After a security forces operation in Chhattisgarh last week killed 27 Maoists, including Communist Party of India (Maoist) general secretary Basavaraju, there have been multiple media reports on India’s ‘war on Maoism’. The central government has vowed to “eliminate” Maoism by March 2026 through a multi-pronged strategy.
For better context and understanding of where the state stands in this crusade, Newslaundry interviewed Sundarraj Pattilingam, Inspector General of Police (Bastar Range) and a top cop spearheading the ongoing anti-Maoist operations in the region.
Originally from Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu, Sundarraj is a 2003 batch IPS officer of the Chhattisgarh cadre. He was first posted in Bastar district when he was 25 years old and has held multiple field postings in the area since then. Prior to his current role as IGP, he served as Deputy Inspector General of Police (anti-Naxal operations).
Edited excerpts from the interview:
How and when was Operation Kagar conceptualised?
The name Operation Kagar was never officially designated by the security forces. It originated purely through media speculation. In fact, the first time we officially named any anti-Naxal operation was during a 21-day combing operation in the Karregutta Hills, located along the border of Sukma district in Chhattisgarh and Bhadradri Kothagudem in Telangana. That operation was named Operation Black Forest.
Before 2024, none of our operations were given formal names. But over the years, we have been consistently working to dismantle the Naxal network, and recently, we’ve achieved significant breakthroughs. What was once seen as a never-ending conflict, where violent incidents were expected to continue indefinitely, has now reached a point where we’ve managed to shatter that long-held belief.
Through relentless efforts, we’ve hit targets that once seemed impossible. These successes have not only boosted the morale of our security forces but also restored public faith that Naxalism can indeed be eliminated. Our special units – DRG, Bastar Fighters, Special Task Force, and the CRPF’s COBRA unit – have been conducting regular, coordinated operations on the ground.
To address the security vacuum and establish permanent presence in once-inaccessible areas, we ramped up our infrastructure push. In 2024 alone, we set up 30 new security camps, and another 12 in the last five months – a total of 42 camps in just 18 months. To put that in context, earlier we used to open only about 12 to 14 camps in an entire year.
These camps are not just security installations; they’re catalysts for development. They are enabling the construction of roads and infrastructure, making remote regions accessible to both locals and security personnel. Even the Abujh Maad region – long considered an impenetrable Naxal stronghold – is now witnessing signs of progress.
A key development is the construction of National Highway 130D, which will connect Gadchiroli in Maharashtra to Narayanpur in Chhattisgarh, passing right through Maad. This highway is expected to open the floodgates to opportunities in employment, education, and overall regional development.In essence, this is not just a security operation, it’s a roadmap for lasting peace and prosperity.
How many Naxal cadres have surrendered or been killed since 2024?
There has been a sharp escalation in anti-Naxal operations over the past 17 months, leading to a significant rise in both casualties and surrenders among Naxal cadres. In 2023, there were only 69 encounters between security forces and Naxals in the Bastar range. However, this number jumped to 123 in 2024. From January to May 2025 alone, there have already been 49 encounters, indicating a clear intensification of operations. The number of Naxals killed has also risen significantly from just 20 in 2023 to 217 in 2024, and 184 more in the first five months of 2025.
Alongside this, there has been a notable spike in arrests and surrenders. In total, 1,335 Naxals have been arrested over the last 17 months – 929 in 2024 and 406 between January and May 2025. Similarly, 1,337 Naxals have surrendered during the same period, with 800 surrenders in 2024 and 537 in the last five months alone. These numbers point to a visible collapse in Naxal morale and operational strength, as more cadres either fall in action or choose to lay down arms in the face of sustained security force pressure.
How many personnel from various security forces – District Reserve Guard, Central Reserve Police Force, Commando Battalion for Resolute Action, etc – were deployed in the present anti-Naxal campaign? Why is the DRG at the forefront in the fight?
The DRG has emerged as the most formidable force in the anti-Naxal campaign, and for good reason. What sets the DRG apart is its unique composition; it is made up entirely of local youth and surrendered Naxals, all recruited from within Bastar. This 100 percent local recruitment gives the DRG a decisive edge. They are intimately familiar with the terrain, speak the local dialects fluently, understand tribal customs, and can navigate the dense forests and hilly landscapes with unmatched ease. They quite literally know the region like the back of their hand.
Formed in 2015, the DRG has proven to be a game-changer in counterinsurgency operations against Naxals. Over the years, their tactics have evolved significantly, and today they are equipped with state-of-the-art weapons and receive top-tier training. They have become the primary strike force in Bastar, often outperforming other units in terms of ground-level intelligence and swift execution of operations. Their local roots make them highly effective.
