In recent UK general elections, Northern Ireland has struggled to get a look-in. The reasons are familiar. The election in the 18 constituencies of Northern Ireland dances to a different tune from those in Britain. The issues are different. So are the parties. And in a parliament of 650 MPs, the results rarely affect the final arithmetic in big ways, even during the hung parliament of 2010-15.
The 2017 election in Northern Ireland hasn’t quite bucked that trend. As usual the contest is firmly rooted within and between the two traditions of unionism and nationalism. Only one or two of the 18 seats show much possibility of changing hands. But there is a discernible change in mood nevertheless. In the wake of Brexit there is a greater awareness in mainland Britain that the contest in Northern Ireland has implications for the wider UK – and Northern Ireland’s parties have noticed.
Last week Theresa May relaunched her Brexit argument with a 12-point plan of which two – a deal that works for the devolved parts of the UK, and the maintenance of the common travel area – directly affect Northern Ireland. Labour’s manifesto likewise insists that Brexit must not result in a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Irish republic. The EU has itself made clear, in the words of council president Donald Tusk, that the three big issues in the Brexit talks will be “people, money and Ireland”. To the extent that this has been a Brexit election, Northern Ireland is therefore very much at its heart.
Yet the election in Northern Ireland is actually proving to be the usual contest between the two traditions refracted through the prism of Brexit, rather than a contest that Brexit has upended into a remain v leave battle. In that respect, and in its own distinctive way, Northern Irish politics is similar to politics elsewhere in the UK, where the transformative impact of the Brexit vote has also been exaggerated. To be sure, a practical solution to the Irish border issue will be a massive element of the forthcoming process and must not be taken for granted. But the expectation in London, Belfast, Dublin – and Brussels – remains that a solution will be found. Claims that Brexit has put Irish unification back on the agenda are wide of the mark and wishful thinking.
The more pressing issue is whether and when the parties will agree to relaunch the devolved institutions that have been suspended since January. At the moment, there is no sign of that happening. A week from now the parties will resume talks. If Theresa May is prime minister, there is little likelihood of immediate progress, especially if her majority is small and the unionists decide on brinkmanship. If Jeremy Corbyn is prime minister, progress is even less likely, with republicans now the ones looking for concessions, and unionist alarm bells ringing.
The weekend changing of the guard in Dublin, by contrast, is less likely to disturb things. Enda Kenny’s departure as taoiseach and the election of Leo Varadkar as the new Fine Gael leader poses no immediate threat to the minority government in the republic. Mr Varadkar’s eyes will be fixed on winning over middle Ireland in time for an election that is expected in 2018, provided that the eurozone continues its recent growth. This would be symbolised for Ireland by the recently mooted start of the sell-off of the AIB bank bailed out at the height of the 2010 crisis.
On 8 June Northern Ireland is likely to elect a familiar mix of MPs. Yet they will take their seats (or not, if Sinn Féin maintains its boycott) in a parliament that will make the biggest decision affecting Northern Ireland since the Good Friday agreement. The softest possible border for Northern Ireland is widely recognised to be in the common interest of both halves of Ireland and of Britain. It should be an integral part of an approach to Brexit by the incoming UK government that extends beyond Ireland to the whole EU. All possible practical ties should be maintained and adapted within the new relationship imposed by the 2016 leave vote.
