Russian operatives worked in Chad in 2024 to pull the country closer to Moscow and away from Western influence, internal documents reviewed by an international media consortium reveal. The papers show efforts to build ties with Chadian authorities, spread anti-Western narratives and target opposition figure Succès Masra during a tense election year.
The documents were analysed as part of the investigative series Propaganda Machine, led by the pan-African outlet The Continent and the investigative network Forbidden Stories, with RFI among the participating media.
They come from Africa Politology, a Russian influence network set up by Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin and later taken over by the Russian state.
On 21 September 2024, members of the Chadian press gathered at a two-storey house in the Farcha district of N’Djamena for the official opening of the Russian House in Chad.
The cultural project was backed by Rossotrudnichestvo, the Russian Foreign Ministry agency responsible for international cooperation and scholarships.
There were “canapés and music by Tchaikovsky”, RFI correspondent Carol Valade recalled. The event projected a soft, cultural image of Moscow’s growing presence.
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Election intrigue
But security agents from Chad’s National Agency for State Security were quietly filming from above. Among the guests were two men presented as representatives of the Russian cultural network – Andrei Denisovich and Evgeny Tsarev.
Tsarev, who spoke fluent French and was known locally as “Eugène”, led most of the conversations.
According to internal documents reviewed by the consortium, Tsarev had been active since 2021 in Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Sahel, supporting Russian-linked operations, including the deployment of paramilitary forces. Denisovich, a Belarusian national, was described as a “political analyst”.
Moments after the ceremony ended and guests left, Chadian soldiers moved in and arrested both men.
Two days earlier, on 19 September, two other Russian operatives had already been detained on arrival at N’Djamena airport. They were Maxym Shugaley, a veteran of the Wagner-linked information network and head of the Foundation for the Protection of National Values, and Samir Seyfan.
Shugaley had visited Chad several times in 2024. Alongside Seyfan, he posed as an “investor” and sought meetings with officials ahead of the presidential election on 6 May.
In May, Shugaley posted videos from N’Djamena on Telegram and on African Initiative, a platform linked to Russian intelligence services. He documented meetings, including one with Hilal Abdelkader Abdramane, treasurer of Nouvelle Génération, a group supporting President Mahamat Idriss Déby.
A post by Maxym Shugaley on Telegram: 'Voting in the Chadian presidential election has concluded. The winner is now known. I had the honour of observing the work of Mahamat Déby’s campaign headquarters.'
During one meeting, the Russians gave Abdramane 20 polo shirts bearing Russian and Chadian flags. A photo of the encounter quickly spread online, fuelling speculation about Moscow’s growing role in the Sahel.
Under one of his posts, Shugaley wrote: “The vote [...] is over. The winner is clear, despite an attempt at American interference.” He also told Valade: “The Chadian people do not benefit from their relationship with France.”
Abdramane later told judicial authorities the episode had been exaggerated and was not coordinated with the president’s campaign. But internal documents suggest the actions formed part of a broader strategy.
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Targeting Masra
A central part of that strategy was a sustained campaign against Prime Minister and opposition figure Succès Masra.
In the run-up to the election, Russian-linked operatives promoted the idea that tension, or “antagonism”, between President Déby and Masra was necessary. Their coexistence, they argued, reflected a “Western scenario”.
Masra, leader of Les Transformateurs, an opposition party, had returned from exile under a political agreement backed by Western embassies and was later appointed prime minister. He positioned himself as a “co-pilot” in the transition.
According to internal records, more than 120 publications were produced to undermine him.
The campaigns included false or misleading claims. They said the United States had drafted his political programme and sent advisers, that he had signed a security contract with the private consultancy firm Bancroft, and that he was linked to plans for an international investigation into the Chadian leadership.
Some narratives also alleged coordination between Western governments and rebel groups, including plots involving drone strikes.
Tog-Yeum Nagorngar, secretary-general of Les Transformateurs, told RFI he was not surprised by the tactics but was struck by their scale. “We had seen Mr Shugaley physically taking part in Mr Déby’s campaign, at public rallies,” he said.
