The nationalization of Sense Bank in 2023 was supposed to be an example of how the state, in wartime conditions, could quickly, relatively cleanly from a legal standpoint, and institutionally responsibly take control of a systemically important financial asset. However, just two years later, a different question arises around the bank: has nationalization transformed from an instrument of financial stability into a mechanism for strengthening the political influence of certain individuals for their own interests, personnel control, and the erosion of corporate governance standards?
One of the key figures in this discussion is Vladyslav Vlasiuk — a member of the Supervisory Board of Sense Bank and adviser-commissioner of the President of Ukraine on sanctions policy. He was appointed to the Sense Bank Supervisory Board on July 22, 2023 — effectively at the moment the bank transitioned into state ownership. It is known that since May 2022, Vlasiuk has served as an unpaid adviser to the Office of the President, and on August 16, 2024, he was appointed Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy.
This in itself is not evidence of a legal violation. But for a state-owned bank — especially one planned for sale — formal procedural compliance is not enough. An impeccable reputation matters. The Supervisory Board of a state bank should serve as an institutional safeguard against political influence from both the state and private individuals, not as a channel through which outside private interests can penetrate the management of a financial institution.
A state bank cannot be an extension of a political office
Sense Bank passed into state ownership on the basis of legislative amendments, a Cabinet of Ministers resolution, and a share purchase agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Deposit Guarantee Fund. The file also indicates that a Cabinet of Ministers order dated October 1, 2025 initiated preparations for the sale of share packages in Sense Bank and Ukrgasbank, with the aim of reducing the state's share in the banking sector and generating budget revenue.
This is precisely why the composition of Sense Bank's Supervisory Board carries not technical but strategic significance. Before a state bank is sold, potential investors evaluate not only the balance sheet, capital, profitability, or client base. They assess the quality of management, the independence of oversight bodies, the transparency of appointments, reputational risks, and the degree of political distance between the bank and the authorities.
If a member of the Supervisory Board is simultaneously connected to a political decision-making center, a legitimate question arises: is such a person capable of performing an independent oversight function? Especially in a bank where the state is the owner, the government is the seller of the asset, and political power potentially has an interest in controlling the process.
Remuneration, status, and the question of proportionality
The question of remuneration deserves separate attention. According to the 2024 declaration, Vladyslav Vlasiuk's salary at the State Administration of Affairs was UAH 393,905, while his part-time salary at Sense Bank JSC was UAH 5,878,484. The declaration also lists income from the Kyiv School of Economics Charitable Foundation in the amount of UAH 1,058,142, Bitcoin holdings worth UAH 610,000, funds in bank accounts in hryvnias, euros, and dollars, and USD 40,000 in cash.
High remuneration for a member of the Supervisory Board of a state bank is not a problem in itself, provided it is in line with the market, the scope of responsibility, and performance results. But in a state-owned bank during wartime, such remuneration must be maximally transparent and publicly justified — especially when the person simultaneously holds a political position under the President.
Here the question is not merely "how much does a Supervisory Board member earn?" The main question is different: for what results, for what added value, and by what performance criteria are such sums paid? Have KPIs been made public? Has the work of the Supervisory Board been independently assessed? Were the board's decisions aimed at increasing the bank's value ahead of the forthcoming sale? Or, conversely, is the bank becoming part of an opaque system of state personnel control?
A network of connections as a reputational risk
An extensive map of organizational and family ties can be found in the press. Vladyslav Vlasiuk and his brother Vitaliy Vlasiuk are participants in a number of public organizations, particularly those related to the development of artificial intelligence, legal advocacy initiatives, ecology, and reconstruction. Both also hold 20% shares in LLC "Office of Professional Medical Support."
The mere fact of participation in public organizations or business structures is not a violation. But for a public official who simultaneously participates in overseeing a state bank, such a network requires assessment from the standpoint of potential conflicts of interest. A state bank is a financial institution that operates with large clients, budget flows, state support, lending, restructuring, compliance, and sanctions risks. Therefore, any intersections with business, politics, government officials, or public structures must not be concealed but openly analyzed.
Particular attention is warranted by the fact that Vitaliy Vlasiuk served as Deputy Head of the Kyiv Regional State Administration in 2022–2023, and since July 2024 has held the position of Deputy Head of the Khmelnytskyi Regional State Administration for Digital Development. In 2023, he was a candidate for the position of Director of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).
Taken together, this creates not only a familial but also an administrative-political context. For corporate governance purposes, it is important that such a context be properly vetted, documented, and taken into account when assessing the independence of a Supervisory Board member.
