Relief, however profound, can be quickly replaced by complacency. It is hard to remember how omnipresent the fear of nuclear war once was. Most teenagers surveyed in the UK and US in the early 1980s thought they were likely to see a nuclear war, and a third of American high school seniors agreed with the statement that “nuclear or biological annihilation will probably be the fate of all mankind in my lifetime”. The threat of Armageddon suffused even pop songs. The television dramas Threads and The Day After terrified British and American audiences with their depiction of nuclear strikes and the aftermath.
Even Ronald Reagan privately confessed that he was “very depressed” by the latter film and one biographer suggested it played a small part in shaping the US president’s pursuit of arms control deals. In 1987, he and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The cruise missiles were removed from western Europe, including Greenham Common.
Yet on Friday this key plank of arms control is due to fall. The US announced in January that it would pull out, due to Russian breaches. One danger is that the US could decide to deploy previously banned missiles to Europe – and that Russia would respond. The bigger danger is that the remaining plank will soon be jettisoned too: New Start, which limits the number of strategic warheads held by the US and Russia, expires in 2021. It could be extended by another five years, but the national security adviser John Bolton, who despises any constraints on the US, has already said that is unlikely. His boss has suggested that the US and Russia could end up with a new deal drawing in China. That looks unlikelier still: while China has invested huge sums in upgrading its military, its stockpile of warheads is a fraction of the size of Washington or Moscow’s.
Some think Mr Trump might override Mr Bolton if Russia, which would like to extend the treaty, offers token amendments, allowing him to claim that he improved on his predecessor’s deal (which replaced an earlier treaty). Others look to Congress. On Wednesday, bipartisan Senate legislation was introduced, calling for the extension of New Start unless the administration provides clear evidence of Russian breaches justifying its expiry, or a new agreement is signed. Adam Smith, the Democrat chair of the House armed services committee, is proving a compelling opponent of unrestrained nuclear spending: without treaties, the only controls are financial.
It is true that New Start is limited and born of another era: it controls only nuclear weaponry and covers only two countries, albeit those with over 90% of the nuclear stockpile. This is an age of nuclear proliferation (the US approved exports of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia late last year; North Korea has been busy testing missiles this week). There is a growing threat from cyberweapons and other new technologies.
But many experts fear that without it, a new arms race is inevitable. Even if the loss of transparency and predictability – due to an end to verification – might be a bigger issue than proliferation in the short term, that in time would be likely to lead to the growth of armouries. The best-case scenario might be an eventual return to some form of arms control agreements – after time has been lost, money squandered and risks have grown exponentially. The ideal, of a comprehensive multilateral deal, is not currently on offer, and a separate nuclear deal still makes sense. And it is hard to see why others should sign up when the two biggest players are reneging on or trashing existing agreements.
