian soldiers killed in Afghanistan.
In December 2013, he was charged with being an accessory to murder of his ex-wife and was later found to have instigated the savage killing by his then-partner, Amirah Droudis. Both he and Droudis were released on conditional bail – one of the three occasions on which Monis was granted bail in the 12 months leading up to the siege.
Two months beforehand, in October 2014, Monis had been charged with a further 40 sexual assault charges against six women. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) had told police that there were not grounds to seek his detention.
When Monis walked into the Lindt cafe, he was on bail for for 43 counts of sexual assault as well as for being an alleged accessory to murder. A total of 18 calls had been made to the National Security Hotline about him in the week prior.
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What really happened in the Lindt cafe?
By dawn on Tuesday, 16 December 2014, Man Haron Monis’ 17-hour siege of the Lindt cafe on Martin Place had come to an end, and three people were dead: Monis, Tori Johnson and Katrina Dawson.
Today the New South Wales coroner, Michael Barnes, will hand down his findings into the deaths resulting from the siege, one of the most complex inquests in Australia’s history. It is hoped that his long-awaited report will bring victims’ families and survivors some closure, while also finalising any lessons to be learned for the police response.
Following reports of a “botched” operation – Dawson was killed by ricochet from a police bullet, while the delay to storm the cafe has also been questioned – the NSW Police Association is already on the defensive. On Monday the acting president Tony King called the inquest an “extravagant taxpayer-funded show trial”, led by “grandstanding” lawyers for the benefit of media, that undermined the professionalism and bravery displayed in the police response.
In particular, King was critical that the reasons for the decision to release Monis on bail (“the fundamental driver of the drivers”) were never scrutinised by the coroner, calling it indicative of a “double standard between the treatment of the legal fraternity and police officers”.
On Monday night, Tori Johnson’s partner was highly critical of what he characterised as the “great level of incompetence” of the police operation on the ABC’s Four Corners. Thomas Zinn said police evidence at the inquiry had caused him to lose faith in the institution.
It is hoped that Barnes’ findings will shed light on what, if anything, could have been done to prevent the tragic loss of life that arose from the siege, to ensure any mistakes are never repeated.
The report also represents the final formal chapter of a story that has been ongoing in Australia for two and a half years. Monis held a total of 18 people captive for 17 hours, every moment of which has been subjected to intense scrutiny. As well as lessons for the future, Barnes’ findings may bring some closure for those affected by the harrowing ordeal.
My colleague Ben Doherty is at the hearing in Sydney and will be reporting from there once Barnes has handed down his findings. In the meantime, we will begin by looking over the questions that remain to be answered.
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