As the battle against foreign interference moves out of the shadows and into the spotlight, our spy agencies have provided high-profile professions with advice on how to stay out of trouble with potential state agents
Politicians and academics have been warned to guard against foreign agents seeking to exploit their connections and research, as New Zealand’s intelligence agencies ramp up their campaign against foreign interference.
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Security Intelligence Service and Government Communications Security Bureau have released new guidance for the high-risk professions in a bid to ensure they do not succumb to any improper approaches.
The guidance for members of Parliament and local body politicians warns that “not every foreign state actor who seeks to engage with you will have benign intentions”, and names diplomats, academics, lobbyists and journalists as among the potential proxies for foreign interference and espionage.
Foreign state actors would be “interested in your ability to steer policy-making, especially when it may relate to their country”, and value inside knowledge “such as points of tension, split opinions, or off-the-record views held by fellow politicians or personal contacts”.
Politicians are cautioned about efforts “to gain undue influence and leverage” over them, with the document warning: “Engaging in inappropriate activities, even if they are not illegal in New Zealand, could leave you vulnerable to coercion.”
They are warned that “some grassroots, independent organisations who say they represent local communities may not be what they seem” and could be acting as a front for foreign agents, and asked to consider whether someone who has contacted them is “showing an unusual or sustained level of interest in you, your work, or your colleagues”.
“If you’re separated from your device for any length of time while travelling (for example, at an airport) you should consider it compromised.”
They are told to take a “trusted colleague” with them when meeting somebody new, as that could act as a deterrent to foreign intelligence officers, and carry out due diligence on any offers of donations, gifts or other favours.
The guidelines warn that politicians should “consider any system with an internet connection as vulnerable to the most capable attackers”, with the communications of staff, family and friends also susceptible to being targeted.
They are told to only use official IT devices provided by government organisations, ensure their security settings are all enabled and kept up to date, and avoid connecting to free Wi-Fi in public places like hotels, airports and coffee shops.
Politicians are advised to take as little technology as possible when travelling overseas for business or leisure, and consider using a “pool” phone or laptop which contains only the basic information they require and can be wiped clean when they return to New Zealand.
“If you’re separated from your device for any length of time while travelling (for example, at an airport) you should consider it compromised.”
They are also told to provide a photocopy of their passport to a hotel reception, rather than the original document, and be alert to any “suspicious activity” with their electronic equipment, such as a device running hot or its battery draining quickly.
Lifting the veil on foreign interference
The release of the guidelines comes as the NZ Security Intelligence Service has become increasingly candid about its efforts to counter foreign interference.
In its annual report for 2020, published last week, the NZSIS revealed it had been investigating a New Zealand citizen it had assessed was working on behalf of a foreign state’s intelligence services.
It said the person was “almost certainly collecting intelligence against New Zealand-based people who are viewed as dissidents by the foreign state’s government” and passing it onto the country’s embassy, with the NZSIS looking at its legal options to address the threat.
A year earlier, the agency had gathered intelligence about another person carrying out foreign interference, who was closely linked to another state’s intelligence service and was “attempting to form personal relationships with a range of individuals in New Zealand who held senior and influential positions”.
Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said the Government had not played any role in the greater level of transparency from the spy agencies, but had talked openly about the need to continually review policy settings around foreign interference.
“I do think we all have a job to do around ensuring the best interests of New Zealand are protected, and so transparency around that is helpful and ensuring people are mindful of the risks that exist.”
Ardern was confident that MPs and ministers were attuned to the risk of foreign agents seeking to improperly influence them, saying the intelligence agencies did a good job of building awareness through sessions with political parties and protective briefings with individual politicians representing the country overseas.
An NZSIS spokesman told Newsroom the agency had made “significant efforts over the last year to raise awareness of foreign interference across a variety of sectors”, delivering targeted briefings to political parties, MPs, mayors and local government officials.
“We have also increased our engagement with academic institutions, particularly universities and Crown Research Institutes, to help them identify and manage risks associated with sensitive technology.”
[The guidance] cites over-dependence on a single source of funding as a significant risk for academic institutions and departments, whether from “a single organisation or a single nation”, as it could allow funders to pressure organisations when they sought to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom.
PSR has also released separate guidance for academic institutions and researchers to protect their research against “potential theft, misuse or exploitation” from foreign collaborations - an issue of growing concern.
In 2019, Newsroom revealed Massey University was working with a Chinese company blacklisted by the United States for its involvement in the persecution of Uyghur Muslims, while the risk of foreign interference or espionage at universities was cited in a government crackdown on sensitive exports with potential military uses.
The research guidelines say that while the Government is “actively seeking to increase the international connectedness of the research and innovation system”, there are risks with foreign partnerships that must be identified and managed to avoid reputational damage, lost intellectual property, and harm to New Zealand’s interests.
“Joint research can be misused by organisations and institutions in nations with interests and ethical values that are different from our own … [and] provide opportunities for people with hostile intent to access expertise, IT networks, and research.”
It cites over-dependence on a single source of funding as a significant risk for academic institutions and departments, whether from “a single organisation or a single nation”, as it could allow funders to pressure organisations when they sought to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom.
The reputation of a researcher and their institution can be damaged if it becomes clear that another country has exploited their research for military or authoritarian purposes, the document says.
While most research would be low-risk, projects related to sensitive defence or national security technology, or with future dual-use or unethical applications, need careful attention.
The document asks universities to carry out suitable due diligence when considering new collaborations, including “ethical, legal and national security considerations as well as financial ones”, and consider “segregating” different research projects online and in person to ensure only people with a valid reason to view the information can see it.
University of Canterbury academic and China expert Anne-Marie Brady, who has written about the People’s Liberation Army using academic collaborations as a “foothold” to strengthen its militarisation programme, told Newsroom it was good to see the Government doing more to educate the public about foreign interference.
“The documents contain very detailed information about what foreign interference is, and how to prevent it, and highlights how our politicians and academics are being targeted by foreign governments.”
While central and local government agencies had staff with national security training who could help politicians and officials manage the problem, universities had no such expertise.
“Universities now need to make this information more widely known to academic staff, and devise internal national security and political ethics policies to match this guidance,” Brady said.
