In November 2012, an internal report into the shortcomings of the United Nations in the final stages of the war in Sri Lanka urged: never again. The secretary general embraced it, speaking frankly about the UN’s failure to meet its responsibilities and the need to learn lessons. Ban Ki-moon went on to note that the conflict in Syria was the latest reminder of how crucial the organisation’s work was.
Almost four years on, however, the Syrian crisis shows the dilemmas still faced by UN humanitarian missions, and persistent deficiencies in its response. The $4bn (£3bn) aid effort is its most expensive and challenging to date. The dedication of its staff is to be commended. It is also all the more reason to be dismayed by the Guardian’s revelations that contracts worth tens of millions of dollars have gone to people close to Bashar al-Assad. They include payments to businessmen whose companies are under US and EU sanctions and to charities set up by the president’s wife, Asma al-Assad, and his friend and cousin Rami Makhlouf, linked to pro-regime militia groups.
The problem is clear: operating in the country forces humanitarians to make difficult choices, as a UN spokesman has said. One could be blunter: it forces them to make bad choices, since those are the only kind available. Faced with choosing between dealing with unsavoury partners or turning its back on needy civilians, it has opted for the former course. Yet the decisions it has made in Syria are of deep concern to many within the organisation as well as outside it. These unhappy compromises have left millions of desperate civilians without aid, and enabled a flow of aid to government-controlled areas which bolsters Mr Assad.
Concerns that the regime might kick the UN out of Syria entirely, should it become too outspoken, are real. With Moscow on his side, the president feels he has little to fear. Yet it is worth considering the precedents again. The 2012 Sri Lanka review found that the UN had failed to adequately confront the government over its obstructions to humanitarian assistance. Thousands died from inadequate medical care and lack of food. In at least one instance, the report noted, the expectation that the UN would not confront the government may have influenced the latter’s actions.
The international community has failed to halt the war. A robust and fair humanitarian response is the very least required. The UN’s scope for leverage may be extremely limited, but it is not nonexistent. In one of the most disturbing cases in Syria, the World Health Organisation has spent more than $5m to support the national blood bank – controlled by the defence department. Insiders questioned the legality of dealing with defence rather than health officials, and acknowledged concerns that supplies could be directed to the military first. Blood bags and testing kits are not included on UN convoys from Damascus to areas outside government control. Yet when the agreement was drafted, the Syrian government could not obtain the supplies that it needed. This was, surely, a prime opportunity to push back.
The UN now faces calls for an independent inquiry into its actions. Such a review would be valuable. But the record shows that asking the right questions and drawing the appropriate conclusions are one thing; putting them into action is the much harder but more important task.
• This article was amended on 31 August 2016. An earlier version referred to “latter course” where “former course” was meant.
