When Hungary's Tisza party swept to a two-thirds majority, it ended Viktor Orban's 16-year grip on power and raised hopes – and difficult questions – about the country's democratic reset. Zsuzsanna Szelenyi, an early Fidesz member turned critic and now political analyst, reflects on Orban's transformation of the party, Hungary's regime-change challenges and a new generation's pro-European momentum.
Hungary's political landscape has been transformed by Tisza's election victory, which delivered the party a two-thirds majority and opened the door to a potential overhaul of the country's institutions.
One of the most interesting voices to assess that shift is Zsuzsanna Szelenyi, who was among the founding members of Fidesz in the late 1980s but broke with the party after Viktor Orbán pushed it sharply to the right and concentrated power around himself.
She later returned to politics and co-founded the opposition Egyutt ("Together") party, a coalition of civil society groups, and is now director of the Democracy Institute at the Central European University in Budapest.
RFI: You were one of the early members of Fidesz. When did you realise the party was no longer what you hoped it would be?
Zsuzsanna Szelenyi: Fidesz began in 1988 as a youth movement during the communist era, and in its early years it was still quite democratic and energetic.
The break, in my view, came after Viktor Orban became party chairman in 1993, when power started to centralise around him. From the mid-1990s onwards, he also shifted the party away from its liberal roots towards the right, as he saw greater political space there.
RFI: What was Orban like back then, and how much of today’s Orban was already visible?
ZS: He was already highly political, strategic and ambitious. He wanted to be first to speak and first to act, and he liked setting the agenda before others could.
He has certainly become more disciplined and much more experienced over time, but the basic instinct for power and control was always there.
RFI: Was your break with Fidesz a sudden decision or a slow process?
ZS: It was definitely a process. For me, it took one or two years before I concluded that I could no longer identify with that community.
"Orban always wanted to be the first"
Interview Zsuzsanna Szelenyi
By then there had been many conflicts and a great deal of frustration. Leaving also meant walking away from friends, a shared history and part of my own life, so it was very painful.
RFI: You’ve described Fidesz as a toxic political culture. What do you mean by that?
ZS: Orban treats disagreement as enmity. Even back in the early 1990s, people who thought differently were increasingly seen as opponents rather than colleagues.
That created a warlike atmosphere inside the party, and I think it later became the same logic in Hungarian politics more broadly: you are either with him or against him.
RFI: How would you define Orban’s system ideologically?
ZS: It is illiberalism, which is fundamentally anti-liberal. It rejects the separation of powers, the neutrality of the state and the idea that pluralism should be protected.
In Hungary, state resources, media and institutions have been used to serve Fidesz's political interests, while independent civil society and critical voices have been pushed back.
RFI: Why has Orban’s pro-Russian line worked in Hungary, despite the country’s 1956 history, when Soviet troops crushed a freedom movement and installed a pro-Moscow government?
ZS: It is important to say that Hungary itself is not pro-Russian; Orban and his government are.
He gradually changed the narrative, first by speaking of Russia in pragmatic terms, then by neutralising the memory of 1956 and later by framing the war in Ukraine in a way that shifted blame away from Russia.
But younger Hungarians are much less receptive to this, and that gives me hope.
RFI: How do you assess the rise of Peter Magyar? Like you, he also left Fidesz.
ZS: There are similarities, because anyone who leaves Fidesz has to deal with Orban's overwhelming personality and the very rigid structure around him.
But Magyar is from a different generation and has chosen a different tactical line. He avoids Fidesz's favourite culture-war topics, which is sensible because it gives them less room to attack him.
RFI: Can Hungary really change government smoothly after the majority win of Magyar and Tisza?
ZS: The victory does not automatically mean an easy transition. Fidesz loyalists are embedded across the state apparatus, ministries, the police, the military and many other institutions.
On top of that, a lot of public money has been moved into private hands through structures built by Fidesz. So this is not just a normal change of government; it is a much deeper regime-change challenge.
RFI: How much support is there now for a different future?
ZS: There is a major generation gap. Many older Fidesz voters still follow Orban, but young people in their twenties are far more European in outlook and often do not even understand his Brussels-versus-Hungary rhetoric.
That is why I believe Hungary can still return to a more democratic and reasonable path, even if the practical work ahead will be very difficult.
