Nato is facing a pivotal moment in its history.
Ahead of its June 24-25 summit in The Hague, Nato is weighing up whether it can truly continue to count on US support (and membership), whether it will become a European-only organisation, or whether it has a future at all. This suggests a massive shift for the intergovernmental organisation that sits at the heart of defence and security for Europe, and beyond.
The past year has changed everything. Trump’s anti-Nato rhetoric has become increasingly vociferous and disrespectful, undermining both the organisation itself, and the other 31 Nato member countries, which include Germany, France, Canada, Turkey, the UK, Sweden and Norway. Add to this the Trump administration’s embrace of international isolationism, and the potential, consequential loss of clear US backing for the alliance, all of which highlight the organisation’s historical dependence on the US.
This is what makes the June 2025 summit so critical. It is a make-or-break opportunity to unveil a plan for Nato’s wholesale transformation, or an event conclusively marking its obsolescence. The plan itself is simple: build – or rebuild – Nato as a possible Europe-only endeavour.
If this plan becomes reality, historians of European security and defence may spot earlier parallels for Nato with the original Western European Union (WEU). The WEU was the European defence security structure established in 1954 under the Paris Accords, which helped to redefine relations with West Germany.
Ultimately subsumed into both Nato and EU governance structures, the WEU’s prime goal at the time was to bolster the European content of the Atlantic alliance.
US never wanted Europe to lead
There is a deep irony in Trump’s bluster about Nato states paying more towards their defence. The US has, for decades, been sanguine at best, and hostile at worst on almost every form of European defence autonomy, from basic ops established by the EU to more ambitious strategies. Instead, the US has insisted almost exclusively on increased defence spending by other Nato members, improved interoperability between the various national forces, but all “in furtherance of a US-dominated alliance”, rather than a more authentically US-European approach to safeguarding both European and American interests, according to Max Bergman, a former senior adviser to the US state department.
If the US is now reducing its involvement in Nato, or abdicating entirely, the only option for Nato is to reduce its dependence on the US, and in doing so, to focus more on Europe. A clear mandate is needed, to ensure that being US-less does not render Nato itself useless. Without a mandate, opportunistic space would quickly open up for an aggressive Russia.
Trump made clear early in his first administration that he was no fan of Nato, and argued that its funding structure should no longer overburden the US. In his second administration, Trump has been even clearer, has variously threatened to pull US troops from Nato joint exercises, reduce US security commitments to Nato as a whole, remove some or all of the 80,000 US troops on permanent rotation in Europe and vastly reduce the US’s contribution to Nato’s central budget of US$5 billion (£3.6 billion).
These threats are now repeated routinely by US defence secretary Pete Hegseth and others in the Trump administration. This has profoundly rattled Nato as an institution and its individual member states.
As Nato’s own records show, from 2023 onward, there have been major increases in European defence spending. But the opportunity to keep spending commitments high, as well as overhaul the organisation to meet Ukraine’s demands and defence opportunities for the EU as a whole – which could have been nailed onto Nato’s 75th anniversary summit in 2024 – did not materialise.
There are pros and cons of a new Europe-focused approach for Nato, and these will work themselves out in the final five-to-ten-year plan which is being prepared ahead of the June summit.
For some, building a European defence mission within Nato is an opportunity to plot a new and more sustainable course for Nato, rather than trying to shore up an expanding US-shaped hole. Spending increases that reduce Nato’s perceived helplessness, or reliance on the US, may also be a benefit.
For others, the removal of US command and control, hardware, software, intelligence and much more from Nato is a futile endeavour that will leave the organisation in pieces at best, and present Russia with a golden opportunity for continued eastern aggression at worst.
The signals from Washington remain confusing. Trump’s suggestion of a sudden and total US withdrawal from European defence was tempered in April by US secretary of state Marco Rubio’s suggestion that Trump remained supportive of Nato but also demanding expanded spending commitments (these demands vary from 2.5% to 5% of GDP), and for other members to take on far greater responsibility for developing Nato’s capabilities.
An emerging European coalition
Many members now support the emerging “coalition of the willing”, led by France and Britain, to underwrite a force and secure a post-conflict deal for Ukraine. In figuring out the current provision of military force, including logistics and intelligence capacities in addition to air, land and sea forces, Nato members are aiming to remove the US’s presence and fill the vacuum with European assets over a decade.
The task is colossal, and not without risks. Nato does not want an overnight abdication of the US, as it currently relies far too heavily upon US capabilities, such as long-range precision missiles, and crucially, heavy-lift aircraft which are vital in shifting armoured forces around the continent rapidly. Nato also wants a clear plan, which new member Finland has emphasised as crucial, to prevent an abrupt and disjointed transition that Russia could exploit.
A new vision must be set out by the end of June in order to deal sensibly with ongoing defence spending commitments, reworked governance structures, and possible planned responses to the war in Ukraine.
Scrapping Nato is unnecessary and lays Europe – and the US, if the White House could but see far enough ahead – open to innumerable threats and consequences. Even without the US, Nato provides a valuable structure for security cooperation in Europe. Strengthening European capabilities within Nato, rather than creating an entirely new defence structure, makes sense.
Amelia Hadfield does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
