Former United States national security adviser John Bolton worked closely with President Donald Trump during his first term in the White House, but is highly critical of the president's current policies regarding Iran. Bolton tells RFI why negotiations to end the Middle East war are likely to fail, and in a prescient move Swiss authorities announced Friday that US-Iran talks planned in Switzerland were "postponed".
Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a deal on Wednesday intended to bring an end to the current US-Israeli conflict with the Islamic Republic.
A two-month negotiation period now begins, with all eyes on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and whether progress can be made over Iran's nuclear programme.
But a final peace deal set for Friday in Switzerland has been postponed, the Swiss government said early Friday, hours after US Vice President JD Vance called off his trip to the Alpine country.
Under the text, Washington commits to immediately waive oil sanctions crippling Iran's economy. Once a final agreement is reached on the Iranian nuclear programme, the US will also facilitate the release of a $300 billion (€258 billion) reconstruction fund supported by regional nations.
However, Trump's decision to end the war, in which 13 US service members were killed, has sparked criticism from some of his allies at home – with US Senator Bill Cassidy from Trump's Republican Party describing it as the "worst foreign policy blunder in decades".
Apparently anticipating such criticism, Trump said at the G7 that he was prepared to "bomb the hell" out of Iran if they violated the agreement.
Fellow Republican politician and former national security adviser John Bolton is also critical of Trump's manoeuvres in the Middle East. He told RFI why.
RFI: You have consistently supported regime change in Iran under several Republican presidents, advocating a hardline approach against the Islamic Republic. What are your thoughts on the new chapter of negotiations between the US and Iran?
John Bolton: I think the US objective for many years should have been regime change in Iran, because I don't think there will ever be lasting peace and stability in the Middle East until that happens. What Trump's objectives were in launching the strikes with Israel back on February the 28th, to this day, I don't know.
I think that we caused substantial destruction to Iran's military industrial complex, but obviously the regime is still in place. And what we're facing now, despite the military successes of the campaign, is a potential political surrender by Trump to the regime that will allow it to remain in power in Tehran, sell oil on international markets, gain substantial revenues, re-entrench itself in control in Tehran, rebuild its nuclear weapons programme and its terrorist activities and continue to threaten the international economy by its sway over the Strait of Hormuz.
So what was at least a partial military success risks being turned into a political failure.
RFI: Is this a failure of Donald Trump? Or a failure of all those who, like you, believed regime change in Iran could be brought about by force?
JB: No, I don't think regime change was attempted by Trump, I think there are many things I'd be delighted to take hours discussing with you about what he didn't do that could have facilitated regime change.
You can tell by his language and the language of his aides that they look at the negotiation they're involved in now as an effort to change the behaviour of the regime in Iran. That is an effort that's lasted 47 years and has failed. And I think it will fail again.
This is a regime committed to its original ideals. It has not moderated. If anything, it has grown worse. And to think that the external world can induce that regime to change its behaviour has been a fool's errand for 47 years, and it remains so today.
RFI: Did the US and Israel underestimate the Islamic Republic's capacity for resistance?
JB: It's a good question on the capability side as to how much we really understood the Iranian regime had done to build underground facilities, to hide drones, missile launchers, missiles, various aspects of their military programme.
[The US] didn't estimate that capability correctly, as Israel and the whole world underestimated Hamas's amazing underground tunnel network in Gaza. That would be a failure of intelligence.
I think the real failure was in not understanding that the regime itself is an ideological regime. It is deeply committed, right down through all elements of the Revolutionary Guard, to the ideals of the revolution. And that means it's not a regime where just taking away the head person could potentially change the regime. That's not a question of underestimating Iran's capabilities. It's a failure to understand the regime itself. I don't think the Israelis made that mistake. I think Trump made that mistake.
RFI: On the issue of Iranian nuclear power, what do you think of the terms emerging from the memorandum of understanding? How do they differ from the 2015 nuclear agreement that Trump tore up during his first term?
JB: Well, there's really very little specific to go on, but every indication is that Trump's prepared to agree to something very like that. And the 2015 nuclear deal was a big mistake for many, many reasons. It was a significant victory for Iran and for its proliferation efforts. Ignoring Trump's bluster, it looks like he's heading down the same road with the same inevitably failed result.
RFI: Was it US domestic politics that led Trump down this path?
JB: I think the deal that will be signed in Geneva on Saturday is due, on the US side, to one reason only: Donald Trump wants a way out of this conflict.
He's worried about the high price of petroleum globally. He wants Gulf Petroleum out on international markets to bring the worldwide price down and to bring what we call the price at the pump of gasoline in America down, to avoid political damage to his prospects in the elections this coming November.
There's no geostrategic analysis here. It's all about getting the headline price of gasoline down.
RFI: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government feels betrayed by this memorandum of understanding. And support for Israel has never been more controversial in the US, among both Republicans and Democrats. Are American and Israeli interests now fundamentally diverging?
JB: The relationship is much more than how the two leaders get along, that's certain. And I think that remains very strong. Obviously, it's a very difficult time personally between the two leaders. Netanyahu does not want the war in Lebanon tied to this deal. As far as we know from what's been reported or leaked, that's exactly what the deal does.
So that's a real point of tension at the moment – and how it gets worked out, we don't know. It certainly would be nice to have an official text of this memorandum of understanding. If it were so good, from Trump's point of view, you can bet it would have been out by now.
RFI: How do you see the US-Europe relationship? Can there be a joint effort on Ukraine?
JB: Well, certainly the text of the G7 declaration looks positive. I think that may be because the text of that particular document referred approvingly to Trump's deal on Iran, and he probably read that part and didn't pay much attention to the rest.
I think we're approaching a very important stage of this conflict with Russia. I hope this may be a sign of Trump coming closer to the correct view, which is that defeating the Russian aggression is critical. But, with Trump, it depends on what time of day it is. I think the declaration of the G7 is a good sign. But it will last as long as it lasts.
RFI: What are your thoughts on the reduction of the US military presence in Europe? What are the consequences for deterrence capabilities against Russia?
JB: I think it's a mistake. I think you can certainly talk about where in Europe forces should be deployed. I think that's a question that changes every day. It should be subject to constant review. But I do think a significant American presence in Europe is a key deterrent.
I think it's time that Trump better understood that America benefits from NATO just as the European members benefit from NATO and a functioning alliance – everybody benefits. He doesn't understand that. And as long as he doesn't, to him, expenditures on NATO benefit Europe, not the US.
RFI: Do you still identify with the Republican party in 2026?
JB: I've been a Republican since Barry Goldwater ran for president in 1964. So I don't intend to change now. I think we're going to have a battle for the soul of the party in terms of its nominee in 2028.
And I believe based on my conversations with Republicans in Congress and Republicans around the country, that the party at its root remains a Reaganite-Bush party. So I think the Trump phenomenon is unique. I think he's an aberration in American politics. We've never elected anybody like him before. And with God's help and good luck, we never will again either.
With newswires, and adapted from an interview by Nicolas Falez of RFI's French service.
