The international response to the existential crises facing Sierra Leone and Iraq – of Ebola and the Islamic State – has been largely reactive and tactical. Instead it needs to be strategic.
Britain has strong links to, and interests in, both countries: Britain was directly responsible for Iraq’s creation in 1920, with League of Nation’s approval, and has been heavily involved in the country ever since, whether it was its lead role in the first Gulf War, or helping set up the prime minister’s office and council of ministers following the 2003 invasion. The new incumbent prime minister even held British citizenship until last month.
Britain’s relationship with Sierra Leone is just as close, not least aided by the nation’s continued membership in the Commonwealth and Britain’s intervention in the Civil War in 2000 which helped bring the disastrous conflict to a definite end.
Both countries share democratic governments that could be overwhelmed by the challenges they are currently facing. The fears of governmental collapse in both Sierra Leone and Iraq are demonstrated by the shipping of over 3,750 western military personnel to the former nation, and the military and air power support provided to the latter. At worst, these crises can lead to a breakdown of order and the real possibility of total collapse. Even established governments struggle to handle major crises. One needs only recall the failure of the US government to provide adequate humanitarian aid to New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina’s destruction. In a febrile environment where rumour and misinformation stalk every corridor and where decision makers are confronted constantly by mortal threat, the task is greater still.
High-quality strategic support to the central government machinery in Iraq and Sierra Leone is critical to stabilise the situation in both countries. Existing institutions, administrative machinery and established procedures - while imperfect - must be reinforced and strengthened rather than bypassed.
Specifically roles and responsibilities of key institutions, in handling key aspects of both crises, must be clarified – whether the purpose and policing of the three day lock down in Sierra Leone or managing the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) crisis in Iraq. Decision-making and accountability must be tightened; communications and information flows within government - and to media outlets and the public - must be improved.
So far, tactical necessity has prevented such strategic action. But the bombing of Isis positions to ameliorate the immediate threat to Baghdad, and the rushing to establish hospital beds for Ebola victims, represent short term panaceas rather than long term cures.
In addition to being a tactical necessity, development trends are not conducive to support of this nature. Following the UK’s retreat from foreign aid to Iraq in 2011, the lack of vital aid support to governance programmes and institution-building in conflict-affected countries exposes the Iraqi government.
The UK’s cut of institutional health care support to Sierra Leone has been linked to its government’s ability to respond, with Sir Malcolm Bruce saying that the scale of the crisis ‘may well be connected to declining levels of international support for health system improvements’ in Sierra Leone.
The shock for observers I knew of in Baghdad eight or nine years ago was the scale and mediocrity of technical assistance to the Iraqi Government. The shock I experienced on a visit to Baghdad this month is the almost total lack of meaningful assistance after the international community headed, with alacrity, to the exit in 2010/11.
This is not the time to beat the retreat from governance support This is the time to double down, to learn from and accept the failures of the past. While the donor focus on the development of the private sector is to be welcomed - growth cannot be achieved in the absence of governance, institutions and rule of law. In Iraq and Sierra Leone the “golden thread” approach to development must begin at the centre of government.
In both Iraq and Sierra Leone both governments require immediate short to medium term support in the following areas:
1. Co-ordination within government
Support is required to define who is responsible for what and to help establish more effective decision-making frameworks. Following the deterioration in Mosul and the flight of the Yazidis, the Iraqi government while in the midst of a political transition has established what I believe to be a number of overlapping and poorly co-ordinated bodies – in the cabinet office, in the prime ministers’ office, in Erbil and in the ministry of migration and displaced persons - to handle the internally displaced people crisis. These are operating largely in isolation.
In Sierra Leone decision-making processes need to be fine-tuned given confusion among donors about who to work with, complaints from some ministers about being bypassed, and conflicting public statements amid the arrival of greater international support.
The priority is to co-ordinate and define the roles of the Presidential Task Force, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Ebola and the Ebola Operations Committee; and ensure that processes are instituted to make sure the information that flows to and from these bodies is efficient and aids decision-making.
2. Strategic communications to help control and define the agenda; to get the messages out to the population about the current realities and the steps that being taken to address the crises.
Misinformation, rumour and conjecture are filling the empty space, fuelling concern and in some cases panic. Sierra Leonean reports of dead Ebola victims coming back to life, and the subsequent public panic, is a clear example of how misinformation is fuelling panic. Rumours in Baghdad on 30th September of an Isis invasion 2km from the city centre demonstrates the need for proper governmental communication. The new government in Iraq has yet to appoint a government spokesperson. In Sierra Leone there is no media centre able to handle the crisis.
3. Support to establish capacity to monitor results and drive delivery
Both governments are operating with limited data on what is happening. This is needed to provide evidence to inform decision-making, drive delivery and to provide material to inform public communications.
4. Work to prepare recovery plans to address the equally challenging tasks of responding to the economic, social and political fall-out from the crisis.
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