Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai today took charge as the 52nd Chief Justice of India. His tenure will last barely seven months and is set to end on December 23. This is only slightly longer than that of the current CJI, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, whose term spanned about six months. By contrast, former CJI DY Chandrachud had a two-year tenure – one of the few longer stints seen in the last seven-and-a-half decades.
The brevity of terms has become more pronounced in recent years. From April 2014 to August 2022, the average tenure of a CJI was about nine months. But even in earlier decades, CJI terms were not particularly long. Data from a study covering 1950 to 2018 shows the average tenure was around 18 months – hardly substantial for a period spanning nearly 70 years.
This means several CJIs have served even shorter terms. For example, Justice UU Lalit, the 49th CJI, held office for less than three months. Notably, Justice KN Singh, the 22nd CJI, had the shortest tenure – just 17 days – taking office on November 25, 1991, and retiring on December 12 of the same year.
Longer terms are rare and often seen as exceptions. Justice YV Chandrachud, the 16th CJI, had the longest stint of over seven years, serving from February 22, 1978, to July 11, 1985. Other relatively long tenures in recent decades include Justice A.M. Ahmadi (1994–1997) and Justice SH Kapadia (2010–2012).
Since 1950, when the Supreme Court replaced the Federal Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as India’s apex court, most CJIs have served for less than two years. This pattern is largely shaped by constitutional norms, as outlined in Article 124, and established conventions. However, these short terms raise important concerns about institutional stability and the consistent development of a judicial philosophy at the top court. As both the administrative and judicial head of India’s judiciary, the CJI’s frequent turnover leads to abrupt shifts in the leadership and direction of the court.
This brings us to the obvious question: Why are CJI tenures often so short?
The answer lies in the interplay between constitutional provisions and conventional practices. Supreme Court judges must retire at the age of 65. Additionally, by convention, the senior-most judge is appointed CJI. When both conditions are met, it often results in brief CJI tenures, since senior judges typically have only a short time left before mandatory retirement.
While this system ensures impartiality and predictability in appointments, it can also be overly rigid and indifferent to the drawbacks of frequent leadership changes. The brevity of these terms is rarely factored into appointment considerations, and its implications for judicial administration are often overlooked.
A short stint hampers the CJI’s ability to implement systemic reforms. As master of the roster, the CJI allocates cases, forms benches, and oversees court administration. Frequent transitions disrupt continuity and hinder the formulation of a consistent policy vision. A longer tenure would allow a CJI to leave a stronger administrative and judicial legacy, address pressing issues such as case pendency, infrastructure, and court management, and shape the court’s jurisprudence in a meaningful way.
Moreover, stability at the top brings predictability for court staff, the bar, and litigants. Long-term reforms are more likely to take root when the court’s leadership remains steady.
One way to address this issue is to revisit the retirement age. Compared to other judicial systems, India’s retirement age appears modest. In the United States, Supreme Court Chief Justices hold lifetime appointments, subject only to resignation or impeachment. In the United Kingdom, the President of the Supreme Court – equivalent in rank to India’s CJI – retires at 70, and seniority is not a criterion for appointment.
That said, India’s judiciary must be viewed within its own historical and institutional context. Calls for reform must be grounded in local realities.
Scholars Aparna Chandra, William Hubbard, and Sital Kalantry, in a data-driven study, have argued for raising the retirement age of Supreme Court judges to 70 – though not for lifetime appointments. The Law Commission of India has also recommended a three-year increase. Besides promoting institutional stability, Chandra and colleagues note that a higher retirement age could reduce the need for retired judges to seek post-retirement appointments. However, they caution that to avoid perceptions of self-serving reform, any constitutional amendment must apply only to newly appointed judges.
Another reform option is re-evaluating the seniority principle in appointments. However, this is more contentious. Bypassing seniority introduces discretion into appointments and risks politicising the process. The current system, despite its flaws, offers predictability and carries the weight of long-standing legitimacy. Thus, increasing the retirement age may be a more palatable and effective reform than altering the seniority convention.
As the new CJI begins his short tenure – like many of his predecessors – it is imperative to bring the conversation about tenure reform into the public domain. Institutional stability, coherent judicial philosophy, and the capacity to implement long-term reforms all demand a longer, more assured term for the country’s top judge.
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