It was appropriate that the rush defence employed by England should play such a big part in the end of the All Blacks’ Rugby World Cup dream. For much of the year, it seemed like the New Zealand brains trust had been in a rush, trying to piece a title defence together by making dramatic last-minute changes to both strategy and personnel in an ultimately failed pursuit of the perfect formula.
It was policy on the run, rather than the culmination of a detailed four-year-plan. A series of gambles, creating some structural issues that always had the potential to unravel when it mattered most. Settled teams win World Cups. All Blacks coach Steve Hansen should have appreciated this more than anyone, having been associated with two massively experienced title-winning teams in 2011 and 2015.
Yet he rolled the dice on a number of positions, in each instance discarding experience in favour of youth. The use of five different midfield combinations alone, in 10 Tests, screamed instability. The catch cry was work rate, but calm heads under pressure are important too, and these were absent when the All Blacks’ needs were at their greatest, most notably with midfielder Ryan Crotty and winger Ben Smith sitting in the stand, while 108-Test prop Owen Franks didn’t even make the plane to Japan.
Smith was part of arguably the best player leadership group the game has ever seen in 2015, yet even they were challenged for an answer at a critical moment, as happens at World Cups. The All Blacks fell behind 12-7 in the semi-final, with flanker Jerome Kaino in the sin bin for 10 minutes, but skipper Richie McCaw and his cohorts stepped up, taking control. By the time Kaino returned, not only had there been no further damage, the All Blacks had clawed back three of those points, and then took the lead two minutes after they were restored to full strength, going on to edge South Africa 20-18.
At the weekend, a botched lineout allowed New Zealand to within six points with 20 minutes to play. It was a lifeline they didn’t deserve on the run of play, but a door ajar nonetheless. It was a not dissimilar scenario to four years previously, but with a vastly different outcome. Such was England’s hold on the game, or more specifically on the All Blacks, New Zealand remained helpless, with their discipline and composure disintegrating further as England completed their historic 19-7 victory.
Why couldn’t the All Blacks respond? Too many personnel changes, a player leadership group severely weakened and too much invested in a tactical plan based on speed to the neglect of all else, that lacked a fallback option. The warning was there, but largely brushed off, after the calamitous 47-26 loss to Australia in the opening Bledisloe Cup Test of the year.
The introduction of the Richie Mo’unga-Beauden Barrett twin-playmaker axis, which got the wobbles during that defeat in Perth, was emblematic of a selection template that came up short. This switch carried plenty of upside, but the combination had too few outings to be fool proof and could not deliver leadership under pressure.
Starting the 2014 world player of the year, Brodie Retallick, on such an important night, less than a game of playing time on from a dislocated shoulder, was also a risk. Retallick is a talisman and his presence hardens the All Black pack. England knew that and targeted him physically; stop the lead bull and you stop the herd. But the herd were not so much stopped in this instance as scattered.
Like some of the other changes, the positioning of Ardie Savea, a specialist openside, on the blindside flank, was intoxicating when it worked, but that was largely when there was no traffic coming the other way. Damningly, it seduced the All Black hierarchy into not preparing well enough for other eventualities. Scott Barrett was given little time in the No 6 jersey and was ill-prepared for the task he was given against England, especially in a situation where those in front of him were struggling.
The New Zealand public has, to a large extent, matured in relation to major All Blacks defeats. With each failure after winning the inaugural tournament in 1987, the pressure had grown on the team, as the demands of the public have become greater. Pressure has led to the mental disintegration of some very good All Black teams, most notably in 1999 and 2007, but the back-to-back successes of 2011 and 2015 loosened that vice, and the public disappointment is now tempered somewhat by the comfort of the previous two wins.
New Zealanders recognise that England are a good team that was well prepared. While the ashes are already being raked over, and more detailed forensic examinations will follow, the team and coaching staff will not suffer any of the push back, or personal unpleasantries, that have been the signature of past failures. Hansen has the credit in the bank that his two most vilified predecessors, John Hart and John Mitchell, did not have.
What will probably rankle the outgoing All Blacks coach most is the damage to his legacy. When he was re-appointed after the 2015 tournament, Hansen’s major brief was to beat the British & Irish Lions and retain the World Cup. New Zealand Rugby mortgaged the house to make that happen, but the report card will read fail on both KPIs. And, even if Kiwis have learned to be pragmatic this year, that will hurt.
