The revelation that in 2012 Israel’s intelligence agency took a different view from its prime minister about Iran’s intentions is little surprise. It merely confirms that Binyamin Netanyahu is an unreliable witness in the global debate over what to do about Iran’s nuclear programme.
For years he has exaggerated its nature and extent, cried wolf about the imminence of a nuclear weapon, promoted hyperbole about Iran dominating the Middle East, overplayed what sanctions or war could achieve for Israel, and decried the international rules in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Israel’s history is unique. Because of this, it has a missile-borne nuclear force, which gives as much deterrent power in the Middle East as such weapons give us in Europe. Iran sees itself as doing God’s work on Earth: that cannot be done if the Islamic Republic is obliterated in a nuclear exchange.
We would all like absolute certainty that Iran will never seek to use its nuclear capabilities to acquire weapons. But the six governments negotiating with Iran know that neither bombing nor perpetual economic sanctions would eliminate that risk. Bombing could provoke Iran to develop a nuclear force, which it has not done so far; and new sanctions would not bring Iran to its knees. In the form proposed by some in the US Congress, however, more sanctions would induce Iran to close down both the current agreed limits on its activities and the transparency that enables the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor it.
The six nations – the permanant security council members (US, Britain, France, Russia and China) plus Germany, or P5+1 – are negotiating hard for an enforceable agreed scheme that will ensure Iran abides by its declared policy of not seeking nuclear weapons.
For 10 years this goal eluded the international community because it asked for more than any Iranian government could agree to – no enrichment, which contradicts the Non-Proliferation Treaty under which it is lawful for Iran to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.
The negotiations turned a corner in 2012 only when the P5+1 based its case on reciprocity, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and a step-by step process, and then – after skilful secret talks with America – agreed with Iran in November 2013 that this meant the country could retain its right to enrich uranium under IAEA supervision and would ultimately gain the permanent lifting of nuclear-related sanctions.
The political atmosphere around these negotiations is going to heat up further in Tehran and in Washington. The US and its partners, and President Rouhani’s government backed by the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are showing admirable perseverance against their detractors. They are trying to resolve, by the end of March, how and when sanctions will be lifted; the duration of the agreement; and the exact dimensions of Iran’s enrichment programme (which includes the number of existing centrifuges, and arrangements for more advanced ones). Then there is Khamenei’s demand that all the implementation details be wrapped up with the core political negotiations and agreed in one go, not left for a second stage of discussion.
The latest round of talks between Iran and the US, which have just ended, have given the clearest signs yet that, among other things, limits to Iranian capabilities and production, revelation of past military research and development and permanent adherence to the highest standards of monitoring, along with the gradual lifting of sanctions, are all negotiable.
This is good news because it would allow both detection and deterrence of any dash for a weapon. It would block the available known pathways to the accumulation of sufficient highly enriched uranium for a bomb, and reduce – as much as can be done anywhere in the world – the risk of a covert weapons programme.
Netanyahu portrays it as bad news, despite having no better alternative to offer. He would prefer that Iran’s potential for nuclear weapons be “eliminated”.
That is is not possible – the knowledge of inherently dual-use technology that Iran has acquired cannot be erased. But it is possible to limit and to verify the Iranian programme for a substantial period of time, and to ensure Iran’s programme is exclusively peaceful.
The key difference between Netanyahu’s assessments and those of the Mossad and the six countries negotiating with Iran today is whether or not Iran’s activities amount to the inexorable implementation of a plan to build nuclear weapons. They do not.
