As everyone knew it would be, Georgia's attempt to wrest control of the breakaway province of South Ossetia was short-lived. An offensive which began on Friday by pounding the heavily populated capital Tskhinvali with Grad missiles, heavy artillery and air strikes ended last night in ignominious retreat, followed by an order for a complete ceasefire. Grigory Karasin, Russia's deputy foreign minister, said more than 2,000 people had died in the onslaught, and 30,000 had been forced to abandon their homes, although there was no independent confirmation of these figures. But it was a bit late for Georgian leaders to be expressing regret for loss of human life.
Russia, however, lost no time in shedding whatever moral advantage it felt it had by bombing Georgian targets - civilian as well as military - far removed from the zone of conflict. Russian bombs fell on blocks of flats, an aircraft factory and the Black Sea port of Poti, and just missed the oil pipeline from Baku. Its fleet blockaded Georgian shipping and landed troops in Abkhazia. That separatist government declared mobilisation, saying it intended to push Georgian forces out of the Kodori Gorge, the only part of the province under Georgian control. If Russia's entry into Georgian territory was motivated solely by the need to protect Ossetian lives, as Moscow claimed it was, what was it doing bombing Georgian towns? Or was this an act of collective punishment?
This has been a lose-lose conflict from the start. The chief loser is the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, a man who gambled that Russia would not take South Ossetia back, and lost. The reunification of Georgia was central to his presidency, and yet he has now lost more territory than he has won. He elbowed out an unpleasant though essentially local Russian-backed potentate in Adjara. But he has now lost South Ossetia for good, and may well face a military strike from Abkhazia.
This is the second time in living memory that Georgia has tried to take South Ossetia back by force. However complex the relationship between the Georgians and the Ossetians may have been before August 7 - there are many mixed families - it is less complicated now. Even discounting Russia's dark manoeuvring, Ossetians will not forgive Georgia for the destruction of their towns and villages. When the dust has settled, the political opposition in Tbilisi may well grow as a result of Mr Saakashvili's military defeats.
Russia, too, has paid a price. A military invasion of the sovereign territory of a neighbour has shaken the entire region, not least Ukraine, which "reserved the right" to bar Russian ships from returning to their base in the Crimea. This has reopened the conflict over the use of Sevastopol as the base for the Black Sea fleet. A weekend of ever more specific statements culminated in a White House warning that Russian actions could have a "significant, long-term impact" on US-Russian relations. So far the US has countered Russian objections to missile defence bases in Poland and the Czech Republic by saying the installations are not aimed at them, but at Iran. A future US president may be tempted to switch tack and argue that a radar that monitors most of Russia's airspace is needed after all.
The Georgian experience has hardened European opinion against Russia, especially in France and Germany, the two European powers who had prevented the Nato conference in Bucharest from awarding Georgia and Ukraine membership action plans. This does not suit Russia's strategic or oil interests. On the contrary, it was doing quite nicely by playing on Europe's divisions. Above all, this short war should be an object lesson to those in Europe and Nato who dangle the prospect of security guarantees that they can not deliver on. It would have been safer to have admitted the limits of western influence.