He rejected the allegations against Masra. “Succès Masra has chosen the legal route for his struggle; he has nothing to do with the rebellions. His policy is justice, equality and dignity for all,” he said.
Researcher Remadjy Hoinathy of the Institute for Security Studies said Russian actors tend to align with those in power. “Succès Masra appeared to them as an obstacle,” he said. He added that Masra’s scepticism towards pro-Russian “Pan-Africanism” may also have played a role.
The Chadian government rejected the allegations, insisting that state institutions operate “with full sovereignty” and that the election process took place under favourable conditions.
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Paid influence
Alongside political messaging, the investigation describes a wide network of sponsored content and media placements.
Internal documents include lists of articles allegedly placed in African media, with detailed payments attached, amounting to thousands of dollars. Many pieces promoted narratives of Western interference or conspiracies against President Déby, while criticising French media, including RFI.
Some media executives denied direct links to Russian operatives. One said sponsored content was submitted through standard advertising channels and published unless there was a “clear problem”. The articles were labelled “partner” and carried disclaimers.
However, discrepancies in pricing raised further questions. While outlets reported charging around 150 euros per sponsored article in 2024, internal documents suggested payments of 500 to 600 dollars, leaving an unexplained gap.
Several journalists said they had accepted advertorials for fees ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 CFA francs, or roughly 75 to 300 euros.
Olivier Monodji, director of the Chadian news website Le Pays, said he had been misled. “They showed me a press card and mentioned advertorials; they spoke good French and seemed serious,” he said. “I feel like I’ve been duped, tricked. It’s a regret; it cost me four months in prison, a trauma.”
In 2025, seven people, including journalists and campaign affiliates, were detained on suspicion of collusion with a foreign power. They were later cleared after showing they had acted in good faith.
The case highlighted how vulnerable the media sector can be. Limited resources and weak oversight can leave newsrooms open to covert influence. Burkinabé fact-checker Harouna Drabo said editors are sometimes unaware of such practices until problems emerge.
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Limited impact
At the heart of the operation was a clear objective, stated in internal documents: “Distancing Chad from the Western sphere of influence.”
The documents also referred to efforts to promote Chad’s integration into a pro-Russian geopolitical framework. Campaigns pointed to President Déby’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in January 2024 and a later visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
Other narratives promoted the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and BRICS, while also amplifying tensions with France. Legal proceedings against Déby in France were widely publicised, and regional security partnerships with Cameroon and the Central African Republic were emphasised.
The Russian House in N’Djamena was seen as a key tool, combining cultural outreach with political messaging.
These efforts coincided with shifts in Chad’s foreign policy. In April 2024, US special forces withdrew from the country. In December, Chad requested the departure of French troops, which took place shortly afterwards.
Speculation grew about Chad joining the Alliance of Sahel States, with participation in regional events and high-level visits fuelling the narrative.
Yet the situation appears more complex. Within the Chadian leadership, views remain divided. Some officials favour new partnerships, while others worry about dependency and financial risks, particularly given France’s role in supporting Chad through international donors.
Hoinathy said Déby’s approach appeared cautious rather than ideological. “He wanted to see what was possible,” he said, adding that Russian commitments had not fully materialised.
Ties with France were never fully severed. By January 2026, Déby and Emmanuel Macron had publicly reaffirmed their relationship under a “refounded” partnership.
In this context, the arrest of the Russian operatives in September 2024 has been interpreted by some observers as a signal from Chadian authorities to avoid deeper involvement with external influence operations.
Similar concerns have emerged elsewhere. In Angola, two Africa Politology agents have been detained since August 2025 over alleged interference in the country’s next presidential election.
This story was adapted from the original version in French by François Mazet
►The Propaganda Machine investigation is based on 1,431 pages of internal Russian-language documents obtained anonymously and analysed by an international consortium including Forbidden Stories, The Continent, All Eyes On Wagner, Dossier Center, openDemocracy, iStories and others, later joined by RFI. The archives include strategic plans, operational reports and financial records covering disinformation campaigns from late 2023 to November 2024.
