He controls a million-strong army and runs a nuclear weapons programme but for years Kim Jong Un has ruled with a nagging sense of fear. The young North Korean dictator, some argue, was afraid to leave his isolated, impoverished nation in case his generals launched a coup or foreign forces used the opportunity to bring his brutal reign to an abrupt end.
Such notions were shattered this week as a private armoured train trundled 20 hours from Pyongyang to Beijing for Mr Kim’s first trip abroad as paramount leader of North Korea.
The visit, initially shrouded in secrecy with the Chinese capital on lockdown, was seen by experts as an attempt to mend Pyongyang’s frayed ties with Beijing — its principal backer — ahead of a possible summit between Mr Kim and US president Donald Trump in May. But to others it signalled something more: the dictator’s growing confidence in his hold on power — a position that he has for years meticulously strengthened through a series of political, economic and military policies that are becoming synonymous with his reign.
“The trip to China marks a major change in his operating mode and it signals that he does feel that his control . . . is secure enough for him to be away from his headquarters for a few days,” says Hank Morris, an adviser at Erudite Risk in Seoul. “That in itself is meaningful.”
For Beijing it was a chance to re-insert itself into the Kim-Trump talks. After years of encouraging direct dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington, China risked being left out of the latest diplomatic round. Mr Kim was its way back in.
In the months leading up to the his visit, China intensified pressure on Pyongyang by going beyond its commitments under UN sanctions to virtually halt exports of petroleum products, coal and other key materials to North Korea — a reminder to Mr Kim of Beijing’s crucial role in his regime’s survival.
At home Mr Kim has followed a three-pronged strategy to cement his grip on power: high-level political repression, grassroots economic liberalisation and the unwavering development of his nation’s nuclear programme.
Surveys of defectors appear to show that his policies are having an impact. They indicate that Mr Kim enjoys broad support among ordinary North Koreans, while analysts now believe he has the nation’s military on a tight leash.
“This is the dictator model to the extreme,” says Andrei Lankov, a noted North Korea expert at Kookmin University in Seoul. “Kim wants to keep people’s stomachs full of food but their hearts full of fear.”
The developments are crucial to diplomacy in the region. A newly emboldened Mr Kim now feels ready to pursue ambitious foreign policies, such as the summit with Mr Trump and a meeting with Moon Jae-in, the South Korean president, on April 27.
For many observers, the North Korean regime is motivated by just one thing: survival. Mr Kim, 34, wants “to die a natural death at an advanced old age,” says Prof Lankov. As such, its policymaking, from building nuclear weapons to developing the economy, is overwhelmingly weighted in support of this goal.
Mr Kim’s first obstacle when he took power after the death of his father in 2011 was opposition from the country’s elite and military, who viewed him as an unknown quantity. This scepticism triggered a bloody years-long purge that has claimed some of the nation’s biggest scalps, including Kim Jong Nam, Mr Kim’s own half-brother who was murdered in Malaysia last year.
It also ensnared Jang Song Thaek, Mr Kim’s uncle, who was tried for treason and executed by firing squad in 2013.
“The crackdown on the elites was a move to consolidate power by removing his father’s people and putting his own in place,” says Ahn Chan Il, president of the World Institute for North Korean Studies and a prominent defector.
Unlike Kim Jong Il — his father whose reign became associated with a famine that killed hundreds of thousands in the 1990s — Mr Kim has focused his ire mainly on the North Korean elite and military, leaving his image among the wider populace relatively unscathed.
“From the people’s perspective, the purging of elites is seen as the right thing to do due to their alleged wrongdoings,” says Kim Young-soo, a professor at Sogang University in Seoul.
Prof Lankov echoes the sentiment, saying Mr Kim was “only killing people [holding] guns”.
“He has not touched a single economy manager. If you are a bank manager, you are safe. In six years, he has had seven ministers of defence, which is as many as his father and grandfather [Kim Il Sung] had combined in 60 years. He is playing it safe [with his own security],” he says.
Mr Kim further weakened the power of the military hierarchy by transferring rights to operate foreign currency-earning businesses away from certain generals back to the ruling Workers’ party, according to Mr Ahn, who formerly served in the North Korean army.
Alongside purges of the elite, Mr Kim has also taken steps, via a rebooted propaganda operation, to bolster his image among ordinary North Koreans.
Human rights violations still plague the nation, with arrests, forced labour and executions endemic. But like Maoist China, Mr Kim has honed his cult of personality, which appears to keep him above the fray. He is regularly portrayed in state media with a broad grin or engaged in frivolous activities with civilians or soldiers.
Most importantly for his reputation, however, Mr Kim has overseen a period of quiet but effective and gradual economic reform by allowing the spread of markets and de facto private enterprises, which have led to a clear uptick in wage levels and the standard of living.
“Ironically, as UN sanctions have tightened in recent years, the economy has become more decentralised and productive, as weakening state controls have allowed the spread of market activities, providing incentives for individuals and families to work in their own self-interest,” says William Brown, a professor in Asian economies at Georgetown University and a former US intelligence officer.
In the eyes of the public these changes are intimately associated with the supreme leader. They form a crucial element of his byeongjin ideology. Translated as simultaneous advancement, byeongjin is a survivalist dogma that promotes the dual development of the economy and nuclear weapons. “This is his signature policy. His identity is based on this,” says Daniel Pinkston, a North Korea expert at Troy University’s international relations faculty in Seoul.
The reforms have triggered an uptick in growth — the Bank of Korea measured a 4 per cent rise in gross domestic product in 2016, which Mr Kim believes can — at least in the short-run — act as a damper on popular dissent.
“This is his survival code. For Kim, the economic reforms are crucial to keeping power,” says Kim Byung-yeon, a professor at Seoul National University and author of a book on the North Korean economy. Adding that the decision of the North Korean leader to meet Mr Trump is a strategic ploy to get sanctions relief.
Polling of public opinion is impossible in North Korea. However, academics in South Korea have charted how an admittedly limited number of North Koreans perceive the regime. Almost 65 per cent of a group of 650 defectors who lived under Kim Jong Un’s regime at some stage say the overall perception towards him domestically is positive, according to a survey by Seoul National University.
“Kim Jong Un’s reputation is relatively good compared with his father,” says Kang Myung Do, a high-ranking defector and son-in-law of former North Korean premier Kang Sung San. “Ordinary people don’t care about him that much. They are OK with him so long as he doesn’t interrupt their market activities and livelihood,” says Prof Kang, who teaches at Kyonggi University in Suwon.
Prof Kim puts it even more bluntly: “People appear to be now saying as long as you don’t touch my money, you can rule the country.”
In November, the Korean peninsula appeared on the verge of conflict as Mr Kim launched his third intercontinental ballistic test missile of the year, triggering global condemnation that was especially sharp from the Trump White House. Amid the furore, many observers overlooked comments from the leader that North Korea had completed its “state nuclear force”.
Kim’s regime
Dec 2011
Aged 27, Kim Jong Un succeeds his father as supreme leader of North Korea.
June 2012
North Korea announces agriculture reforms giving mangers greater responsibility and autonomy over their land.
Feb 2013
Pyongyang tests its third nuclear device; the first of the Kim Jong Un reign.
Dec 2013
Jang Song Thaek, Kim’s uncle and a powerful official, is executed for treason.
Feb 2014
UN report on human rights abuses recommends holding Kim accountable for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court
February 2017
Half-brother Kim Jong Nam is murdered in Kuala Lumpur airport with VX nerve agent
Nov 2017
Pyongyang conducts its third intercontinental ballistic missile test of the year and declares completion of its “state nuclear force”.
Jan 2018
Kim extends an olive branch to Seoul in his new year’s message, triggering a flurry of diplomacy and an inter-Korean summit slated for April 27.
For Mr Kim, this announcement represented the pinnacle of success: he had achieved the goals of his father and grandfather and upheld his byeongjin line. It was a boon for his leadership in a nation that is indoctrinated to cherish state might and nuclear weapons.
But Mr Kim received more than just domestic dividends. The north’s development of nuclear weapons afford him leverage when approaching meetings with the US, South Korea and even China. It is highly unlikely Mr Kim will abandon the regime’s nuclear weapons programme despite repeated claims that he is willing to denuclearise. At the summit with Mr Trump, he may potentially offer a freeze in weapons testing in exchange for the easing of sanctions.
Yet Mr Kim now believes he has enough of a deterrent to prevent a US attack and thus ensure his own survival.
A senior US administration official told the FT that following the Beijing meeting, Washington was determined to keep the pressure on North Korea and ensuring that China maintains its commitment to uphold sanctions and isolate the regime.
Jean Lee, a fellow at the Wilson Center, says Mr Kim’s strengthened position has tremendous implications for how he will engage not only with Mr Trump but also China’s President Xi Jinping.
“Now that he’s happy with his nuclear programme, and the relative position of strength it puts him in at home and abroad, Kim Jong Un is turning his attention to inter-Korea and foreign affairs,” she says. “It has been clear he has wanted to settle the question whether he is qualified to be a military leader for many years. He used the White House’s rhetoric to justify the nuclear programme, and has now settled that question. He feels confident.”
Additional reporting by Kang Buseong in Seoul, Charles Clover in Beijing and Katrina Manson in Washington
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