While I cannot share exact deployment figures due to operational sensitivity, I can confirm that there are at least 3,000 DRG personnel currently active in Bastar. Alongside them, specialised units from the CRPF, CoBRA, Special Task Force, and Bastar Fighters continue to play crucial supporting roles. But it is the DRG’s intimate knowledge of the region and their fearless engagement in the operations that makes them the tip of the spear in the ongoing campaign to dismantle the Naxal network.
What challenges are your forces currently facing on the ground? Terrain, intelligence gaps, local resistance, or misinformation campaigns?
One of the biggest challenges we face is the terrain itself. The forests in this region are extremely dense and treacherous. The enemy we’re up against know the area intimately and use that knowledge to their advantage, often setting up ambushes or disappearing into the landscape.
While our forces are well-trained and experienced, and we’ve developed effective strategies to navigate and counter these tactical challenges, there remains one threat for which solutions are still limited and that is Improvised Explosive Devices. IEDs are currently the most lethal and persistent threat on the ground. The majority of casualties and injuries suffered by our forces are due to IED blasts…What's even more concerning is that hundreds more are believed to still be buried in the area, hidden in terrain that is difficult to scan thoroughly.
This threat extends beyond our forces. Innocent civilians, including women and children, have also fallen victim to these hidden explosives. Even wild animals have stepped on IEDs and lost their lives. The scale of the danger is such that we estimate thousands of IEDs may have been planted in the jungles. In fact, in a recent press release, the Naxals themselves warned local people not to enter the Karregutta area, claiming they had heavily mined it with explosives.
Are you using surveillance drones or other high-tech equipment to track Naxals hiding deep in the jungles? Or is the intelligence primarily gathered through local networks and ground-level sources?
On record, I would like to state that we use all legally available resources at our disposal to enhance surveillance and ensure better operational outcomes. While I cannot disclose specific technical details for security reasons, tools like drone surveillance play a significant role in gathering real-time intelligence and can help prevent untoward incidents. There's nothing illegal about their use; these are part of modern policing and warfare methods. Our focus remains on using every lawful and effective means to ensure the safety of both our personnel and the local population.
What exactly happened during the Karregutta operation, where top Maoist leaders like Hidma and Deva were reportedly present? How did the security forces manage the encounter, what was the outcome, and how did Hidma manage to escape?
In any operation inside the jungle, results cannot be achieved just by doing a siege in the jungle. If things would have been so easy in the jungles, then Naxalism would have been eradicated a long time ago.
In such operations, we keep getting continuous intelligence inputs and information. For instance in the case of Basavraju, the head of CPI (Maoist), or the top commanders of Naxals anywhere in India who was neutralised by our forces in Abhujmad, it’s not like we are able to neutralise him on the basis of just one input. We continuously received hundreds of inputs about him and finally managed to neutralise him on May 21, 2025.
It’s important to understand that these operations are not linear; they are 360-degree actions involving multiple teams, sectors and coordinated movements. At Karregutta, we neutralised 31 Maoists and recovered a large cache of arms, ammunition and several key components of their underground war infrastructure. Among the recovered items were components for BGLs (grenade launchers), IED-making material, solar panels, and machines used in their arms factory. Essentially, we dismantled a major logistics and production hub deep inside the jungle.
Despite our best efforts and a well-executed operation in Karregutta, few Naxal cadres have managed to slip through, possibly due to the difficult terrain and their familiarity with the area. In such dense forest terrain, gaps, though minimal, can exist, and experienced Maoist commanders like Hidma or others often exploit those. In the jungle, even if you comb and siege the entire area, it doesn’t mean that it’s 100 percent secured.
So, while some high-value targets like Hidma may have escaped this time, the psychological and strategic impact of this operation is immense. The area has now been opened up for further action, and the Maoists have lost a key hideout, both tactically and symbolically. This is as much an intangible success as it is a tangible one.
In Karregutta, there are claims that several civilians were killed during the encounter. Other than that, human rights groups and local villagers allege that over 300 innocent tribals have been killed since 2024. How do you respond to this?
We haven’t killed any civilians at Karregutta. All of them were Naxal cadres. Over the past 30 years, more than 2,000 innocent tribals have been killed by Naxals. While security forces are often blamed for civilian deaths, these allegations are largely unfounded. None of our operations in recent years have been legally questioned or proven to be in violation of the law. Yes, there have been occasional allegations, but no substantial evidence has ever backed them.
In fact, it is often the Naxals themselves who spread misinformation, falsely claiming that we target civilians during our operations. While it is true that in a few unfortunate instances civilians have lost their lives in crossfire during encounters with Naxal, we do not hide these facts. We never falsely categorise such deaths as Naxals to keep our record clean. We acknowledge them for what they are – tragic losses of innocent villagers caught in the line of fire by Naxals.
