Here's one from Wired News that I spotted yesterday but just didn't have time to blog (we have jobs here too, you know).
The US government is looking to introduce RFID chips into passports - like the Oyster cards used on London Underground - to allow them to be scanned and information retrieved easily.
But campaigners are unhappy about the idea that such data would not necessarily be secure, allowing anyone with a scanner to get delicate and private information.
Following criticism from computer security professionals and civil libertarians about the privacy risks posed by new RFID passports the government plans to begin issuing, a State Department official said his office is reconsidering a privacy solution it rejected earlier that would help protect passport holders' data.
The solution would require an RFID reader to provide a key or password before it could read data embedded on an RFID passport's chip. It would also encrypt data as it's transmitted from the chip to a reader so that no one could read the data if they intercepted it in transit.
The argument carries over to the British plans for a national identity card, too. If all our identifying data gets digitally stored in one place, how do we protect it?
