*“There is no finer teacher of war than war,” said Mao and as the Ukraine-Russia war nears the end of three weeks, it is time one takes stock of India’s position in the real world of geopolitics.
In the real world, ‘power’ talks — as Greek historian Thucydides wrote in the Fifth Century BC, “Right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power — while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” The dogged resistance of Ukraine notwithstanding, ‘power’ has spoken through Russian actions, with Russian President Vladimir Putin demanding that all Russian demands be met, including a call to surrender. This leads to two fundamental deductions at the macro-level.
Ukraine is alone
First, a nation’s vital interests can be protected only by that nation itself. For all the pompous statements coming from the West, promises of arms supply being made and intelligence inputs that must be getting transmitted, the fact is that it is the Ukrainians alone who are facing the brunt of the Russian military might. It has always been conjectured whether the United States would come to the aid of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally in Europe, following a Russian advance, and risk its own cities in turn. The answer is starkly visible. Good intentions and media statements have never stopped a bullet and surely, there would be soul searching that is ongoing in the minds of allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan too, as the fallacy of a ‘friend’ coming to fight with you and for you has been exposed, yet again.
The Indian parallel
India’s experience has been similar. During the 1962 India-China war, Moscow had no time for New Delhi (in fact, it sided with Beijing) and the Americans offered moral and logistic support, despite New Delhi’s request for military help. The 1965 war was one of redemption as India re-armed itself in a big way, a drive that continued and gave us the outright victory in 1971. Then, in 1974, it is to the credit of the Indian leadership for demonstrating India’s scientific capability through a ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion and the leadership in 1998 for going overtly nuclear. To the common man, this constitutes power, but between two nuclear-capable nations, an atomic weapon is a deterrent in the nuclear realm and not a determinant of ‘conventional’ power. As India faces two nuclear adversaries, the reality of India having lagged in true indigenous conventional capability must be accepted. This leads to the second deduction.
For a nation to have strategic autonomy in matters of national security, self-sufficiency in defence research and development and manufacturing is an inescapable imperative. This would afford the required deterrence to prevent war, and to prosecute it (war) if deterrence fails. The sessions at the United Nations on Ukraine, where India abstained, saw New Delhi as a tightrope walker as it is heavily dependent on Russia and the U.S., for political reasons as well as for arms.
Arms from the West too
After the Cold War ended, India diversified its purchases to dilute its dependence on Russia for arms. While the narrative has been on the MiGs, Antonovs, Sukhois, S-400, T-90 tanks, Grad rocket launchers, Kilo-class submarines, et. al, one overlooks the fact that India has become heavily dependent on the West too for a multitude of frontline armament systems. For example, the heavylift transport fleet of the Indian Air Force (IAF) relies heavily on the American C-17 and C-130J Super Hercules aircraft, while the helicopter fleet has the Chinook and Apache attack helicopters. Similarly, the Indian Navy has the Boeing P-8I long range aircraft for maritime surveillance and is acquiring MH-60 helicopters for anti-submarine warfare and Sea Guardian drones for reconnaissance. The Indian Army’s M777 artillery guns are from the West, the IAF’s Rafale and Mirage fighters from France, Jaguars from Britain and a multitude of drones from Israel; even the basic infantry rifle is being imported. And, India has signed three ‘foundational’ agreements with the U.S.; the sword of Damocles, through the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is ever present. The list is very long and encompasses both ‘camps,’ as it were. Are there any doubts now about why, besides political reasons, we abstained in the UN Security Council vote? So, what is the way out?
The writing is on the wall. A nation’s standing in the pecking order based only on soft power is ephemeral. As the West twiddles its thumbs, ‘Ukraine’ proves that hard power dictates terms in geopolitics. Thucydides understood it in Fifth Century BC and we are in for a rough time if we do not get it even now. The Atmanirbhar thrust of the Government in matters of defence research and development and manufacturing, though gathering pace, has to become a national endeavour in mission mode, bridging differences across the political aisle and providing a political continuum to underwrite it. There is no other way out.
Air Vice Marshal Manmohan Bahadur VM (retired) is former Additional Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi
