A seemingly modest weapon has become a symbol of shifting military power: Iran’s Shahed‑136 drone. Currently used by Iran's ally Russia in Ukraine and by Iran in the Middle East, the weapon represents a new type of warfare that focuses on affordability and mass production rather than technological sophistication.
On paper, the Shahed‑136 is unremarkable. It spans barely 2.5 metres, is powered by an engine that looks more like that of a small car than a jet and relies on basic electronics – GPS, sensors and an autopilot module.
But its simplicity is its strength. While Washington and its allies invest in ultra‑connected, high‑end, un-manned aerial vehicles (UAV), Tehran is flooding the battlefield with a cheap and functional piece of equipment.
The geopolitical review Le Grand Continent places the cost of producing a Shahed at around €3,500 to €7,000 – much cheaper than Western drones. For instance the Switchblade drone series of US company Avinc carry a cost of between €10,000 and €100,000, while General Atomics’ MQ-9A Reaper sells for a staggering €330 million.
Intercepting one can require using Lockheed Martin's Patriot PAC‑3 missile – worth more than $4 million.
When the logistical strain of rearming and the years needed to replenish missile stocks are factored in, the disparity is even starker.
Iran is able to produce Shahed drones cheaply using aluminium, composites and mass-market components, with the manufacturing process resembling a car assembly line more than it does aerospace engineering.
Despite years of sanctions, the country’s automotive and mechanical sectors remain resilient and largely autonomous, with local firms fabricating engines, airframes and guidance modules. Labour and research costs are also a fraction of those in the West.
Long-term dilemma
For the United States and its partners, Iran’s resilience poses a long‑term dilemma. Their air‑defence networks were designed to confront high‑value targets such as ballistic missiles and advanced aircraft, rather than swarms of low‑cost drones.
The result is an unsustainable burn rate of interceptors during lengthy campaigns, while Iran is able to unleash wave after wave of drones.
Iran 'weakened but dangerous' as US air defence stocks face strain
Pentagon figures cited by US media suggest that munitions spending soared into double‑digit billions within the first two weeks of the Middle East war alone.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimated on 13 March that the total cost of the war had already mounted to $16.5 billion in the first 12 days.
Russian invasion
Shahed drones first gained notoriety in the first year of the Russian war against Ukraine. Tehran supplied Russia with the drones in the autumn of 2022, providing several hundred units initially assembled in Iran and shipped via clandestine routes.
These "kamikaze" UAVs, deployed in strikes on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, quickly proved effective at overwhelming air defences through sheer volume – earning the nickname "mopeds" for their distinctive engine noise.
Russia swiftly adapted the concept, acquiring technical designs, and started domestic production at a facility in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, by early 2023. This allowed mass manufacture of the renamed Geran-2 variant, using Iranian blueprints alongside local and imported components.
This shift enabled Moscow to launch more than 1,000 per week by 2025, integrating them into saturation tactics with decoys and missiles to exhaust Ukrainian interceptors.
Sites such as Defense News noted that Russian upgrades, including better anti-jamming tech honed in combat, have made the drones even deadlier, turning Tehran's low-cost export into a cornerstone of Russia's air campaign.
(with newswires)
