Even though Asean may now get a mediation effort started in Myanmar, others who can play a role in helping to address immediate humanitarian needs, particularly related to Covid-19, must go ahead and assist where they can.
More than six months after Myanmar's coup, Asean has finally appointed a special envoy for Myanmar.
Shortly after the military takeover of Feb 1, the regional organisation asserted the importance of "Asean centrality". Although that term has different interpretations, in essence it implies that Asean must be at the core of regional cooperation among member states, and in dealing with international issues affecting the region.
Asean, however, was not in a hurry to address the Myanmar crisis which was quickly spiralling out of control. Its behaviour confirmed that its overriding concern is keeping the peace between the 10 member states. Dealing with a serious crisis within a member state comes second, even if that crisis has regional and international ramifications.
Unfortunately Asean thus far, like a deer caught in headlights, does not know what to do in the face of an existential political crisis that collides with a major humanitarian emergency.
It took almost three months to convene a leaders meeting in Jakarta and another three to appoint a special envoy. Newly appointed Erywan Pehin Yusof, deputy foreign minister of Brunei, has his work cut out for him. While there is no time to be wasted, he remains tied down by divisions within Asean as well as by Myanmar's expected intransigence and obstruction.
Until now, important members of the international community like the United States, Japan, European Union and United Kingdom were resigned to letting Asean take the lead. It suited them because their own leverage with Myanmar's self-professed leaders is limited. But their patience with Asean is wearing thin. If "waiting for Asean" continues to be the axiom for the coming weeks and months, they may feel compelled to step up the pressure. The annual sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, commencing in September, could well prove to be an important inflexion point.
Doubts in the international community are understandable. Just before Asean appointed its envoy, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing tried to legitimise his own position and that of his regime by declaring himself prime minister and turning the State Administration Council into a caretaker government. He also annulled the results of the 2020 election and announced fresh elections in 2023 and extended the state of emergency by two years.
The announcement was a clear effort to stall for time.
Min Aung Hlaing must have thought that covering a dire situation with a bit of veneer would help him keep control of the agenda going forward. But the US, Japan, UK and others took him on. Even the UN commented that it was a move in the wrong direction from international calls for the restoration of democracy.
"The decision by the military to extend the so-called state of emergency in Myanmar is unjustifiable and a blatant attempt to solidify their undemocratic power grab," UK foreign minister Dominic Raab said.
The Joint Communique the Asean foreign ministers issued on Wednesday does not convey a sense of urgency and it lacks any reference to the critical humanitarian situation, including the suffering caused by Covid-19, the urgent need to bring the pandemic under control and to provide direct relief to infected populations. It sticks to the five-point consensus agreed in Jakarta in April.
While the Asean envoy has now been appointed, implementation of the other four consensus points is yet to begin. These include immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue among all parties concerned and the provision of humanitarian assistance through the Asean Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA).
As he proceeds, the Asean envoy should acknowledge that the military regime is not in full control of Myanmar. It lacks control over many civilian government institutions such as the departments of health, education and transport, and over local government structures in many parts of the country. In addition, large swaths of the country are under the control of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs).
The past six months have also shown that Myanmar's population overwhelmingly rejects the military regime as its legitimate representative. Not acknowledging this will fatally flaw the envoy's effort from the start. He must interact with all parties, including the National Unity Government, the EAOs, the Civil Disobedience Movement and any others he chooses to include in his dialogue efforts.
Asean has a role to play but political dialogue and the search for immediate and long-term solutions will take time. The humanitarian crisis in the country is now such that while the envoy pursues dialogue, including about support via AHA, additional, practicable ways must be found to move forward quickly, particularly to address the dramatic Covid situation.
This is already starting to happen. China, for example, is providing vaccines, PPE and medicines to the KIA and the UWSA, two major EAOs operating along its borders, while it also vaccinates people on its own side of the border. This is a win-win situation for both Myanmar and China's Yunnan province.
Working within cooperative structures along Myanmar's long borders is a pragmatic way to start bringing supplies into the country. People on both sides of the Thai-Myanmar border, for example, have decades of experience, and community-based organisations are trusted by the population. Once a foothold has been gained, supply corridors might be extended beyond the border areas if that is a safe way to reach more communities.
This requires partnering with Myanmar's neighbours, the UN, Thai humanitarian organisations and international NGOs. As part of the partnership, people on both sides of the border should receive the same services so that the border is turned into a buffer zone against Covid. Many community-based service providers operate along the border. Their participation would also facilitate the re-opening of border posts, helping communities to revive their livelihoods.
Of the five countries bordering Myanmar, only two are Asean members -- Thailand and Laos. That alone is reason enough to look beyond Asean and to suggest approaches that can also be applied with assistance from Bangladesh, China and India. What is important at this point is to pull together all those who have the capacity to support Myanmar's people at short notice. No option must remain unexplored.
As Emma Leslie of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies has said, "Myanmar's current reality is that the situation differs from area to area. We will need a patchwork of tailor-made approaches to suit individual communities and local actors." A one-suits all approach will fail.
Lastly, Asean and all international actors and aid organisations should commit themselves to the "do no harm" principle. Working with a military regime that has been committing crimes against humanity against its own people on an unthinkable scale, risks legitimising the very regime against which a vast majority of Myanmar's people has risen up.
Syed Hamid Albar is a former foreign minister of Malaysia. Marzuki Darusman is a member of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar. Laetitia van den Assum is a former Netherlands ambassador and member of the Rakhine Advisory Commission. Kobsak Chutikul is a retired ambassador of Thailand and a former elected member of parliament.
