At first glance, the 20-point plan outlined by President Trump and agreed by Benjamin Netanyahu appears more likely to end the two-year conflict in Gaza than anything we have seen so far. Trump has sunk a lot of political capital in bringing peace to the Middle East after “thousands of years”, as he put it. There is apparent deep and wide regional support and, seemingly, that of the Israeli prime minister.
But this is less a detailed roadmap than a rough back of an envelope sketch that allows an equal chance of getting badly lost as reaching the desired destination.
First, Hamas is unlikely to look kindly on a plan that explicitly says it has to give up all or most of its arms and watch as a technocratic “Council of Peace” headed by Trump himself takes over Gaza. The offer of an amnesty for members of the militant Islamist organisation who accept peaceful coexistence with Israel is hardly attractive, even if the group could claim credit for sufficient aid finally getting into the devastated Palestinian territory, delivered by the UN and the Red Crescent.
Can Qatar or others lean on Hamas hard enough to get a grudging even temporary acquiescence to a programme that will basically eliminate the organisation as a political and military force, at least in Gaza? Will its leaders be convinced by the argument that the 50-odd Israeli hostages held by the group there are now a liability because they provide a pretext for Israel to continue the campaign? Will Hamas military commanders in the territory agree with its political leaders in Qatar or Istanbul? None of this is certain.
Arab countries have committed to demilitarise Gaza, Trump says, which is a major and positive step if true. But there is no indication of what this means in practice. Will they all send troops, or money, or both? None has so far made explicit pledges of sending soldiers to complete what would be a hellishly complex and dangerous task. To organise this would take months, and offer plenty of opportunity for squabbling and recriminations.
The linkage of Israeli withdrawal to the pace and extent of disarmament and demilitarisation is also to Israel’s advantage. Any land that is surrendered has been flattened by Israel’s relentless offensive. A slow withdrawal costs little. Israel may eventually pull back to a perimeter, but how long this might take is also unclear. The published maps are vague. All of this is a very long way from Hamas’s demands in recent negotiations. Nor has there been any promise of anything approximating a Palestinian state.
As Netanyahu and Trump both made sure to emphasise, if things don’t proceed as they want, and the Arab countries cannot push Hamas to do their will, then the Israeli military will go back into action with full US backing. Once Hamas has handed over the hostages – within 72 hours of an agreement coming into effect – there is little that might stop Israel reneging on any promises. In March, Israel broke a promise to move to a second scheduled phase of the two-month ceasefire, which could have led to a definitive end to the conflict.
And, yes, the idea of getting regional normalisation back on track and building on the Abraham Accords is attractive, but the last two years have shown quite how much this prospect weighs in the balance for Israeli policymakers.
With divisions deepening and anti-war sentiment spreading at home as well as increasing isolation and a string of diplomatic setbacks, Netanyahu may have made the calculation that more war would bring incremental gains at significant cost and now is the moment to declare victory.
He now begins a new campaign. Throughout the conflict Netanyahu, who is threatened with jail on corruption charges, has made his own hold on political power a key objective. This time, it appears he thinks he can ride out the opposition of far-right members of his coalition who could quit the ruling coalition and bring down the government. He may call their bluff, or he may have the numbers in the Knesset, Israel’s national assembly, to keep power anyway. There must be new elections within a year or so, which he could win despite poor showings in the polls.
For now, Trump has got all but one of the main actors in this appalling conflict to sign on to his plan, or at least plug his somewhat sketchy directions into their collective geopolitical satnavs. This is an achievement. But much hard work is still to come: Even if Hamas is persuaded, there are a host of details to be agreed and then set down and then, somehow, implemented. This is a journey that could take a very long time, and any kind of arrival, let alone a safe and comfortable one, is far from guaranteed.