During your ongoing operation, CPI (Maoist) general secretary Nambala Keshava Rao alias Basavaraju was killed. How was this achieved, and what is the importance of it?
Every operation in Bastar, whether short-range or long-range, comes with a unique set of challenges. The terrain is undulating, the forest cover is dense, and there are constant natural obstacles like river crossings. In these jungles, crossing even a single river becomes a major operational task.
Our personnel often have to counter not just the landscape, but also harsh weather conditions like thunderstorms, flooding of rivers, heavy rains, etc. Wild animal encounters, including attacks by bears, are also a real and recurring threat.
The physical demands are extreme. Walking through Bastar’s jungle terrain is nothing like walking on a plain road. What might be 10 kilometres in flatland feels like 20 in these forests. So, when our personnel trek 40 kilometres here, it’s equivalent to walking nearly 80 kilometres on a normal road. On top of that, there’s the constant threat of IEDs and ambushes lurking in the forest.
The elimination of Basavaraju came as a surprise to many, it was a moment of disbelief for many. The operation began on May 18 and concluded on May 21, during which Basavaraju and 26 other Naxals were killed in the encounter at Kudmel-Kalhaaja- Jatloor area in the jungles of Abhujmad. The death of Basavaraju was meant to be the climax of this long-running operation, but it has now become the pre-climax. A catch like Basavraj was expected to mark the final chapter, with the mission projected to reach its logical conclusion around March 2026. But that moment arrived earlier than anticipated.
His death is the biggest blow to Naxals. With his death, the organisation is in a pathetic state. While we are not underestimating their ability to inflict damage or plan violent acts, the reality is that left-wing extremism is breathing its last. Their operational strength has diminished drastically.
Let me be clear: We don’t take sadistic pleasure in killing. But this is a war. When they attack, we have no choice but to retaliate, or else we face casualties. Now, only a handful of senior cadres remain. It’s time they come forward and surrender. There’s no point in hiding in the jungle anymore. We assure them that if they surrender, they will be treated with fairness and dignity, in full accordance with the government’s surrender and rehabilitation policy.
There is a perception that the focus of security forces is more on eliminating top Naxal cadres rather than encouraging their surrender. What is your official stance on this?
Not at all. We are not some killers on a spree. We would be more than happy if top Naxals want to surrender themselves. Most of their top leaders are in the age group of 60-70 years and above. They must have realised that it’s high time to surrender. But it’s likely their ego or rigid ideology that’s holding them back from taking that step. We will welcome them if they surrender.
But if they choose to stay in the jungle and continue their violent activities, we will not allow that. We will take all necessary action to neutralise any remaining threat. The door to surrender is open to all, whether they are top central committee leaders, divisional commanders, or foot soldiers. But continuing down the path of violence will only end one way.
Can you share the names of top Maoist leaders who have been neutralised during the ongoing campaign to ‘eradicate’ Maoism by March 2026?
In 2025, several top Maoist leaders were neutralised as part of the intensified campaign to eradicate Naxalism by March 2026. Among them were Nambala Keshav Rao alias Basavaraju, considered the supreme commander of the CPI (Maoist), Vivek Chandri Yadav alias Prayag, and Ramchandra Reddy alias Chalapati. While Basavraju and Chalapati were eliminated in operations in Chhattisgarh, Yadav was killed in Jharkhand.
In addition, six other senior Maoist leaders, all members of the Central Committee, including Milind Teltumbde, were killed in encounters across Gadchiroli (Maharashtra), Kerala, Jharkhand, and Telangana. Four top cadres also died of age-related ailments in states such as Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand and Maharashtra.
Separately, 17 senior Naxal leaders were arrested between 2007 and 2023, and eight others surrendered between 2005 and 2019. In total, 38 top Naxal leaders have been taken out of the equation – some were killed in operations, others surrendered, and a few died due to age-related ailments.
Can you elaborate on your recent success in anti-Maoist operations
Our success is the result of a sustained and strategic commitment by the security forces to bring this decades-long conflict to a logical end. One of the biggest game-changers has been the consistent presence of security forces, backed by parallel government development initiatives in remote and previously inaccessible areas. The construction of roads and other infrastructure has not only improved connectivity but also dismantled the Naxals’ exclusive control over these territories. This has severely disrupted their supply chains and made movement and coordination difficult.
