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National
Emma Hatton

Tactical response model puts pressure on police staffing

Police Association president Chris Cahill wants to see the trialed tactical response model rolled out nationwide. Photo: Lynn Grieveson.

A review of police’s tactical response model has shown frontline officers feel safer under the changes, but the pilot has strained staff resources and left some rural communities out in the cold 

The Police Association is keen to see the trialed tactical response model (TRM) expanded nationwide but admits there are some kinks to be ironed out.  

The model was officially announced in September last year and has been piloted in four districts - Northland, Counties Manukau, Waikato and Central - since November 2021.  

Touted as a halfway house between the status quo and general arming of the force, it created tactical prevention teams tasked with (usually) pre-planned operations such as search and arrest warrants for high-risk offenders, tactical dog teams and boosting Armed Offenders Squad-type tactical training for all frontline officers.  READ MOREThe Detail: Should we be arming our police force?Small retailers ditch insurance over rising costs

It hoped to address mounting concerns about frontline safety, particularly after Constable Matthew Hunt’s murder and the abandonment of the armed response teams trials a few months before.  

Association president Chris Cahill said by and large the new scheme was successful.  

“We talked about this at our annual conference, it was probably the one thing that everyone agreed on that the model is working for them.  

“People are keen to see it roll out around the rest of the country but it comes with a price tag, obviously … it has been budgeted for but you always like to see it in the bank.” 

In May the Government committed to expanding the model, promising $185 million over four years. 

Cahill said as far as developments in policing went, implementation had been quick, and he envisioned a full-scale rollout taking between six months and a year.  

“Things don't happen quickly in police so from a police perspective it’s happened very quickly. And it's been pretty comprehensive. They've looked at lots of different things and it seems to be working.” 

"It's been a challenge and it's put strain on other areas of policing, without a doubt. But district commanders I've spoken to said it's worth it - we're willing to take the pain in this area for the safety of the staff in that area - it's more important." - Chris Cahill, Police Association.

But the model has had to suck resources from other operations.  

The evaluation report written by the department’s own evidence-based policing centre noted staff hired to be a part of the tactical response model were not replaced. 

“For example, tactical safety coaches, tactical prevention team members, and tactical dog operators were drawn from existing AOS resources,” the report said.  

“Although it is clear every effort to support these workgroups was made, the displacement of staff has potential to leave others feeling hard done by, or less safe. This consequence is particularly apparent with the removal of highly qualified and capable staff such as AOS members.” 

Tactical prevention teams (TPT) in particular noted the strain the model put on the Tāmaki Makaurau AOS operations.  

“Regarding staffing, all AOS commanders were concerned with the strain full TRM rollouts would place on them. Although they recognised district differences, they noted that most positions would require AOS qualification.  

“One suggested way to manage the strain was to have a ‘pool’ of AOS operators into which staff would rotate (as opposed to the current ad hoc approach), to reduce burnout and maintain skill currency and credibility.” 

A lack of staff also stopped some prevention teams being deployed at all.  

“The last couple of months have been really hard on us. About just trying to manage our abstractions, but we have a team of four, so it's a team leader and three. We have to operate with those numbers under the model.  

“So, if one of us takes leave, we have to backfill that. It's been really hard to manage over the last couple of months,” one police officer reported as feedback.  

The report also found, however, that prevention teams had lightened the load somewhat for the AOS teams. 

“Considering all districts combined, the number of pre-planned AOS deployments was estimated as 27 percent lower on average than what we would expect had the TRM not been implemented.” 

Cahill said there had also been resourcing constraints when it came to providing the extra training for frontline officers.  

“It's been a challenge and it's put strain on other areas of policing, without a doubt. But district commanders I've spoken to said it's worth it - we're willing to take the pain in this area for the safety of the staff in that area - it's more important.  

"You'd be disappointed if you've made that commitment and feedback wasn't that good from deployment, but it clearly is, so the next challenge is getting those positions backfilled so that you can have those trainers in permanently - that’s the next challenge.” 

"When specialist teams show up to rural areas with which they are not familiar, the level of response may look like an excessive show of force, or could escalate a situation where only one additional backup officer may be needed." 

Another challenge police need to contend with is how the model is deployed - and perceived - in rural communities.  

Under the model, district command centres are responsible for assessing rural deployments - and there were 331 such deployments across the piloted centres - but local police did not always see the benefits.  

"Qualitative data highlight a disconnect between DCC and rural staff. DCC reported that they felt they were doing a good job of supporting rural staff … but rural staff generally did not notice any changes in the support that was offered.” 

On the flipside, when specialist teams did show up to rural areas, it sometimes did more harm than good. 

“One potential unintended consequence was noted: when specialist teams show up to rural areas with which they are not familiar, the level of response may look like an excessive show of force, or could escalate a situation where only one additional backup officer may be needed.  

“In interviews and focus groups, a number of rural staff noted a strain on community relationships after TPTs had been there. The organisation should continue to monitor the use of tactical teams in rural communities moving forward.” 

Cahill said policing in rural areas presented unique challenges, and warned against simply copying a city approach to crime prevention, into rural areas.  

“Certainly, if they are going to be deployed, the first person they should liaise with is the local guy or girl to know what's going on … and to ignore that is missing your biggest intelligence source of that town so that should definitely happen.  

“But I can certainly see from a lot of rural policing, the visual changes won't be there for them, they won't see the TPTs, they won't see the double team dog crews. The double crewing at night isn't as easy for them to do.” 

He said adapting to and managing rural areas would be the biggest area of consideration for the model.  

“What has changed, though, is there's a lot more consideration about whether you call [a lone officer] out to go to a job by themselves and that’s seen a lot of drop off in the call-outs and so that's positive. 

“There's a lot more that the district command centres are looking for, asking do they need to go and if they do can we deploy someone else … so they’re thinking a lot more about this but there’s still work to be done.” 

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