Without the Scottish National party’s opposition to renewal of Trident there would be almost no discussion about defence in this election. Given the scope of the debate Britain needs, of which Trident’s future is one part, this absence shames all the main parties. The silence is also dishonest, since the parties know that after 7 May swingeing cuts will force important decisions.
Two questions underlie the debate. What kind of country do we want to be? And what external threats face us and our allies? One approach to the first would advocate a scaled-down military that more closely reflects Britain’s reduced global standing – a super-Denmark, as one Tory describes it. An alternative answer would emphasise a force and reach that would allow the UK to maintain a disproportionate world influence. Yet neither approach means much without a realistic appreciation of current dangers related to, say, Russia and failed states where terror groups prosper, and of plausible but unknown future threats too.
UK diplomats argue that military strength – and a nuclear deterrent – are central to keeping the trappings of power, such as the permanent UN security council seat. Others regard these things as expendable, even anathema. Neither the Tories nor Labour are in a mood to grapple with the big questions. The present plan is that the Commons votes by 2016 to renew Trident, with the first of the four new submarines due to be operational by 2028. That schedule is not fixed. The existing Vanguard submarines could be kept going, with a decision on renewal delayed. At that point, there may be more appetite at home and abroad for multilateral disarmament.
Even if you accept the in-principle case for Trident, and this newspaper has been wary, is there a need for four submarines? The military says that is the minimum if it is to keep one at sea at all times. But there are alternatives. The UK and France, which also has four nuclear submarines, could work together to keep one boat on patrol at all times. Others options might include reducing the number of warheads; retaining “the art and the artifice” so that a nuclear programme could be rekindled with some notice; and abandoning the weapons entirely.
One question after May is, or ought to be, the relative value of having a nuclear weapon at the cost of the further running down of conventional forces. Britain, with an army already down to 82,000, and a navy with two aircraft carriers commissioned but lacking the planes to use them, might soon struggle to contribute meaningfully to interventions in the Middle East, Africa, and even to Nato exercises to send a message to Russia. Some may welcome that. Intervention remains unpopular post-Iraq, but the mood may change in future, not least if intervention halted a humanitarian disaster.
The Conservatives pretend we can have it all: Trident, an army of 82,000, and a growing equipment budget. Labour has been a little more upfront about the squeeze ahead. The election will be followed by a defence review, and a real debate, shaped by awkward truths. But in a democracy that debate should come before, not after, polling day.