Earlier, Naxals would forcibly recruit locals, often coercing villagers into handing over their children to be trained as cadres. That pipeline has dried up. With new security camps established deep inside forested regions, Naxals are no longer able to hold meetings in villages or mobilise the local population as they once did. Their recruitment, once averaging 400–500 cadres a year, has now dropped to negligible levels.
The impact of this is clearly visible on the ground. Take the example of Basavaraju, the top commander and general secretary of the Maoists. During our recent operation, he had only 25–30 fighters providing him security – a stark contrast to earlier years when he reportedly moved with a three-tier security cordon. This sharp decline in manpower is not just symbolic, it reflects a genuine collapse in their organisational strength.
Who are the other active top Maoist leaders whose surrender or elimination is critical for dismantling the movement?
There are currently 15 top-ranking Maoist leaders who remain active, and their surrender is critical to achieving a complete end to Naxalism. Among them is Muppala Laxmanrao alias Ganapathy, the former general secretary of the CPI (Maoist). Other prominent names include Mullojula Venugopal alias Vivek alias Bhupati (Politburo member, Central Committee member, secretary of the Central Regional Bureau, and party spokesperson), Thippari Tirupati alias Devji (head of the Central Military Commission), and Mishir Besara alias Bhaskar (in charge of the Eastern Regional Bureau’s military wing and its spokesperson). Each of these four carries a reward of Rs 1 crore.
Additional senior leaders still at large include Kadri Satyanarayan Reddy alias Kosa (in charge and secretary of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee), Pullari Prasad Rao alias Chandranna (secretary, Telangana State Committee), Modem Balkrishna alias Balanna (Central Committee member and CRB member), Ganesh Uike (secretary, Odisha State Committee), Anil Da alias Toofan Da (secretary, Bihar-Jharkhand Special Area Committee), Gazrala Ravi alias Uday (member, Central Military Commission), Sabysachi Goswami alias Ajay (secretary, West Bengal Special Area Committee), K Rajchandra Reddy (secretary, North Sub-Zonal Bureau and spokesperson for the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee), Sujata alias Kalpana alias Sujata Akka alias Mainibai (in charge of the South Sub-Zonal Bureau and Secretary of the Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangathan), Thentu Lakshmi alias Narasimha Chalam (Central Committee member), and Madavi Hidma alias Hidmalu alias Santosh (Central Committee member and South Sub-Zonal Bureau commander).
Neutralising or securing the surrender of these senior cadres is essential to dismantling the remaining core of the Maoist insurgency.
How formidable is Hidma as an adversary?
Hidma is, in many ways, an overrated figure. Yes, he has been involved in almost every major Naxal attack against security forces since 2008, and we have suffered significant casualties in operations led by him. But that doesn’t mean he is invincible. If we can neutralise the top leadership of the Maoist movement, including someone like Basavaraju, the head of the entire organisation, then Hidma is no exception.
He was once the commander of PLGA Battalion-1, widely regarded as the most formidable guerrilla unit among the Naxalites. This battalion has access to elite weapons, most of which were looted from security forces over the years. Although Hidma has since been promoted and is no longer the official commander, he still operates closely with Battalion-1 and continues to influence its movements and strategy. This unit, along with company number-7 which is equipped with their strongest firepower, forms the backbone of their offensive capabilities. These battalions are their real hard fighting guerrillas.
Much of the aura around Hidma has been built on the strength of these battalions. He is a local tribal, and his name carries a certain weight in the region – some even find it ‘stylish’ – which has contributed to the mythologising of his persona. But let’s be clear: he is not invincible. He still has the option to surrender, and if he chooses the path of peace, he will be treated with fairness and in accordance with the government’s surrender policy. But if he continues down the path of violence, he will meet the same fate as Basavraju, Chalapati, and Milind Teltumbade. His time is running out.
Will you really accept Hidma’s surrender or are you more keen on eliminating him?
We will wholeheartedly welcome anyone who chooses to surrender, be it the senior leaders or a junior cadre. If they are willing to shun violence and return to the mainstream, they are most welcome. Our aim is not to kill people; our objective is to bring an end to Naxalism, which has brought decades of violence and suffering. Whether it’s Hidma or anyone else, if they genuinely wish to lay down arms and reintegrate into society, we are ready to receive them with dignity.
What steps are being taken to prevent the resurgence of Naxalism after the end of the ongoing operation?
In the past, surrendered Naxals have been reintegrated into the mainstream through various skill development initiatives and employment opportunities. Currently, efforts are underway on multiple fronts, including education, livelihood, and connectivity. Once this menace is fully eradicated, the government plans to engage former cadres in sustainable employment avenues to help them become self-reliant. Most importantly, once the fear of Naxals is gone, normalcy will return, and peace and development will naturally follow.
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