Senior United States military commanders, operating under Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth's drive for rapid action, overrode database warnings about severely outdated intelligence to approve a wave of initial bombings in Iran on 28 February, a decision that led to a strike on a school that killed nearly 200 civilians, according to three sources familiar with the targeting process.
Hegseth has repeatedly expressed a desire to allow battlefield commanders to operate faster by removing bureaucratic constraints, an approach he summarised as requiring 'maximum lethality, not tepid legality'.
The attack on the Shajareh Tayyiba school in Minab occurred on the first day of American combat operations against Iran, hitting the educational facility which, according to Iranian state media reports, left at least 168 children and 14 teachers dead. The incident is now one of the deadliest civilian casualty events in recent US military history and has prompted an internal investigation.
Rushed Drive For 'Maximum Lethality' In Iran
The scale of the deaths appears rooted in systemic oversight and political pressure. Details about why outdated information was used shed light on how a pre‑war push for targets contributed to the accidental strike.
As the US military launched operations, officials and intelligence analysts faced an urgent scramble to update targeting information for thousands of sites following President Donald Trump's decision to initiate combat.
Given the compressed timeline, analysts prioritised what were considered upper‑tier targets, primarily mobile missile sites and aircraft deemed an immediate threat to American forces. Fixed sites, such as the target that ended up being the school, were placed in lower‑tier categories.
Analysts could not refresh all the relevant records in the Pentagon databases before the first bombs fell.
Consequently, the intelligence for many added targets was more than a decade old. Information regarding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps facility next to the Minab elementary school had not been thoroughly vetted in years. Satellite imagery from 2013 showed the school and the military base were once part of the same compound.
However, imagery from 2016 indicated a fence had been erected to separate the school, with a distinct entrance for students. By December 2025, surveillance showed dozens of people in the school courtyard.
How Outdated Target Intelligence Slipped Through
This context was not fully captured in the targeting process. The primary targeting databases, the legacy Modernized Integrated Database and the newer artificial intelligence platform known as MARS, indicated that the intelligence related to Iranian targets required updating before use. Two sources confirmed that the decision by senior commanders to ignore these embedded warnings was made for 'expediency'.
An analyst had previously noted the structural changes at the Minab site in a separate digital tool. That specific software was not linked to the official intelligence database used to develop the final strike coordinates, meaning the update was never conveyed to the military commanders authorising the launch. The gap shows how rapid military escalation left strike teams without critical information.
Senior US military commanders bypassed warnings in critical databases that intelligence about potential targets in Iran was severely out of date and approved some strikes — including one that hit a school, killing nearly 200 children and adults, according to three sources… pic.twitter.com/SR2inXz58O
— CNN (@CNN) July 7, 2026
Human Cost Of 'Maximum Lethality' Orders
The systemic failures were reportedly compounded by administrative cuts. Multiple sources revealed that senior Pentagon leaders repeatedly pressed military officials to provide targets in the immediate lead‑up to the conflict.
One source described an environment where the Pentagon pushed everyone to move faster, noting that a mixture of former hedge‑fund executives and television personalities were driving the agenda, while leadership at US Central Command did not push back.
A factor increasing the risk of such a mistake was the reductions to the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response teams. Before the conflict began, Hegseth made cuts to these programmes.
He reduced staff across military commands by more than 90 per cent, removing civilian harm specialists from strike teams and shrinking the dedicated unit at Central Command from ten people to a single full‑time employee. Remaining staff were still trying to do the best possible work, but were too under‑resourced to prevent the deaths in Minab.
Months later, the Pentagon has not released the findings of its investigation, though sources claim military officials knew how the mistake happened within days of the strike. A White House official maintained that the investigation is ongoing, adding that the United States does not target civilians.
Central Command declined to comment, while Trump, who initially suggested Iran might be to blame, continues to threaten a return to large‑scale bombing. The lack of an official explanation continues, and families in Minab are still waiting for accountability.
