President Donald Trump appears eager to declare that peace has come to the Korean peninsula.
The president has deluded himself that North Korea is well on its way to getting rid of its nuclear weapons. Last week, he excitedly tweeted "North Korea recommits to denuclearization � we've come a long way."
We haven't.
Yet Trump looks ready to issue a peace proclamation, overruling his top advisers who warn of the risks of declaring peace before North Korea gets serious about eliminating its nuclear arsenal.
Instead the president may listen to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, whom he will meet at the United Nations next week, as well as North Korea's Kim Jong Il. Both are urging that a U.S. peace declaration be issued by the end of the year to supersede the 1953 armistice.
Kim has called on Trump to hold a second summit meeting at which the peace declaration could be forthcoming. "North Korea wants a summit with Trump in order to decouple Trump from the rest of the administration, because it sees him as an easy mark," says the Heritage Foundation's Bruce Klingner, a 20-year veteran of U.S. intelligence agencies who specializes in North Korea. Kim hopes that Trump will disregard advice and lessons learned from decades of U.S. negotiations with North Korea.
Here are four reasons why a peace declaration is unwise.
1. It is premature.
Pyongyang must first demonstrate willingness to dismantle its nuclear program, warheads and missiles. Contrary to Trump's proclamations, Kim has made only puny gestures since the Singapore summit.
Indeed, the vague statement Trump procured from Kim in Singapore pales before more specific past pledges that North Korea made (and broke) to denuclearize, notably under President Bill Clinton. As the Brookings Institution's Korea expert, Jung Pak, tweeted Sept. 19: "We should recognize that 13 years ago, they agreed to far bigger concessions... These are minuscule moves on Kim's part..."
True, the North Korean leader has toned down the rhetoric, as has Trump, which is good. And Kim has gone 10 months without testing missiles or nuclear weapons.
But North Korea has halted nuclear tests before for lengthy periods. Moreover, Kim has made clear he thinks more tests aren't needed for his intercontinental ballistic missile program.
As for Kim's pledge to dismantle a key nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, that facility has been partly dismantled and shut down on several occasions, only to be restored and restarted again.
In other words, Kim is playing Trump, giving gifts that don't touch on the main issue, his large nuclear arsenal of warheads and missiles. (He distracted attention by returning the remains of 55 missing Americans, which is very welcome, but the United States received remains of 629 Americans prior to 2005.)
2. Further concessions will make it harder to deal with the nuclear issue.
No expert I spoke with believes Kim intends to give up all the nuclear weapons he has.
"What we have seen so far is (only) a North Korean commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula," says Klingner. "But the North Koreans have a very different definition of what that means from the U.S. definition."
While Washington seeks the elimination of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons, Pyongyang defines the phrase to mean the initial removal of U.S. troops and nuclear umbrella � before addressing its nuclear program. And even then, Kim believes he must keep an arsenal to ensure his survival.
"North Korea wants to be accepted as a nuclear weapons state, the Pakistan of East Asia," Klingner says. Pakistan conducted major nuclear tests in 1998 and has managed to get away with keeping a large nuclear arsenal, despite long-term U.S. and global pressure. Kim wants to do likewise, "with sanctions removed and economic benefits that flow freely." A premature peace plan may help Kim achieve his goal.
3. A premature peace plan will undercut pressure on North Korea.
Since the Singapore summit, China and Russia are already weakening their adherence to sanctions against North Korea. Why not, since Trump said (incorrectly) in Singapore that North Korea "was no longer a nuclear threat"?
A peace declaration could set in motion increasing pressure within the South Korean public for withdrawal of U.S. troops and ending the alliance with Seoul. Kim knows Trump wants to bring the troops home and could skillfully play on the president's belief that he is being taken advantage of.
But weakening the U.S.-South Korean alliance, without eliminating the North's arsenal, would leave South Korea at the mercy of an aggressive and unreliable Pyongyang, a dictatorship with nuclear arms that maintains vast concentration camps at home.
4. Lifting pressure on Kim could plunge Washington back into a nasty standoff with Pyongyang.
Eventually, Trump will be forced to realize that Kim has no desire to demobilize his nukes. At that point, the president may revert to aggressive rhetoric and threats.
Neither the United States nor North Korea is likely to start a preemptive war, but the room for dangerous mistakes would be vast, especially if Trump feels humiliated. So let's hope the president's advisers persuade him to focus on pressing Kim for detailed data on Pyongyang's nuclear program and arsenal, along with international inspections, before engaging in further peace fantasies. Otherwise, a premature peace may lead to a premature end of the Kim-Trump bromance.