It was all so different this time last year. Arlene Foster had been able to boost her personal authority (which had been damaged in the 2017 Northern Ireland assembly election when, for the first time, unionists lost their overall majority) by emphasising the “real power” that accompanied the “hugely significant” deal between the Democratic Unionist party and Conservatives. She earned thunderous applause at her party conference when she boasted, “The union is secure.”
Today, that confidence and supply agreement – in which the DUP props up Theresa May’s minority government – is, at best, wobbly and the DUP is accusing May of a “gross betrayal” that threatens to “undermine our precious union”. Tory leadership hopeful Boris Johnson will provide high-profile knockabout at this year’s conference for a grassroots audience that needs cheering up, but the DUP leadership would have preferred a prime minister who had faced down the European Union and stood shoulder to shoulder with Foster.
It has been a bad year for the DUP. Vociferous objections from some of their key players to the prospect of an Irish Language Act killed off rising hopes of a new power-sharing deal with Sinn Féin in February, meaning that Northern Ireland is just about to reach 700 days without an assembly. A long-running public inquiry into how a DUP-run department made one monumental and expensive blunder after another has exposed a party at war with itself and operating almost entirely by its own rules. And now May, their supposed ace in the hole, has stared them down with a withdrawal agreement that includes options she knew would have been unacceptable to the DUP. All in all, not the easiest background for an annual conference.
The DUP’s primary difficulty with the withdrawal agreement is that it leaves open the possibility that Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU could, after December 2020, be different to the relationship between the EU and Great Britain. And it’s that difference which raises difficulties for the DUP – and unionism generally – about the constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom.
May argues that there is no threat to the integrity of the union, because the longstanding constitutional guarantee (that Northern Ireland remains in the UK until a referendum in the region decides otherwise) remains in place. But the DUP counters that claim with the argument that treating Northern Ireland so differently in such a specific and momentous circumstance would undermine the union and, consequently, embolden those – on both sides of the border – who want a referendum on Irish unity.
The DUP is in a very difficult position. Yes, it could withdraw from the confidence and supply agreement, but that means wandering on to pyrrhic victory territory. There is no guarantee that pulling out would kill off the withdrawal agreement or topple May; or that any replacement for her would come up with something better for Northern Ireland.
Ironically, the DUP and Theresa May are in similar positions when it comes to power. I don’t think she ever expected to be prime minister: but now that she is, she will hold on for as long as possible. The DUP never expected to sign a confidence and supply deal that put them at the heart of government: but now that they have, they will keep it going for as long as they can.
Ending that deal would be a very public admission that the party had been wrong to put so much faith in the Conservatives; and it would also raise awkward questions about the relationship between Ulster unionism and UK national interests. The DUP likes the profile and clout it now has (which has also been useful when it comes to government Northern Ireland policy) and it won’t be keen on a crash and burn response to the present problem.
So, is there wriggle room? The DUP needs clarity and reassurance on what happens post-2020. Its position since June 2016 has been consistent: as long as the final Brexit deal ensures that the entire UK is treated the same way, it can live with it. It may not like it, but at least there would be no existential threat to the union. The DUP cannot shift without that certainty, but it is in its interests to hang on for as long as it can. When it comes to negotiations it is a canny operator, as anyone who has dealt with it knows.
The final decision, of course, rests with the prime minister. Forcing Northern Ireland to be treated differently would lead to serious problems and destabilise the peace process; maybe even end it. It would also raise questions in Scotland: “If Northern Ireland can have special arrangements, then why not us?” Crucially, though, May probably does not want to go down in history as the prime minister who began the unravelling of the United Kingdom. The DUP and Theresa May still have mutual interests and goals – at this point.
• Alex Kane is a former director of communications for the Ulster Unionist party
