BOSTON -- Facing growing military tension over the Korean Peninsula, the international community has been urged to deal with the precarious situation. James Stavridis, the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University explained his view of what the United States should do regarding the North Korean issue during an interview with The Yomiuri Shimbun. Stavridis, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, examines the prospect of U.S.-led strategic cooperation with Japan and South Korea under the Trump administration, as well as U.S. relations with China and Russia. The following is excerpted from the interview.
The Yomiuri Shimbun: What is your risk analysis for North Korea's nuclear and missile development?
James Stavridis: I'll give it to you as the chances for war. I think there is a 10 percent chance that we will see a significant war on the Korean Peninsula. I think there is a 20 percent chance that at some point we will have an exchange of ordinance -- missiles, ships -- but not a full-blown war. And I think there is a 70 percent chance we can resolve this diplomatically, through economic sanctions and negotiations.
Q: There is a 10 percent chance of war.
A: Yes, it's significant. Very high. A year ago I would have said a 1 percent chance. The difference is that [North Korean leader] Kim Jong Un continues to behave very recklessly. He is continuing to launch longer-range missiles, and bigger nuclear weapons. And on the other side, U.S. President Donald Trump is very impulsive and is using very pointed, dangerous rhetoric. As a result, you have two leaders that are on a collision course -- in a way that was simply not the case a year ago. So I think that percentage of a chance has risen significantly, unfortunately. [Since the beginning of this year] we have heard a relatively lower key message from Kim Jong Un. I still believe, though, that there is a 10 percent chance for a full-on war on the Korean Peninsula, but that the odds still indicate we can maneuver diplomatically. I am hopeful he will be more restrained in 2018.
Q: How should the United States respond?
A: First, get more intelligence. We need to spend more time with our South Korean allies who understand Kim Jong Un. And we need better intelligence and information sharing with Japan, and other allies in the region.
Secondly, we need to increase our missile defense, both on the Korean Peninsula, in the U.S. possessions like Guam, the state of Hawaii, and on the mainland of the U.S.
Thirdly, we need to improve our capabilities for offensive cyber abilities. This gets into very classified information, but we can do more in terms of cyber than we have thus far.
Fourth, we should consider a maritime interdiction operation. A "blockade." Using our ships to cut off the flow to and from the sea coming into North Korea.
Fifth, we should approach Beijing more aggressively with more "carrots" and more "sticks" in terms of obtaining their pressure on North Korea. A "carrot" would be a guarantee that the U.S. has no interest in regime change, and that we are willing to see the peninsula continue to be divided. "Stick" would be putting pressure on Chinese entities that are doing business with North Korea individually. Sort of "precision guided sanctions." I think a combination of those two things might convince [China's] President Xi [Jinping] to put more pressure on the young leader.
Finally, we need to continue to build our alliances in Asia. Of course with South Korea, but most importantly with Japan. Also with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. So I think the degree to which we can build those kinds of alliance structures will be the best that we can do in terms of deterring Kim Jong Un.
All roads to Pyongyang lead through Beijing. Of all the six things I mentioned, the most important is working with China. I think that means putting pressure on them and also offering incentives. The next logical step would be four-party talks -- North Korea, South Korea, China, the United States. Then expand that to six-party talks to include Japan and Russia. I think that's our best hope, and I think there's a 70 percent chance that is how it will work out.
Q: Do you see any chances that the U.S. and China will cooperate militarily?
A: I don't see a U.S.-Chinese joint military operation because the two nations have opposing views. The U.S. supports South Korea, China supports North Korea. China wants a divided peninsula, the U.S. would prefer to see a unified peninsula. China wants to see Kim's regime continue in power, the U.S. would like to see it end.
What I could see, as part of an enhanced sanctions regime, is a joint maritime operation in which U.S. and Chinese ships would together close off the sea. China can control the northern border, South Korea controls the southern border, so then you've really contained North Korea. That, I can see. But a major ground campaign fighting against North Korean troops, that seems unlikely to me.
I think that China continues to support Kim Jong Un and wants a divided peninsula because what China does not want is a unified, democratic, U.S.-aligned Korean peninsula. They look at what happened in Germany, when Germany was reunified, East and West. And they think "How did that turn out for Russia? It did not turn out well." So, from a Chinese perspective, they would like a divided peninsula that is a legacy of the Korean War. I think they are quite content with the status quo. But what they need to do is stop Kim Jong Un and freeze his nuclear program. If they do that, then I think we can all go about our business.
