Rwanda has threatened to withdraw its troops from Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, signalling a potentially decisive shift in the southern African country’s security architecture.
The threat of withdrawal is driven by a European Union (EU) warning that it may stop funding the Rwandan Defence Forces’ mission in Mozambique in May 2026.
Rwanda’s military intervention in northern Mozambique began in July 2021, when Kigali deployed about 1,000 troops and police at the request of the Mozambican government.
Around December 2022, the EU began to contribute to this Rwandan mission, initially disbursing €20 million, and adding another €20 million in November 2024.
The deployment followed a major escalation of violence by Islamist insurgents in Cabo Delgado. The insurgents captured strategic towns near natural resource sites, such as Mocímboa da Praia, and carried out attacks near a TotalEnergies gas project in Palma.
Rwandan forces quickly helped retake key areas and stabilise zones critical to energy infrastructure, in this way distinguishing themselves from slower-moving multilateral responses.
In 2024, Rwanda increased its troop presence. This helped fill the void left by the withdrawal of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission which had begun in July 2021.
However, the Rwandan mission has begun to look less effective in the last couple of years. There were only four documented clashes between Rwandan forces and Islamic State rebels in Mozambique between December 2024 and March 2025. This had deadly consequences for civilians, who are a strategic target of the rebel group.
I study security dynamics, regional interventions such as Rwanda’s mission in Mozambique, and insurgency responses across sub-Saharan Africa. In my view, Rwanda’s threatened withdrawal wouldn’t be just a tactical shift. It would be a structural turning point. This risks creating a security vacuum in Cabo Delgado.
This exposes the limits of regional and continental intervention mechanisms when local structures remain weak, fragmented and unable to sustain security gains without external support.
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Should Rwanda withdraw from Mozambique, Maputo would face a limited set of options.
It could once again turn to multilateral forces, such as the SADC or the African Union. Given that the SADC has struggled to meet past security commitments, this appears unlikely. Instead, Mozambique may continue to prefer bilateral commitments – most likely with Tanzania – to shore up its counterinsurgency efforts.
In any case, any disruption of counterinsurgency efforts – and failure to address the root causes of unrest – will inevitably lead to further violence and suffering for civilians.
Inside Cabo Delgado
Cabo Delgado is endowed with natural resources, but is one of the poorest regions of Mozambique. It holds reserves of graphite, gold, timber and precious gems. The region contributes about 80% of the world’s ruby supplies.
The discovery of a natural gas reserve in 2010 led to an influx of foreign direct investment by gas companies.
The perception that these resources and investments have not benefited the local population has driven resentment. This began to manifest in the growth of the Islamic State-affiliated Ahl al-Sunnah wa al Jamma’ah (ASWJ), which locals refer to as “Al-Shabaab” (not connected with the Somali entity of the same name).
The group sought to present itself as a legitimate alternative to a state that had failed to deliver services.
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Although the Cabo Delgado insurgency began in 2017, it hit major international headlines in March 2021. This followed a jihadist attack in Palma that targeted a TotalEnergies natural gas project, killing dozens and forcibly displacing thousands. TotalEnergies suspended operations, and only in November 2025 announced its intention to restart activities in Mozambique.
Since the insurgency began in 2017, about 6,500 people have been killed, and 1.3 million displaced.
After years of failing to contain the insurgency, the Mozambican army was forced to seek external counterinsurgency and counterterrorism support.
The SADC sent an initial contingent of peacekeepers in July 2021. However, member states were accused of lagging on their commitments. Meanwhile, Rwanda – outwardly eager to cement its reputation as Africa’s most professional and effective military force – quickly garnered a reputation for its incisive interventions.
But it intervened largely in areas rich in natural resources, while neglecting other areas of Cabo Delgado.
Potential scenarios
The mere announcement of a potential drawdown of Rwandan troops is a psychological victory for Mozambique’s jihadist groups. In May 2024, insurgents claimed victory over SADC forces following news of the mission’s withdrawal. A dangerous vacuum would follow the withdrawal itself.
In my view, there are three possible scenarios for the security of Mozambique.
First, Mozambique could invite the SADC to return as part of a multilateral mission. It would, however, have the same logistical and political obstacles that plagued its first mission.
Second, the African Union could intervene under Article 4(h) of the act that established it. This provision allows for intervention in cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity in member states. Though legally plausible given the documented crimes against humanity in Cabo Delgado since 2017, an AU direct intervention is unlikely. The union has shown consistent reluctance to invoke Article 4(h) without invitation from member states.
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Third, the most probable scenario is a reinforcement of Tanzania’s existing, if modest, military presence in Cabo Delgado. Dar es Salaam has the clearest strategic interest in stabilising its southern neighbour.
Malawi, which also borders Mozambique’s northern regions, has a fraught historical relationship with Maputo. This is a result of Lilongwe’s support for Mozambican guerrilla movements throughout the civil war of the 1970s and 1980s.
Tanzania’s porous border with Cabo Delgado and the involvement of Tanzanian nationals in Mozambique’s violent extremist groups make it the neighbouring country most affected by counterinsurgency in Mozambique.
Scaling up from the current contingent of 300 troops in Mozambique, however, would require considerable political will and logistical coordination.
What next
Those are only some of the scenarios that may occur.
The African Union will most likely not intervene with a multilateral mission of its own accord. The government of Mozambique itself would have to request it, but prefers more agile, bilateral missions.
Whichever actor may replace Rwanda, the withdrawal of troops would result in a security vacuum with likely fatal consequences for civilians in Cabo Delgado, and repercussions for neighbouring countries, particularly Tanzania.
Kaitlyn Rabe is affiliated with Mondo Internazionale APS.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
