Vladimir Putin’s marathon press conference on 19 December, an annual year-end event, offered no evidence that Russia may abandon the goals the president set for his “special military operation” against Ukraine in February 2022: conquering Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. True to form, Putin seemed unperturbed that nearly four years into the war his army had managed to fully occupy only Luhansk, despite having already taken control of more than a third of that region, as well as Donetsk, by 2015.
Putin’s unyielding stance shouldn’t be a surprise. Soon after the invasion, Russia’s State Duma adopted legislation incorporating these four Ukrainian regions into Russia – and this month the foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, and the deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, reiterated Putin’s territorial claims.
Russia’s inflexibility clashes with Donald Trump’s desperate efforts to achieve a political settlement by Christmas. To meet his self-imposed deadline, Trump even tried to pressure Volodymyr Zelenskyy into surrendering the parts of Donetsk that Ukraine still holds. Though Zelenskyy refused, he was willing to end Ukraine’s years-long quest for Nato membership and adopt neutrality, in exchange for solid western security guarantees.
Zelenskyy’s shift won’t mollify Putin. Russia’s longstanding – and understandable – anxiety about Nato’s expansion predates him. But Putin’s 2022 war stems from something deeper, because there’s no evidence that Ukraine was any closer to formal membership in the alliance on the eve of Russia’s 2022 invasion than it had been in 2008, when, at its Bucharest summit, Nato declared that Ukraine would join its ranks at some future, but unspecified, date.
Just as they had been in 2008, Nato countries have been divided on Ukraine candidacy, indeed even more so. That matters: article 10 of Nato’s 1949 founding treaty requires unanimity to admit new members. When Nato truly wants to increase its membership, it can act with speed: note the rapid induction of Finland (April 2023) and Sweden (March 2024), both of whom applied for membership in May 2022. To explain Putin’s motivation to invade Ukraine, we must take of account of grievances rooted in history.
He has stated, repeatedly and at length, that Ukrainians and Russians have been one people for centuries; that their separation into two states after the USSR disintegrated was a tragedy; that Ukraine’s south and east, home to large numbers of ethnic Russians or Ukrainians whose native language is Russian, rightly belong to Russia. In short, Putin believes Russia was robbed.
Still, at his press conference, Putin applauded Trump for being “absolutely sincere” in launching negotiations to end the war, adding that Russia remained committed to them and would end its military offensive, providing its interests are taken seriously.
Putin’s flattery has a purpose, not to mention a susceptible target. Trump has praised Putin’s “genius”. He, like Putin, has blamed Ukraine for starting the war. He wants a rapprochement with Russia that includes multibillion-dollar joint investments. He has backed Putin’s demand that Zelenskyy must hold elections, despite the war, to demonstrate his democratic legitimacy. He, like Putin, disdains Europe and would prefer to cut a deal that leaves the Europeans (and Ukrainians) on the sidelines. These are all reasons for Putin to court Trump and deepen the divide between the US and Europe.
Despite their convergent views and Trump’s sympathy for Russia, he hasn’t produced a deal that suits Putin. Unless he does, the bloodshed will continue. It has already taken a terrible toll on Ukraine, which is no surprise: it’s the weaker side by far. The real surprise is the Russian army’s massive losses – in casualties and equipment. Russia’s economy is also under increasing stress and barely growing, though it hardly faces collapse. But Russians’ hardships, to say nothing of Ukrainians’, won’t matter as long as Putin believes his objectives remain achievable – whether at the bargaining table, by persuading Trump to keep coercing Zelenskyy, or on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the EU has taken a major step that will reduce the chances of Russia succeeding quickly on either front by ensuring that Kyiv’s coffers won’t run dry. The bloc’s leadership had hoped to use the interest earned from the €210bn (£185bn) in frozen Russian assets to bolster Ukraine. Although that plan failed because of outright opposition from a few EU members and reservations expressed by others, the EU managed to find a different solution. It will borrow €90bn (£79bn) to support Ukraine for two years – and with no repayment obligation unless Russia pays reparations, it is something no one expects.
The press coverage highlighted the EU’s disunity over the frozen Russian assets, but what is really significant is that a bloc of 27 unruly sovereign states managed to come up with the money to ensure Ukraine wouldn’t collapse. Just as Putin’s words ensure the war will continue, so do the EU’s deeds. The EU’s decision is also important because it shows Europe’s willingness to act independently on the war, even if it means putting distance between itself and the US.
In August, Trump remarked that Americans have no stake in Ukraine’s war because they are separated from it by a “big, beautiful ocean”. Europe lacks this geographical luxury. That, along with Trump’s new National Security Strategy, which depicts the continent as a place drowning in problems and therefore of diminishing importance to the US, may have convinced European leaders to start acting independently.
Given Trump’s suspension of all direct military aid to Kyiv in March, Europe’s assistance alone may not be enough to ensure that Ukrainians obtain a peace that they deem just. Then again, this has been a war of surprises, the greatest of which is that Ukraine’s army remains unvanquished.
Europe has thrown Ukraine a lifeline, but we should be under no illusions. Ukraine will continue to fight with its back to the wall against an adversary that has vastly more of every war-relevant resource – and whose leader’s idea of compromise is indistinguishable from his adversary’s capitulation. Barring a sudden change in Russia’s position on the territorial question, Trump will be denied the Christmas gift he yearns for. Albeit each in their own way, Putin’s press conference and the EU’s loan package for Ukraine make it all but certain that the war will extend into the coming year.
Rajan Menon is a professor emeritus of international relations at the City College of New York and a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He will be making his fifth visit to wartime Ukraine this spring.
