Donald Trump promised a “Big Day at the White House”, and in terms of diplomatic “optics”, it lived up to the billing. He found himself entertaining four presidents (European Commission, Finland, France, Ukraine), two prime ministers (Italy, the UK), the German chancellor and the secretary general of Nato. It was an unprecedented gathering, and one that spoke to the geopolitical importance of the issues discussed.
It was also striking that the Russian president was fussed over rather more a few days ago in Alaska, with Vladimir Putin greeted on touchdown by President Trump and with a flypast of B2 bombers. That was a generally more sycophantic reception than the European posse were granted, and Mr Trump even allowed Putin to take control of the agenda, cheekily permitting the Russian war criminal to play the role of host by the end of the shameful proceedings.
Still, at least this time around, Volodymyr Zelensky escaped being ambushed for another televised scolding in the Oval Office. Now that Mr Trump has reverted to his previous alignment with Moscow “talking points”, that is a mercy.
As for substance, the Washington summit, despite its stellar cast, left the situation more or less where it was before the signatories went through the cycle of “grin and grip” photocalls and their wary conversations.
After Putin mesmerised President Trump, again, into being an active advocate for Kremlin policy, it was clear what kind of deal would greet President Zelensky and his distinguished minders when they arrived in DC. Russia’s terms were the same as they have been for many months: that Ukraine should accept the loss of Crimea, evacuate and surrender the parts of the Donetsk province it still holds; and renounce any ambition to join Nato.
In return, Putin undertook to put the terms of such a deal into Russian legislation, with a promise – eerily echoing Adolf Hitler before the Second World War – that the Donbas represents his last territorial demand. The novel element was that America would make some as-yet undefined commitment to guaranteeing a reduced Ukraine’s changed borders. It is said that this would be similar to the “all for one, one for all” mutual security guarantee enshrined in Article 5 of the Nato treaty, but would not formally amount to Nato membership, presumably to appease Putin.
To borrow a phrase from another peace process, Ukraine has been presented with a “land for peace” deal. And that peace will be an uneasy one.
It was no surprise that President Zelensky didn’t tear Mr Trump’s arm off in his eagerness to take the surrender deal back to Kyiv. As Mr Zelensky has long made clear, the territorial integrity of Ukraine is not his to bargain away. Ukraine belongs to its people. Any settlement, and especially one as radical, not to say humiliating, as this would have to command the acquiescence of an exhausted but proud people. That is up to them – not Mr Zelensky or Mr Trump, nor even Mr Macron, and still less the Russian president.
The Putin-Trump plan, for that is what it amounts to, will have to be considered by Ukraine and her allies in Europe and beyond in the “coalition of the willing”. Nations such as Canada, Japan, Australia and Turkey will also have to have a say, though it is principally a European enterprise under the leadership of Britain and France. Ukraine has a choice, but so does Europe, in effect, and it is Europe’s attitude that is key to whether Ukraine can fight on.
The question, then, is whether Europe is prepared to continue to back Ukraine if it decides it cannot accept the Russian-American terms. The vague US security guarantee that is being discussed may not be a reliable one, given that the Trump administration is equivocal and transactional even about going to war to save Poland or Britain if they came under Russian attack. America as a nation – not just the Maga movement – has turned isolationist, and that is the new reality and context under which Europe is being forced, reluctantly, to face taking responsibility for its own future.
This is actually where we were before Mr Trump became “disappointed” with Putin and came up with his plan, now abandoned, for an immediate ceasefire. That’s gone. Mr Trump is back on Russia’s side, and he wants an end to the war, on Russian terms, even if he talks about some sort of security guarantee. Yet who would rely on Mr Trump’s word?
If Europe finds that “peace” package unacceptable, then it will have to find a way to replace American financial and military assistance for Ukraine. That means sacrifices, even if the burden is shared with other global partners. It may be that America continues to provide high-tech weaponry, provided the coalition of the willing pays – but even that cannot be taken for granted.
On the other side, Russia has become a war economy, effectively propped up by Chinese loans, Indian trade, plus North Korean manpower and equipment and whatever Iran can offer these days. Is the coalition of the willing, in other words, prepared to pay the price and bear the burden of defeating the Russian-led axis of evil? Or is it, in reality, only ready to allow the Ukrainians to fight indefinitely (which is unrealistic), and risk Russian control of Ukraine and its resources?
Perhaps the Russian economy and its war machine will collapse under the strains, but perhaps not in time to save Ukraine. Do Europeans want to endure Putin enjoying his victory parade from the balcony of the presidential palace in Kyiv, as loathsomely symbolic as Hitler inspecting Paris in 1940? If Europe won’t rescue Ukraine and push the Russians back, then this is the beginning of the end for Ukraine, and this will turn out to have been a big but bleak day indeed at the White House.
