To a government which relies upon hammers, everything looks like a nail. But the new coronavirus which emerged in Wuhan cannot simply be beaten down. Despite tens of millions being under lockdown in Hubei, around 640 people are dead and more than 31,500 infected (the vast majority in the Chinese province, but with other cases from Canada to Singapore to Russia). It is unpredictable: we remain unsure of its transmissibility and its fatality rate. We do not know how far it has spread already. We do not know whether it will be containable. This time, the enormous powers of the Chinese state face an enemy immune to its controls, exposing the system’s fundamental flaws.
A state which justifies its existence largely by providing material security has proved able to mobilise and supply huge amounts of resources when faced with emergencies, as in its rapid response to 2008’s devastating earthquake in Sichuan. But this time, while the state has made a great show of constructing brand new hospitals, the city lacks medical staff and basic protective gear. The sick are being herded into quarantine centres where minimal care is available.
The anger has spread beyond Wuhan to the broader Chinese population as the full, shocking scale of failures by local officials has become clearer. One man’s death exemplifies them. Li Wenliang warned fellow doctors of his concern about a spate of unusual pneumonia cases early in the outbreak – only to be silenced by police. His death sparked fury, itself swiftly censored.
Similar surges of public anger have been seen over issues including shoddily built schools, toxic baby formula and a high-speed train crash. Each time, the rage reflected deeper concerns about the role of corruption and cover-ups – and, after a brief flurry of openness, it was suppressed. While authorities have warned officials not to conceal coronavirus cases, censorship of courageous Chinese reporters and social media is tightening. Yet the outbreak continues to unfold, and it directly affects people across the country, emotionally and economically if not physically. There are growing questions about national authorities. Some believe that Xi Jinping’s centralisation of power, and valuing of ideology over technocracy, has degraded local competence and exacerbated the urge to suppress bad news. That Dr Li was punished for a private message to other doctors shows how far the space for discussion has shrunk.
China’s measures are draconian, and their effectiveness has yet to be seen, though the WHO cautiously welcomed an apparent drop in new cases in recent days. Other places have taken dramatic steps too, including closing borders to travellers from China. Though experts focus on hygiene measures, some think movement controls may help to buy scientists and doctors time. To deal with uncertainty and nuance is hard. But it is necessary if we are to act humanely and sensibly. What is needed is the best response, not the toughest: scalpels rather than hammers.
