A secret meeting in Zurich between Sudanese army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and US envoy Massad Boulos has raised hopes of progress towards ending Sudan’s brutal war and getting more humanitarian aid to the millions forced from their homes. But Africa researcher Roland Marchal warns that neither the Sudanese army nor its rival forces can win enough on the battlefield to secure a stronger negotiating position.
Sudan's conflict has claimed more than 150,000 lives, displaced over 10 million people and left millions more trapped without aid as deliveries are blocked by both sides.
As al-Burhan and Boulos consider their next moves, Marchal told RFI that battlefield gains are unlikely to give either al-Burhan or Rapid Support Forces paramilitary leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – known as Hemedti – a decisive advantage at the negotiating table.
He says any talks must open humanitarian access and push for a political process that includes civilians, not just the rival generals.
RFI: What do we know about this plan for a comprehensive ceasefire that was reportedly proposed by the United States during their meeting?
RM: Firstly, discussions are taking place with only one of the two parties, with al-Burhan. We do not know whether other discussions are taking place in parallel or will take place with Hemedti.
What we think we know is that American diplomacy is trying to facilitate humanitarian access and that there is work to be done on both sides.
In other words, humanitarian access is being hampered by both the RSF and the Sudanese army. And so this is undoubtedly of crucial importance in the discussions on facilitating the removal of a whole series of pseudo-bureaucratic obstacles to allow aid to reach where it needs to go.
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The second problem is obviously what kind of ceasefire and political revival can take place.
The information we have about the meeting does not shed any light on this. We know that al-Burhan will undoubtedly advocate for the total exclusion of the RSF and that is probably the professional judgment of all those who have been closest to him. But it is certain that in confidential discussions, al-Burhan may outline a path that has not yet been taken.
RFI: And why did al-Burhan agree to meet the Americans this time? Could this be explained by the advances made by Sudanese forces on the ground?
RM: Yes and no. Yes, the Sudanese government is no longer in the weak position it was in a year ago. But on the other hand, there is growing criticism of al-Burhan.
There are sanctions because apparently chemical weapons have been used by the Sudanese army against the population, and also because, at least from a military point of view, we are well aware that on both sides, there has been an escalation in the technology being used and that it will take more than just military superiority to resolve this conflict.
And then there is also concern that al-Burhan may be aware that it is difficult to control the militias within his own troops, so this may also be a good time for him to try to score diplomatic points by emphasising how much evidence there is against the RSF regarding the killing of civilians and massacres.
RFI: But aren't there any concessions that could be demanded of al-Burhan, such as his departure or the establishment of a civilian government?
RM: We don't really know what expertise the American envoy claims to have. So we don't know if these are high-level discussions or whether the American special envoy has an extremely precise view of the forces involved. It's important to remember that there are civilian forces that opposed Omar al-Bashir in 2019, and also civilian forces that aspire to govern, that aspire to change.
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So the question is whether the Americans will ultimately settle for negotiations with the two armed parties, or whether they will go much further towards a genuine civilian transitional regime that may or may not include figures close to the two parties currently in conflict.
RFI: With these discussions, can we hope that humanitarian aid will flow more freely in Sudan, and more specifically to El Fasher?
RM: On the Sudanese government side, things are at the same time simple as there is an authority and a chain of command. It is also more complicated because there is also the army's chain of command. But there are also many militias on the roads, with their own checkpoints.
It is a truly Kafkaesque process to obtain all the authorisations for the UN to leave Port Sudan, where humanitarian aid arrives, in order to reach places that are, it should be remembered, controlled by the government in some cases, and in other cases by forces more sympathetic to the RSF.
And in this case, there is very strong opposition. The US special envoy may find ways and arguments to convince al-Burhan to act a little more decisively, to enforce the chain of command, since the government claims to be in charge.
This will undoubtedly be much more complicated from the point of view of the RSF, insofar as, although there is the image of a central command, there is still a very weak chain of command, which means that the militias on the ground can set up checkpoints and do not care about papers, even if they are signed by Hemedti or his second in command.
(This interwiew has been adapted from the original version in French and lightly edited for clarity.
