If all power corrupts, power which has to argue its corner corrupts somewhat less. In differently-shaped systems from the UK’s, political leaders often have to persuade a separate legislative branch to go along with their plans, or else persuade judges that their laws can be squared with the constitution. In Britain, however, the ultimate ground rule is that “the Queen in parliament is sovereign”, which in plain English means that a prime minister in possession of a decent Commons majority can do pretty well as they please. The potential dangers were long ago summed up by Lord Hailsham in the phrase “elective dictatorship”. In practice, however, other aspects of the political culture have checked the corruption of process, notably an independent civil service, increasingly rigorous parliamentary scrutiny and a shared understanding, across party lines, that top public jobs go to people who know what they are doing, as opposed to placemen.
Alarmingly, however, all of these informal checks and balances are now being short-circuited. In parliament, MPs are asking better questions about government bills than they used to, but ministers are pushing through ever-more of their programme in regulations, obviating the need for any new legislation, or any argument about it. The issue came to attention after George Osborne attempted to ram through tax credit cuts, which would hit many families for well over £1,000 a year, in so-called statutory instruments. In that case, exceptional public and media pressure ultimately emboldened the House of Lords to show him a firm thumbs down. But when there are over 10,000 SIs made annually, typically sailing through on a simple “yay or nay” vote, or with no parliamentary division at all, such disruptions are going to be rare. The wider trend, as the former lord chief justice, Igor Judge, has argued this week, is for “Henry VIII clauses”, which quietly undo legislation that has been properly thrashed out in parliament, and for bills like the recent Childcare Act, which handed ministers sweeping powers to appoint someone or other to do something or other at some later stage.
The other big issue, highlighted by the outgoing commissioner for public appointments, Sir David Normington, concerns the sort of “someone or other” that gets picked to big public jobs. Ministers are always tempted to appoint kindred spirits, just as much so in the New Labour era as since. What has been unravelling more recently, however, are a few basic understandings which date back to the mid-1990s, when appointment rules were tightened in response to a perception of sleaze that dogged the Major government. The recent Grimstone report is full of reassuring rhetoric, but sweeps away most of the specific protections against packing jobs with partisans. Open competitions, the requirement for reconsideration when standards are not met, and independent appointment panels – all of these things will become optional extras.
Ministers have already secured more power to pick top mandarins and now they are looking to shore up their grip on the boards of public bodies, from economic regulators to the BBC. Sir David relayed to the FT how one secretary of state had raged after five ministerially favoured candidates for a particular job, four with Conservative connections, were denied interviews, for failing to match the official criteria. It was, no doubt, frustrating for the minister concerned. In the end, however, good governance depends on top public professionals speaking truth unto power. Partisans cannot be relied on to do that.
