“We have the character of an island nation … and because of this sensibility we come to the European debate with a frame of mind that is more practical than emotional.” This was David Cameron’s pitch to Europe in a speech at the start of 2013: British pragmatism could help European leaders achieve overdue reform, in order to create a more flexible Europe to the benefit of everyone.
Almost three years later, Cameron finds himself mired in a set of difficult negotiations that cast this offer in a naive light. As Europe has found itself contending with the eurozone and refugee crises, he has struggled first to even articulate a set of reform proposals and then to get them meaningfully on the agenda.
Cameron was right to raise the issue of EU reform. The European Union was founded in the name of international order: above all else, to prevent another war. Events of the last 24 months – the Russian annexation of Crimea; the refugee crisis; Islamic State’s growing sphere of influence and the Paris terror attacks – show that the transnational approach to cooperation that the EU represents has never been more essential.
But Europe is facing significant challenges as a result of internal dynamics and external factors. European leaders have simultaneously driven a deepening of the union, through currency integration, and its broadening, through eastwards expansion. Both the refugee and the eurozone crises have exposed limits to national leaders’ appetite for cooperation in a union that spans ever greater economic and cultural diversity, and have led populations across Europe to increasingly question the legitimacy of the European project. As an outlier from the core European bloc, Britain’s experience has been different. Euroscepticism is more prevalent here than on the continent, which has shaped the British approach to Europe: Britain has maintained fiercely guarded opt-outs – for example, from the Schengen agreement – and stood back from joining the euro.
In the context of an ascendant Ukip earlier this year, Cameron had to address growing concerns about immigration and the EU. The rise of Marine Le Pen’s National Front in France is a cautionary indication of what can result when voters perceive that the political elite have failed to address their concerns about immigration.
Given the draining nature of the debate on Britain’s future in Europe, the prime minister had a strong case when he proposed a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU.
But Cameron’s negotiating strategy has put that membership at unnecessary risk. Rather than making a pragmatic case for staying in Europe while acknowledging its need for long-term reform, he has framed the EU as a deeply problematic set of institutions we should only stay in if we can get significant reform. His demands range from the symbolic and easy to grant to his request to restrict the eligibility of European migrants for in-work benefits, which is very difficult. This latter proposal would contradict existing EU law and, unless a fudge can be found, would require treaty change, something only achievable through years of alliance building. But treaty change now is in no one’s interests: the French and Germans will do anything they can to avoid opening it up ahead of their national elections in the next two years. Cameron was never going to win the support of eastern European leaders for his proposal while being seen to scapegoat their citizens in Britain.
Even if the prime minister were to win this concession, experts agree it is unlikely to have a significant impact in reducing immigration from Europe: benefits are not the main draw. In fact, the higher national living wage will most likely more than outweigh any disincentive effect that may come from reducing benefits eligibility. Everyone in Europe knows this.
Far from the British pragmatism Cameron promised his European colleagues three years ago, he has stubbornly pursued a concession on inwork benefits that was always going to be difficult for European leaders to deliver. He needs to agree a deal quickly to resolve the existing impasse, in which he is neither arguing for Britain to stay in or out, and the “remain” campaign do not know the deal on which to base their campaign.
The saving grace is that European leaders no more want Britain to leave the EU than Cameron wants his legacy to be our departure. It means he will probably get some kind of face-saving deal on benefits that would sit easier with EU law than what he is currently asking for. But the lack of the British practical mindset Cameron originally championed means he has wasted an opportunity for Britain to contribute to the longer-term European reform debate.
