In the wake of recent strikes by Israel and the United States on Iranian cities, military sites and nuclear facilities, a troubling paradox has emerged: actions intended to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons may actually be accelerating its pursuit of them and encouraging other countries to follow suit.
On June 13, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a military campaign aimed at dismantling Iran’s nuclear program. The operation began with a series of co-ordinated strikes targeting Iran’s top nuclear scientists, senior military officials and key members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Despite establishing air dominance, Israel did not possess the capability to destroy Iran’s most heavily fortified nuclear facilities — especially the Fordow enrichment site, which is buried deep within a mountain.
Read more: Why Israel and the U.S. are sure to encounter the limits of air power in Iran
On June 21, the U.S. carried out major airstrikes targeting Iran’s critical nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. Using B-2 stealth bombers equipped with bunker-busting bombs, the operation aimed to cripple Iran’s deeply fortified nuclear infrastructure.
Three days later, Iran and Israel agreed to a ceasefire, bringing the 12-day conflict to an end. While both sides declared aspects of the campaign successful, the war marked a dangerous escalation in regional tensions and raised renewed concerns over the future of nuclear nonproliferation and security in the Middle East.
History of nuclear negotiations
The U.S. has consistently asserted that Iran must never be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. In 2006, Iran was subjected to international sanctions after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported the government was not in compliance with its nuclear energy obligations.
Under former president Barack Obama, the U.S. government pursued a diplomatic path, culminating in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under the deal, Iran agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent and allow intrusive IAEA inspections. In exchange, it received relief from some international sanctions.
In 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, despite IAEA reports confirming Iran’s compliance. This decision undermined diplomatic trust and prompted Iran to scale back its commitments under the deal.
The Biden administration sought to revive the JCPOA, but Iran demanded binding guarantees that future U.S. governments would not again withdraw — an assurance Biden could not provide.
In the aftermath, Iran significantly escalated its nuclear activities. According to IAEA reports, Iran has more than 400 kilograms of enriched uranium to 60 per cent — an amount that, if further refined to 90 per cent, could be sufficient to produce 10 to 12 nuclear weapons.
Iran has long used its nuclear program as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the U.S. While Iranian officials have maintained their program is purely peaceful, the country produces more highly enriched uranium than it needs for domestic power generation. Enriching uranium has been a way for Iran to raise pressure on the U.S. to lift sanctions.
The second Trump administration resumed negotiations for a new nuclear deal aimed at imposing stronger constraints on Iran’s nuclear program.
Although five rounds of negotiations were held, a sixth round scheduled for June 15 was disrupted when Israel conducted a military strike on Iran two days earlier. The attack escalated tensions and derailed the diplomatic process, further complicating the possibility of reaching a renewed agreement.
Strikes could lead to nuclear proliferation
Although Trump claimed the U.S. strikes had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program, initial intelligence assessments were more cautious, noting significant damage but not total destruction.
Although it maintains ambiguity about its nuclear program, Israel is seen to be the only country in the Middle East to possess nuclear weapons. It has taken military action to prevent other countries in the region from developing nuclear programs.
In 2007, Israel bombed a suspected nuclear reactor under construction in Syria. In 1981, Israeli fighter jets bombed a nuclear reactor in Iraq.
The Israeli government may have calculated that airstrikes could also effectively work against Iran. However, the difference is that Iran’s nuclear program is far more advanced than Syria or Iraq’s were. While the recent strikes may have set the program back by two years, Iran retains the knowledge and capacity to rebuild.
Ironically, the Israeli and U.S. strikes, which aimed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities, may instead encourage Iranian officials to accelerate their efforts. Following the war, Iran ended all co-operation with the IAEA, expelling inspectors and cutting off access to its nuclear sites. Without IAEA personnel on the ground, it has become extremely difficult to monitor or verify the scope of Iran’s nuclear activities.
Bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities each time it advances its nuclear program is not a sustainable strategy. Israel had hoped that a decisive military strike would trigger widespread unrest and potentially lead to the Iranian government’s collapse.
Instead, the opposite occurred: the Iranian public rallied around the flag, perceiving the attack as a blatant violation of national sovereignty. As a result, the government strengthened its domestic legitimacy and further suppressed political opposition.
For now, Iranian officials have maintained that they do not intend to develop a nuclear weapon. However, the Iranian parliament is preparing legislation to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which Iran is currently a signatory.
Exiting the treaty would remove a major legal and diplomatic constraint on Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Should Iran decide to go down that path, it would likely trigger a nuclear arms race in the region.
Saudi Arabia has indicated that if Iran builds a nuclear weapon, it will seek to do the same.
The most effective way to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is through sustained diplomacy and a renewed nuclear agreement. A credible deal that includes robust verification mechanisms and IAEA inspections and sanctions relief remains the most viable solution.
Military strikes, by contrast, tend to backfire, and will likely reinforce the belief in Iran — and elsewhere — that only a nuclear deterrent can shield them from external threats.
Saira Bano does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
