Ahead of a public event in London on May 8 on what the latest research can tell us about the state of democracy, The Conversation asked Scott Williamson, Associate Professor in Comparative Political Economy at the University of Oxford, to help us understand why people don’t always immediately push back when politicians attack their democracies.
Your findings show that people around the world have relatively similar ideas about what democracy means and are relatively committed to this idea of democratic governance. So why are so many people polarised about whether today’s crop of politicians are attacking our democracies and what to do about it?
Most people in most countries say it is important to them that they live in a democracy. Research by my colleagues and me also suggests that people tend to agree that competitive elections and protections for civil liberties are central elements of democratic governance.
Yet, many people who claim to care about democracy also support political leaders and movements that have attacked democratic institutions and values.
We have to recognise that even when people agree about the fundamental definition of democracy, there is still plenty of room to disagree over the specifics of how democracy is implemented in practice.
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Anti-democratic political leaders can take advantage of these disagreements to argue that their actions defend rather than disrupt democracy. Their supporters will often be motivated to believe these claims, especially where politics and the media are highly polarised.
In the US, Donald Trump and the Republican party have long argued they are protecting American democracy from the deep state and the Democratic party. A prominent example is the claim that Democrats stole the 2020 election, and that subsequent charges against Trump were an attempt at political persecution.
This message is consistently amplified by rightwing media. Such claims are false, but they create a framework for justifying Trump’s actions in democratic terms.
A second potential problem is that people who understand democracy similarly and view democracy favourably may still decide that opposing anti-democratic leaders is less important than securing other political objectives. Several recent studies suggest that people in many countries, including the United States, are reluctant to make such trade-offs. Commitment to democracy is relatively strong.
However, this research also highlights certain conditions under which people may begin to give up this commitment. Some people will care less about democracy if they can secure significantly better economic outcomes. In ongoing research with my co-authors, we also show that perceived threats to safety are especially likely to induce democratic trade-offs.
One important finding from these studies is that people are strongly committed to maintaining competitive elections in their countries, but they are more willing to give up civil liberties and constraints on executive power in exchange for preferred economic and security outcomes. Some people are openly sympathetic to a majoritarian vision of democracy that empowers elected leaders to ignore institutional constraints if it means giving the people what they want.
The relatively weaker commitment to these aspects of democracy means that anti-democratic leaders who first focus on undermining political freedoms and expanding their own power, rather than undercutting elections, are less likely to face a backlash.
This well-used playbook may explain why Trump has faced relatively inconsistent pushback from the public, despite brazenly seizing legislative powers and violating civil liberties.
Because Trump won the 2024 election, and because many Americans likely believe that subsequent elections will still meet democratic standards, they may tolerate attacks on civil liberties and checks and balances – especially if it gives them policy outcomes they prefer.
Yet, it is important for Americans who care about democracy to recognise that several of Trump’s actions directly threaten the ability of the United States to hold free and fair elections in the future. The president and his allies have deployed lawsuits and withheld legally obligated funding in an effort to silence critical voices in the media, universities, NGOs, businesses, the legal community, and the Democratic party. Such actions are already muting criticisms of Trump and will make it harder for opposition to compete fairly in upcoming elections.
Vice president J.D. Vance recently accused European leaders of “running in fear” from voters over immigration. What did you make of his intervention?
These comments are a good example of how political leaders who attack democracy often claim to be defending democracy instead. A common strategy is to claim that they are the true representatives of the people and their preferences. As a result, their actions must be democratic, and those who oppose them are blocking the will of the people.
Such claims about immigration should be viewed as a rhetorical cudgel used by the extreme right to beat back accusations of their own anti-democratic stances. Even if their immigration policies are more preferred by the public, this stronger alignment on a single issue should constitute only a small piece of the pie in terms of evaluating their democratic credentials.
And their claims to represent public opinion on immigration stand on shaky ground at best. Attitudes toward immigration are complicated and multifaceted. Though negative views on the issue are clearly prevalent, attitudes have become more favourable over time in several European countries.
Negative voices are often louder but do not necessarily represent the majority. Public opinion also fluctuates. In the United States, Trump was perceived more favourably than Kamala Harris on immigration during the 2024 election. But already by late April, a majority of Americans expressed opposition to Trump’s extreme approach.
How can defenders of democracy meet these challenges?
In countries where anti-democratic parties are on the rise, political leaders and the public should resist normalising them. The more they are treated as just any other party, the more people may begin to perceive their anti-democratic politics as acceptable.
When anti-democratic parties come to power, it is important for their opponents to push back as forcefully as possible before the party can consolidate an authoritarian regime. As the political system becomes more repressive, people will increasingly hide their views, and it will be harder to mobilise opposition moving forward.
For these efforts to succeed, it is important for the opposition to remain as unified as possible. If the ruling party can use its power to make elections less fair, state institutions more biased, and protests more dangerous, then the opposition will need to make use of every advantage they can to oust the government. A divided opposition will be much more likely to fail.
Scott Williamson receives funding from the UKRI/EPSRC Frontier Research Guarantee Scheme (EP/Y036832/1) for the project Democratic Values and Authoritarian Legitimacy (DEVAL).
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