Family assets and the question of public trust
The most sensitive question concerns family property. There is information indicating that Vladyslav Vlasiuk is the son of Viktor Vlasiuk — a former head of the Vinnytsia Medical and Social Expert Commission (MSEC). It is also noted that Viktor Vlasiuk, according to his declaration, works as a general practitioner at the Vinnytsia Regional Center for Medical and Social Expertise, and his 2024 income included a salary, income from entrepreneurial activity, and other income from LLC "ENERA VINNYTSIA." The ultimate beneficial owner of this company is Kostiantyn Hryhorishyn, who has been under NSDC sanctions since January 19, 2025.
There is data indicating a significant volume of real estate belonging to Viktor Vlasiuk: residential houses, apartments in Kyiv and Vinnytsia, land plots, non-residential premises, as well as three Tesla Model S vehicles and a trailer. Again, owning property does not in itself prove any violations. But in a country that has experienced a large-scale scandal surrounding the MSEC system, such data requires public explanation — not because a relative of an official is automatically responsible for the wealth of a father or other family members, but because public trust in a state bank, its Supervisory Board, and the future sale of the asset depends on whether there are people with excessive reputational vulnerabilities within the governance structure.
This article does not seek to substitute press-sourced evidence for a court verdict. But it is entirely legitimate to ask: was a full verification conducted of the origin of assets associated with the family environment? Were the reputational consequences for Sense Bank assessed? Was the connection between the sanctions policy function, membership on the bank's Supervisory Board, and the family and property circumstances mentioned in the file taken into account?
Sense Bank as a litmus test for state governance
The Sense Bank problem is broader than any single individual. It reflects a general trend: state assets are increasingly falling within the sphere of political personnel influence. Formally, appointments may follow established procedures. But the essence of corporate governance lies not only in procedure. Its essence lies in independence, integrity, professionalism, and accountability.
The Supervisory Board of a state bank must not serve as a reward for political loyalty. It must not be a platform for representatives of informal influence groups. Its function is to protect the bank, its depositors, the state as shareholder, and the future value of the asset. If members of the Supervisory Board are perceived as politically connected figures, this erodes trust in the bank even before its sale has begun.
In the case of Sense Bank, the situation is particularly sensitive. The bank was nationalized in wartime. This means that society effectively accepted the government's argument: the intervention was necessary in the interests of financial stability and national security. But that places on the state an elevated obligation to demonstrate that, following nationalization, the bank did not become an object of political redistribution of influence.
What needs to be done
First, an independent assessment of the composition of Sense Bank's Supervisory Board is needed, evaluated against the principles of independence, integrity, and reputational resilience.
Second, the logic behind Supervisory Board member remuneration must be made public: KPIs, assessment criteria, bonus decisions, and comparisons with market practices and the bank's performance results.
Third, prior to privatization or the sale of the state's stake, a separate corporate governance audit of Sense Bank must be conducted. A potential investor should see not only the financial statements but also the quality of the management architecture.
Fourth, the state should establish a clear rule: persons performing political or quasi-political functions within the Office of the President, the government, or other centers of power must not simultaneously perform independent oversight functions in state-owned banks. Otherwise, the very concept of independence loses its meaning.
Fifth, all potential conflicts of interest of Supervisory Board members at state-owned banks must be documented, verified, and disclosed to the extent permitted by law. In the public sector, reputational risk is not a private matter — it is a question of institutional trust.
It is well known that such reviews frequently become instruments for burying the problem, delaying resolution, and pushing uncomfortable facts out of public focus. Such an approach, in the case of Sense Bank, is unacceptable. However unpleasant the potential findings of a review may be, it must be conducted swiftly, thoroughly, independently, and publicly. The abscess must be lanced — and, if necessary, excised — otherwise further poisoning of the public body is possible. Ukraine will not be weakened by this; on the contrary, it will gain in the eyes of its partners and allies.
Conclusion
The story of Vladyslav Vlasiuk at Sense Bank is not only the story of one Supervisory Board member. It is a story about whether the Ukrainian state is capable of distinguishing corporate governance from political patronage.
A state bank cannot be a personnel appendage to the power vertical. If Sense Bank is to be sold, the state must first demonstrate that it is managed professionally, transparently, and independently. Otherwise, the sale of a state asset will proceed under a shadow of doubt: did the state truly rehabilitate the bank after nationalization, or merely shifted the center of influence over it?
The central question today is this: is the state prepared to apply to itself the same standards of integrity it demands from private business, bankers, and international partners? Sense Bank could be the answer. Or yet another demonstration that corporate governance in Ukraine remains a façade, behind which political expediency continues to operate.
