Diplomacy occasionally has the capacity to surprise, and when it does it often portends a deep shifting in the landscape.
Few as recently as the end of last week saw much chance that the UN security council would be able to put aside five months of division over Gaza and agree terms for an immediate ceasefire, yet on Monday that is precisely what happened, in no small part due to some British diplomatic persuasion and a significant American change of heart.
As a result the US did not use its veto to block a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.
What practical difference it makes on the ground in Rafah and Khan Younis it is too early to say, but judging by the initial furious Israeli reaction, and cries of US betrayal, this is about more than some words in the text of a UN resolution: it marks another moment in the painful, almost anguished US diplomatic distancing from its chief ally in the Middle East.
Two weeks ago the terrain looked very different. The US at the UN headquarters in New York had started a concerted effort to reassert its diplomatic leadership role over Gaza. It felt it had been pushed on the back foot, three times vetoing ceasefire resolutions, and wanted to show it could draft a positive policy on Gaza rather than just being cast in the role of Israel’s last diplomatic redoubt.
Yet last Friday this plan fell apart when its lengthy draft resolution was vetoed by Russia and China and rejected by Algeria. The draft was widely billed in the media as backing an immediate ceasefire, but any close examination of the contorted US text showed the sentiments were more complex. It said a ceasefire had to be connected with the release of all hostages, making it a conditional call. The draft also made few explicit demands of Israel, even if many were implied.
At the same time a rival draft ceasefire resolution, much shorter and less conditional, was being circulated at the UN headquarters by the 10 non-permanent members of the security council, including many allies of the US.
When the US text was blocked by Russia on Friday it was assumed this alternative ceasefire text would in turn be vetoed by the US.
Over the weekend US diplomats duly pushed for the ceasefire call in the draft to be linked to the release of the hostages. But the non-permanent members stood their ground, insisting that while both the release of hostages and a ceasefire were imperative they could not be linked, since to do so would provide justification for Israel to continue military action in Gaza on the grounds Hamas had not agreed terms for the release of all hostages.
The absolute priority had to be saving civilians in northern Gaza from imminent starvation, and in southern Gaza the displaced had to be saved from a threatened Israel ground offensive in Rafah.
Similarly the non-permanent 10 did not allow the talks between Hamas and Israel that were being overseen by the US to be anything more than acknowledged in the resolution’s text. This meant the UN could not be treated any longer as a bystander to US-led diplomacy on the ground. The UN had come to its own view of what was necessary and that was an immediate ceasefire and release of the hostages, two self-standing events.
The US faced a difficult choice, especially since its closest ally the UK was not prepared to abstain. David Cameron, the foreign secretary, could no longer hide his fury at Israel’s prevarication over the supply of aid.
So could the US for the fourth time block a humanitarian ceasefire, leaving the civilians exposed to Israel’s promised Rafah attack? Or could it instead finally implicitly acknowledge that continually acting as Israel’s diplomatic protection squad had not won it much influence over either Benjamin Netanyahu’s military or political strategy?
In the end the US acknowledged that its effort to grab the UN Gaza agenda had failed, and instead acknowledged the wider mood at the UN. The applause at the security council after the resolution passed was an outpouring of relief, recalling for some the moment when the French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin gave his stunning speech against the Iraq war in 2003.
Israel had already sensed the way the wind is blowing among western allies, but is in no mood to stop fighting until Hamas is entirely crushed. “All those countries turning away from Israel now will look back at this moment as a mark of shame,” said Israel’s strategic affairs minister, Ron Dermer, last week. “After all those statements in support of the Jewish people when we’re victims, you abandon us now, on the last leg before our victory against a genocidal terrorist force? Shameful.”
The sense of abandonment in Israel will now be acute, but it may not be enough to deter it from testing American resolve by marching ahead alone. However much sympathy Israel retains, the vote is a significant moment in how the world views its conduct in this war.
There is little sign that Biden wants to use the vote as a springboard for a confrontation with Netanyahu. Faced by virulent Republican and Israeli accusations of betrayal the Biden administration has instead tried to play down the significance of the vote, saying the US abstention does not represent a change in policy, and pointing out that references to ceasefire and hostages are in one sentence.
Biden’s diplomats also surprisingly claim the resolution is non-binding – a judgment not shared by the British, who say it should be implemented immediately. It serves to underline how little the US is in control of events.
On Tuesday 30 April, 7-8.15pm GMT, join Devika Bhat, Peter Beaumont, Emma Graham-Harrison and Ghaith Abdul-Ahad as they discuss the fast-developing crisis in the Middle East.
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