Ian Birrell, in an otherwise illuminating article (The delirium of these Tories: it’s like a Ukip convention, 4 October), says that in the forthcoming article 50 negotiations, to be triggered by Theresa May before the end of March, Britain “will have just two years to sort a trade deal with a bloc of 27 nations”. In fact those negotiations are to be about the terms of UK withdrawal: only after the UK has withdrawn from the EU, probably some time in 2019, can negotiations on a substantive trade deal with the EU begin, and a trade agreement of that complexity is bound to take yet more years to conclude.
If only Mrs May had left open the timing of the article 50 trigger, she could have had some leverage with the rest of the EU in seeking a prior understanding about a “framework for [Britain’s] future relationship with the Union” which the withdrawal negotiations are required by article 50 to “take account of” – an impossibility if even an outline framework of the future relationship has not yet been worked out. This would have enabled our government to insist that the withdrawal agreement to be negotiated under article 50 must include an interim trade agreement to cover the years after Brexit while a permanent trade agreement is being negotiated. It would also have provided an opportunity, once the “framework” for future relations was known, for the British people to say, before the trigger is pulled, whether the terms on offer after Brexit would be better for British interests than remaining in the EU on our existing terms.
But by committing herself to pulling the trigger within a mere five months (including the Christmas holidays), the prime minister has thrown away her sole source of leverage, and with it the opportunity to get a better idea of what Brexit will actually involve before she burns our boats. And with the absurdly named “Great Repeal Act” she seeks a blank cheque in advance, designed to usurp parliament’s right and duty to manage the monumental legislative consequences of Brexit! Not a good start.
Brian Barder
London
• When free movement of people is presented as a non-negotiable feature of the European Union, it is well to remember that such movement can in some circumstances be limited. When 10 new nations joined the EU, existing members were offered transitional controls. For a period they could limit the number of migrants from those newly acceding states. The UK declined this facility, though France, Germany and Italy all chose to exercise the right, which expired in 2011. The offer of transitional control demonstrates that free movement of people is not an inviolable principle. Elections are imminent in Germany and France. Anti-immigration challengers face Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande. It seems likely that in self-defensive mode the French and German governments will decide that some temporary dilution of free movement is justified by events. How pointless Brexit will then be seen to be.
David Butler
London
• You point out that under the Good Friday agreement all citizens in the north are entitled to an Irish and therefore an EU passport (Northern Ireland could veto Brexit, Belfast high court told, theguardian.com, 4 October). Under that agreement’s principle of consent, any change to the constitutional position of Northern Ireland must be “subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland”. As you also point out, 56% of Northern Irish voters backed remain. The British government has accepted that the right to self-determination applies in any decision on whether Northern Ireland should leave the UK and join a united Ireland. Arguably withdrawal from the EU will have greater immediate consequences for the people of the north than any decision on reunification. Why should the same principle of consent not apply to this decision?
Declan O’Neill
Oldham
• It is not strictly correct that “ministers … can pass secondary legislation without any reference to parliament” (Brexit repeal bill is undemocratic, Letters, 4 October). Secondary legislation can take one of two forms, either requiring an affirmative resolution or passing automatically if a negative resolution is not moved and carried. There are, however, major problems. Secondary legislation cannot be amended, and all too often it is authorised by bills, like the housing and planning bill, with no opportunity for either house to see the outcome of any consultation that the government undertakes or any draft of possible regulations.
It is extremely rare for the Lords to reject secondary legislation, though over child tax credits it did ask the Commons to think again, much to the annoyance of Cameron and Osborne. The Lords, in the exercise of its function of holding government to account, does frequently debate regret motions to highlight concerns, but there is widespread concern at the growth in the use of secondary legislation to implement contentious policies with a minimum of parliamentary scrutiny.
Jeremy Beecham
Labour, House of Lords
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