Thailand's foreign policy is running amok in questionable directions inconsistent with its longstanding and crafty geostrategic balancing. From signing a joint statement to appease Beijing on its "reunification" with Taiwan and criticising a United Nations special rapporteur on his assessment of the Thai-Cambodian border situation, the Anutin Charnvirakul-led government has extended an undue red-carpet treatment to Min Aung Hlaing, who stole Myanmar’s democratic elections in November 2020 by seizing power two months later and eventually whitewashed the robbery with bogus elections last December-January.
Min Aung Hlaing's high-profile visit will now further divide Asean, Southeast Asia's 11-member bloc which has sanctioned Myanmar's military strongman by excluding him from Asean-related summits over the past five years.
Policy-shy and unversed in foreign affairs, Mr Anutin has effectively outsourced foreign policy to Sihasak Phuangketkeow, who has insisted that Thailand will benefit from bilateral talks over the past two days on trade and investment, migrant labour, the environment, energy, border security, drug trafficking, scam networks, and peace building in Myanmar.
Min Aung Hlaing's just-concluded visit is being presented by the Anutin government as "calibrated re-engagement". Yet there is little calibration about it. With an official reception, meetings and a business forum, the visit looks less like calibrated diplomacy designed to win concessions and more like business as usual on Min Aung Hlaing's terms.
To what extent Thailand will achieve its aims by receiving Min Aung Hlaing so overtly and enthusiastically is unclear. What is clear is that the head of what is essentially a junta-backed government got what he wanted from glowing legitimacy and post-coup personal vindication to business deals that will benefit his associates rather than the Myanmar people. This is the wrong way round.
Thailand appears to have conceded to the coup-maker with the hope that engagement will yield concessions and cooperation. But this is a foolhardy position. Even Min Aung Hlaing's decision to allow the 81-year-old Aung San Suu Kyi to appear in publicised images through a meeting with the local resident representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross appeared carefully timed to coincide with his visit to Bangkok and inevitably raised questions about its purpose.
On this occasion, the ICRC has to be careful. How come the ICRC head has not come out to share impressions of her health conditions and mental state after her post-coup arrest and multiple convictions on bogus charges and closed-door trials with a combined 33-year jail sentence that has been reduced to a still-whopping 18 years? What's the point of meeting her and not telling the world in a high-profile way about how she is doing?
But giving in to Min Aung Hlaing and giving him an undeserved upper hand not only exacerbates Asean's Myanmar conundrum but also undermines the grouping's central role in promoting regional peace and security. Asean's main international role and chief strategic asset is its ability to convene top-level meetings and provide a dialogue platform among world leaders.
If Min Aung Hlaing is included in these Asean-centric summit meetings, top leaders from Europe, Japan, South Korea and other major countries will think twice about joining because the Myanmar strongman and his regime have faced international sanctions for post-coup destruction and deaths exceeding 100,000, including thousands of women, children and other non-combatants.
The military dictator in disguise is hated by the vast majority of his own people. Thailand's endorsement, let alone Asean's potential re-admission of Min Aung Hlaing, will turn away world leaders who would otherwise treat and deal with Asean as a crucial regional player on the global stage.
Without its convening power, Asean means much less than the sum of its member states. With Min Aung Hlaing included, Asean will be the object of scepticism, condemnation and derision in the eyes of dialogue partners and global players that matter most to Asean.
The consequences extend beyond this visit. Min Aung Hlaing seeks full readmission to Asean leaders' meetings, the restoration of Myanmar's Asean chairmanship, the country's representation at the United Nations, and international acceptance of the political setup produced by military-controlled elections.
The current Thai government is helping him advance towards these goals without requiring credible steps to reduce violence, release political detainees or begin inclusive dialogue -- key provisions of Asean's Five-Point Consensus. This will create difficulties for the Philippines as Asean chair this year and for Singapore when the organisation marks its 60th anniversary next year.
Re-engagement may ultimately be unavoidable. But timing, sequencing and conditions matter. The onus should remain on Min Aung Hlaing to demonstrate good faith. Instead, Thailand has reversed the burden, conceding recognition in advance and asking vaguely for cooperation afterwards.
This comes across more like a premature normalisation rather than a calibrated re-engagement. Min Aung Hlaing came to Bangkok after having betrayed his signature to the Five-Point Consensus, rejected its peace plan, and later manipulated elections and used Ms Suu Kyi to shore up his image.
What has taken place is damaging to Thai foreign policy interests. Thailand should stick to the Asean line on ostracising and excluding Min Aung Hlaing from top-level talks until he complies with the Five-Point Consensus, which his government has in fact rejected. Thailand should deal with this military strongman firmly and consistently within the Asean-agreed framework, rather than granting political legitimacy without conditions.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, PhD, is a professor and senior fellow of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University's Faculty of Political Science. He is also a non-resident associate with the Southeast Asia Centre at the London School of Economics.
