The government announced its defence review this week amid much pre-advertising and hoopla. They have described it as epoch–making. “It’s the first review in a long time that hasn’t cut, but grows our defences,” said General Sir Richard Barrons, co-author of the report. “It marks one of the biggest changes in warfare and conflict in 150 years — it’s as if the atom bomb, the internet, aircraft, and armoured warfare came along at the same time.”
The report marks a step change in cyber, electro magnetic radiation, the use of drones and how British defence, and British society, will meet their challenge.
Behind the glossy print and dramatic pictures of the report brochure, old realities creep in. The report, chewed over by several ministries for many months more than intended, raises more questions than answers. The most pertinent questions are those of money, people and time.
Take time. All of the major UK reviews of the past 50 years have been overtaken by events within two to three years of printing. The 1980 review by John Nott — “the way ahead” review — was blown out of the water in 1982 by the Falklands conflict, which it had partly triggered. The elegant Strategic Defence Review of 1998, launched by the then defence secretary George Robertson, now lead author of the current review, was superseded by the 9/11 attacks in America and what followed.
There is a whiff of suspicion that the Treasury had got its hands on the review in the last dash to publication — the mixture of styles in which it is written seem a dead giveaway
The money is the biggest and most immediate sticking point for the new Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Keir Starmer has made a big play that he has agreed 2.5% of GDP should go to defence by 2027, giving “extra money” to pay for the expansion. This should go up to 3% “in the next parliament”, according to the MoD and No 10 - but that could be anywhere between 2028 and 2033. The terms of the pledge seem highly flexible, to put it politely. First we were told it was an “ambition” , then “nailed on” and by the time the review was launched in the late afternoon it appeared to be reduced to the rank of “an aspiration”.
There is a whiff of suspicion that the Treasury had got its hands on the review in the last dash to publication — the mixture of styles in which it is written seem a dead giveaway. All will be revealed, we are told, when Rachel Reeves unveils the Comprehensive Spending Review on June 11th; it will state what the Mod has in its budget for the next three years. This will not be as much as hoped, as the SDR is full of phrases about new assets and programmes, from expanding Army numbers, cadet recruiting and some weaponry, “depending on economic circumstances, plans for growth, and pending further study.”
The money row has broken out less than 24 hours after the SDR launch. A joint endeavour by the Defence Correspondents Association has discovered that Mark Rutte, Nato’s secretary general, says all 32 allies should aim to spend 3.5% of GDP on defence in very short order. Such is the perceived threat from Russia and the concern over European security — not just in Ukraine, but in Poland, the Baltic states and Finland.
Rutte is expected to make the demand of all Nato members at a summit in The Hague on June 24-25. He will say that the allies should think of spending 5% of GDP on security, resilience and defence by 2030. Of this, 3.5% should go on defence itself and 1.5% on ancillary research, intelligence services, pensions and welfare for the services. Britain currently claims to be spending about 2.3% of GDP on defence — but this includes welfare and pensions, intelligence and the nuclear programme, including submarines, weaponry and research. Strip out intelligence, welfare and nuclear and the UK spends something around 1.2 to 1.4 % of GDP on the basic nitty gritty of defence and the armed forces.
Mark Rutte is understood, according to well placed sources, to have agreed to press for European allies to move to 5% to prove their capability of their own defence, as laid out explicitly in Article III of the Nato founding treaty, following a number of exchanges with Donald Trump. The deal is that Nato Europeans pony up for their own defence and only then will America remain committed to the alliance, though with fewer forces stationed on the European continent.
Rutte is expected to spell out these terms when he meets Keir Starmer next Monday. He will point out that far from being a Nato leader in Europe, Britain is the last to sign up to the 3.5% pledge out of all the major European allies, save Spain.
This underlines a structural problem for the way the UK approaches defence policy planning. The veto powers of the Treasury appear to have dented the second George Robertson review of 2025 as it did his first of 1998. The Treasury is sure to have its say, but defence planning for the next ten years cannot be ruled by the forecasting of the Treasury, the OBR and the Cabinet Office. It is rather like believing the outbreak of the First World War was governed by railway timetables in central Europe.
Ukraine shows how tactics and the use of weapons change
Ukraine shows how tactics and the use of weapons change and are reshaped over months. Take the switch from radio-controlled to fibre optic drones and Russia’s switch from artillery to mass drone and glide bomb bombardment of civilian areas. Take the sheer novelty of last weekend’s attacks taking out a third of Russia’s strategic bomber force using cheap commercial drones and basic container lorries in an ingenious way, then enhancing the shock effect with social media. How could Britain cope with such an attack on some of our rural RAF bases or container ports, I asked during the presentation of the SDR . Not easily, was the answer. We might rely on the mighty radars of the Navy’s Type 45 destroyers — of which only four are in operation — and for the rest look for early warnings from allies.
Among the most chilling pages in the review is page 30, headed “Technologies that are redefining warfare”. It lists nine developments: artificial intelligence, robotics and autonomy, enhanced precision weapons, directed-energy weapons, hypersonic missiles, space-based capabilities, quantum, cyber threats and engineering biology.
Autonomous weapons — yes, the killer robots of comic books — worry our Cyber Force and electronic warfare commanders
These are already on the horizon, some well over it. Autonomous weapons — yes, the killer robots of comic books — worry our Cyber Force and electronic warfare commanders. Biological weapons, viruses or genetic engineering mechanisms that take out selected ethnic groups based on DNA are nightmarish, but very possible.
The era of space warfare has begun with whole systems of communication and connectivity vulnerable by action from space. The Chinese have already used a satellite to smash another in a dogfight, creating a huge amount of debris around planet Earth.
The warning about quantum computing is stark. It can break encryption and render guidance systems like GPS all but useless. “It’s possible it will enable spotting and locating every submarine across the world,” a submariner remarked gloomily to me this week. The Chinese are believed to be well ahead in quantum, satellite and hypersonic warfare.
Any combination of the nine technologies listed as redefining warfare could make the SDR plans obsolete before the decade is out
Any combination of the nine technologies listed as redefining warfare could make the SDR plans obsolete before the decade is out.
Fundamental to the SDR is the issue of people. The armed services are still losing more than they are recruiting and are critically undermanned in several key areas. The report suggests several ways to boost numbers and win support for the services: expanding cadet forces by 30% to 250,000, improving housing and conditions, boosting reserves. The Australian idea of the “gap year short service commission” will be announced very soon. Medical standards for entry are to be lowered. The Army is to be grown from 70,000 to 76,000 regular soldiers, but only as economic circumstances allow.
Very little consideration is given to the changing shape, condition and outlooks of British society. We are witnessing, in common with most other industrial powers, the beginnings of a demographic wintering. We are ageing, as the human race is ageing. We are experiencing wintering faster than the US, but slower than Italy, Japan, South Korea or Serbia.
There are fewer workers in proportion to the unemployed and retired and there is a peculiar aspect of demographic wintering — an ugly expression at the best of times. This is the new age of anxiety where young people fear the future will be worse than the past, a mood boosted by the effect and aftermath of Covid. This has led to the increasing reluctance of some young people getting to work at all, especially in in public service. Once in work, there is a rising tendency to quit on grounds of anxiety.
This will affect recruiting and retention in the armed services and their equivalents such as the new Cyber Force. I asked a number of those involved in the SDR, civil servants, military and even the odd minister, how they addressed the effects of demographic wintering and how to mitigate them. Most said they had never heard of the concept.
Perhaps, as with the politics and funding of the review, they need to go on a very fast learning curve.
Robert Fox is defence editor