Q: How would the Trump administration handle the North Korean problem?
A: I think it's difficult to predict the path of crises. I do think that over the next 12 months Kim Jong Un will demonstrate the ability to miniaturize and harden a nuclear weapon. And that will precipitate a crisis. Whether that is six months from now, 12 months from now, 18 months from now? I don't know. But it certainly will occur within the next two years, and it will occur while Trump is the president.
Q: Will the U.S. consult with its allies, Japan and South Korea, if it decides to take military action?
A: If that were to happen, the U.S. would consult with South Korea and Japan, because both nations would have potential military impact. I think we would consult, but not necessarily look for approval.
Q: U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea and European countries are said to have been destabilized under the Trump administration.
A: Our alliances are somewhat weaker, for several reasons. One is that we're removing the economic component. So, the decision to walk away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) weakens our alliances with our Pacific partners. In Europe, the walking away from the equivalent of the TPP [the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP] weakens our relationship with Europe. So, the Trump administration, because they are obsessed with trade balances, are not successfully leveraging the economic component in these alliances.
Secondly, the rhetoric of the Trump administration continues to be distasteful to many of our allies -- both in Europe and in Asia. Our political linkages are lessened.
On the military side, here the Trump administration is increasing defense spending, and that will have a positive impact on the military part of the alliance with Japan, South Korea, NATO, etc. So, it's a mixed picture, where our alliances are less strong economically and politically, but stronger militarily. Overall, the alliance with Japan along with Australia is our two strongest alliances in the Pacific, and our NATO alliance remains crucial to the U.S. in Europe.
Q: So, how do you see President Trump's behavior?
A: I think that in foreign policy, Trump has been conventional in some areas. He has worked hard to have a personal relationship with leaders like Prime Minister [Shinzo] Abe. He is working within NATO. On the other hand, he is making several crucial mistakes. One is pulling out of the climate treaty. One is pulling out of the TPP and other trade agreements. And a third is his obsession with building a wall on our southern border. It's, I think, a big mistake. It's costly, it sends a terrible message to Latin America and won't be very effective.
Q: Britain is leaving the European Union, but not NATO. Do you think it would affect the alliance?
A: I think it will strengthen NATO. Because, as Britain stops supporting EU operations, they will have more military soldiers and sailors and aircraft -- and capability can be placed under NATO command. So, NATO will see a plus-up in its overall capability. It will diminish the EU militarily. They will have less assets to draw upon. That's why it's very important that Germany and France exert leadership and actually increase their defense spending to match the departure of the U.K.
Q: You expect the U.K. to play a larger role in NATO.
A: I do. Because they no longer have to involve themselves with the EU. So, all of their military capability is now available to NATO. And, influence, in NATO, depends on the level of military activity that a nation is doing. So, if the U.K. increases [activity], they will have more influence in the direction and the strategy of the alliance.
I think it's fair to say that, for the U.S., there is good news and bad news. The bad news is that Europe is weaker because of Brexit. The good news is that there will be more capability in NATO -- which is a positive thing from a U.S. perspective. So, as usual, it is a mixed picture. Overall, the U.S. hoped that the U.K. would stay in the EU. Because, having that voice in the EU is worth more than having the U.K. add some assets to NATO.
Q: How do you assess Russia's recent activities?
A: From a U.S. perspective, we have three significant disagreements with Russia. One is Syria, and the support for the Syrian dictator [Bashar] Assad. Number two is the invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Number three is the intrusion into the U.S. election in 2016 using cyber and social networks. We will continue to confront Russia on those points.
There are areas of cooperation with Russia, for the U.S. and for Europe. They include counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy, the Arctic, missile defense -- I think there is some negotiating room on missile defense -- humanitarian operations. But there are going to be some hard issues of confrontation as well. Overall, I think that the U.S. and Russia can have a modus vivendi -- which is a way of working together. But it will require diplomacy and understanding that Vladimir Putin is not a friend of the U.S. We have to be clear-eyed about that.
(The interview was conducted by senior political writer Keiko Iizuka of the Yomiuri Shimbun based in London. )
-- James Stavridis
Former Supreme Allied Commander at NATO
Stavridis is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, and spent over 30 years in the Navy, rising to the rank of four-star admiral. He served as the Supreme Allied Commander at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from 2009 to 2013 and assumed his current post as dean of the Fletcher School in 2013. He authored the book "Sea Power: The History and Geopolitics of the World's Oceans," which was published last year.
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