The summit between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un saw state media in both nations dedicate thousands of words to the meeting, yet they conspicuously omitted any mention of Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. This silence on an issue of paramount concern to the West signals a potentially significant shift in Beijing’s long-held stance.
For years, until the collapse of disarmament talks in 2019, the US and China had collaborated in efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions in exchange for aid and political recognition.
Beijing advocated for “denuclearisation” – a bureaucratic term for nuclear disarmament – fostering hope in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo that it would leverage its influence as Pyongyang's diplomatic and economic ally to resolve the nuclear standoff.
Mr Xi’s recent visit to Pyongyang, his first in seven years, could mark the end of that hope, suggesting a re-evaluation of North Korea’s nuclear programme.
Mr Xi’s silence may be Beijing’s way of acknowledging the advanced state of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities since Kim Jong Un assumed power in 2011. It also reflects the growing unlikelihood that diplomacy could compel Pyongyang to relinquish weapons it views as its ultimate safeguard against external interference.
The Chinese leader’s previous trip to North Korea in 2019 presented a stark contrast, with local media quoting him as stating that Beijing would play a constructive role in the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
China’s primary concern remains stability in North Korea and the wider region, fearing a collapse in Pyongyang could trigger a mass exodus across their shared border.
According to Jiyong Zheng, dean of the Institute of Regional Studies at Tianjin Foreign Studies University, China has often refrained from directly pushing for an end to North Korea’s nuclear programme.
Instead, Beijing has called for the denuclearisation of the entire Korean Peninsula, a phrase that allows it to express the desire for an end to US commitments to use its nuclear arsenal to protect South Korea and the deployment of US nuclear bombers near the peninsula.
Mr Zheng noted that in recent months, Beijing had prioritised stabilising the situation on the peninsula, with denuclearisation becoming a secondary objective.
“China is increasingly concluding that a rigid denuclearization-first approach is impractical and may worsen the regional security environment," he said.
For Mr Kim, the absence of public criticism regarding his nuclear arsenal represents a victory. He has consistently sought international recognition for his country as a nuclear weapons state, a status that could lead to the lifting of UN sanctions.
Despite Mr Xi’s apparent avoidance of the nuclear issue in Pyongyang, South Korean foreign ministry spokesperson Park Il insisted on Tuesday Seoul should not lower its expectations, asserting that China continued to support the goal of nuclear disarmament.
Similarly, following last month’s summit between US president Donald Trump and Mr Xi, the White House said that the two leaders affirmed their shared goal to denuclearise North Korea.
However, China’s account merely noted that the leaders discussed the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Mr Kim’s sister and senior official, Kim Yo Jong, subsequently dismissed the US readout of the meeting as "false information".
Last week, Mr Kim unveiled a new plant for producing nuclear ingredients and vowed to bolster nuclear forces "at an exponential rate”.
His sister also declared that any US push for North Korea’s denuclearisation was an "anachronistic dream”.
Park Won Gon, a professor at Seoul's Ewha Womans University, suggested that China might prefer to keep North Korea within its sphere of influence, using that relationship as leverage with the US, rather than seeing the two grow too close.
South Korean president Lee Jae Myung claimed on Monday North Korea was producing enough nuclear fuel annually for 10-20 bombs and was nearing perfection of its intercontinental ballistic missile technology, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the US mainland.
Mr Kim, meanwhile, has consistently emphasised that nuclear weapons are integral to North Korea’s national identity, enshrining its nuclear status in the constitution and dedicating increasing resources for its maintenance.
Some analysts interpret China’s omission of the word "denuclearisation" during Mr Xi’s recent visit as a clear shift in Beijing’s stance, amounting to a tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status.
Seong Hyon Lee, a senior fellow at the George HW Bush Foundation for US-China Relations, believes this shift could mean that efforts by the US, Japan, and South Korea to deter North Korea will become a regular, rather than temporary, endeavour. "Beijing’s silence should not be viewed as a bureaucratic oversight but as a deliberate strategic signal," he said. "By tacitly accepting North Korea’s nuclear status, Beijing strengthens its position as an indispensable stakeholder in any future negotiations."
Nevertheless, China’s acceptance of North Korea’s military ambitions likely has limits. While Mr Xi’s visit signals a "strategic embrace of Kim", it is “not a blank check for North Korea", according to Leif-Eric Easley, also a professor at Ewha Womans University. The professor noted that Beijing desired stability and respect for its regional ambitions and “North Korea’s persistent expansion of military capabilities is pushing the limits of what its larger neighbour will tolerate”.
