Could there be a temporary Gaza ceasefire and partial hostage deal in the next days or weeks? Yes. Would it lead to the end of the war and a “postwar Gaza” structure? No. Why? For a multitude of reasons, but the overarching and overriding one is that Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu does not want to end the war. He is infatuated with his “wartime leader” status, convinced that he is drastically remodelling the Middle East geopolitical landscape in Gaza, Iran and elsewhere. And for his political interests and expediency, he needs to perpetuate a war and emergency atmosphere.
The New York Times Magazine just published a comprehensive and detailed account of how Netanyahu has been prolonging the war since early 2024. By all indications, this policy trajectory continues and applies to both Gaza and to a future, second strike against Iran, as Netanyahu himself attested during his visit to Washington during the past week.
How does this affect the chances of a ceasefire? The endless talk and abundant speculation of an imminent Gaza ceasefire has become tragically tedious and predictable, with each day bringing a combination of reasons why a deal is just around the corner and the caveat that it won’t last. There’s an explanation for that: the deal that is being negotiated at varying pace – which includes a 60-day ceasefire, a partial exchange of 10 live Israeli hostages and 18 deceased hostages, in exchange for an undisclosed (but large) number of Palestinian prisoners, some convicted of terrorism and murder – is partial. It is supposed to lead to a bigger agreement, and thus its principles, tenets and stages are derived from that “postwar Gaza” framework.
On that framework, the sides are not even close. In fact, it is safe to assume that even if a ceasefire deal is struck in the next days or weeks, its durability is highly questionable. It is almost inevitably doomed to be violated, just like the near identical truce agreement that was in place in January, lasted for 58 days and was then breached by Israel in mid-March.
The reasons for this realistic but patently pessimistic outlook are both substantive and political and are manifest in glaring inner contradictions between the two phases.
There is a series of unanswered questions underlining the current negotiations, with a short answer to each: will Hamas stay in power? De facto yes, according to the current deal. No, according to the postwar plans that Israel, the US and some Arab countries are considering.
Will Israel redeploy and gradually withdraw from the Gaza Strip? Yes, according to the agreement. No, according to Israel, which insists on large and wide buffer zones and total control over Rafah, in the southern part of the Gaza Strip.
Are these reconcilable? Of course not.
Then comes the question of what guarantees exactly did the US provide Hamas that Israel will not resume the war after 60 days? Unclear. How are those assurances consistent with a postwar plan that disposes of Hamas? They are not.
Who is in charge of humanitarian aid and the supply of food and medicine to Gaza? Not clear.
What is included in the so-called “postwar Gaza” political plan and power structure? The US is favourably considering a primarily Emirati plan, which others, but not Israel, have contributed to. The plan has five main principles, all based on the successful implementation of the 60-day cessation of hostilities:
- A gradual transition to governance by “non-Hamas Palestinians” backed by five Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
- A security force will be drawn from some of those countries, backed by US private contractors and possibly a US Command and Control centre, situated outside Gaza.
- The plan will be launched after the Palestinian Authority (PA) invites those countries to execute the plan. That way, the PA is involved, but Israel could credibly claim that it is not a part of the governing structure.
- The Arab partners will vet, recruit and train a new security force and raise the necessary funds (estimated in excess of $60bn) for Gaza rebuilding.
- This plan will impel the PA to reform and become a reliable interlocutor.
Does Israel agree to such a plan? No. Does it have an alternative plan? Not really.
And that brings us to the second paradox that dooms a long-term agreement: the so-called “humanitarian city”. The term is morally depraved Orwellian “Newspeak”, likely borrowed from some third-rate dystopian sci-fi movie, and the would-be place has been described as a location for ethnic cleansing and forcible displacement.
Clearly, in order to advance this patently unviable objective (which the Israeli military opposes vehemently), Israel needs to maintain a vast military presence in Gaza.
So yes, a temporary ceasefire agreement is possible and should be welcomed given the alternative. But no, this does not portend any permanent agreement as long as Mr Netanyahu believes the war must continue.
Alon Pinkas is a former Israeli consul general to the US and was a political adviser to two former prime ministers, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak
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