There are four systemic errors evident in the problem that has hit contact tracing (NHS races to reach 50,000 Covid contacts missed in data blunder, 5 October), and Matt Hancock has recognised half of one of them.
First, a totally unsuitable tool was used and is still being used. A spreadsheet is entirely inappropriate for the task, as any IT professional could explain, and penny-pinching meant that it was even an old and capacity-limited version.
Second, the “system” clearly had not been tested to its limits, which should be a normal part of testing before any “system” goes live.
Third, this is a life-critical system. People will die because of the error. Any life-critical system should not be vulnerable to a single point of failure. This is fully understood and applied for railway safety, for example, as I know from working on railway safety assurance processes. This may be a novel situation for the lab staff, requiring additional data controls. It is the responsibility of management to recognise this and implement the appropriate measures.
Fourth, there was clearly an absence of management attention to the increasing numbers of cases found by the labs and following these through, otherwise the error would have been spotted earlier.
When major mistakes are encountered, accountability lies at the top of the organisation. Hancock has authorised a bodge to allow the system to continue to function despite its limitations. This is a partial fix for the first error. He has clearly not learned what he should have done from this catastrophic fiasco.
This is the governance we get when loyalty to Boris Johnson is valued over competence and experience. The government lacks rigour and expertise, having discarded the skills of all their most capable people last year. Those who demonstrably cannot do their jobs must resign.
Mike Cashman
Loughton, Milton Keynes
• With reference to the recent testing data debacle, as a retired teacher of the A-level in information and communications technology, I clearly remember Michael Gove, when secretary of state for education, deciding that ICT was no longer a “proper A-level subject”. May I point out that all of my students could easily have picked up the basic errors in the use of out-of-date and unsupported Excel software, and unequivocally stated that to be an operational and security risk.
I wonder how many other government departments are also still using software such as the 2003 Excel package, which is completely inappropriate for situations such as these where vast quantities of data need to be manipulated and an audit trail is essential – hopefully nothing to do with our nuclear industry, but I feel we need reassurance at this time.
Given our near total reliance on ICT following the pandemic, maybe the government might regret its ignorance as to the true value of the study of this underrated subject.
Linda Sherwood
Congleton, Cheshire
• I spent hundreds of hours during my IT sales career trying to persuade very intelligent self-starter executives not to use Excel for purposes it was neither intended nor functionally equipped for. The retort was usually along the lines of: “The IT department will take months to do this little task and charge me a fortune, because they will want to integrate it alongside an existing system. I can do it myself with Excel.” Exactly! It usually didn’t matter too much in the past, but this time it will affect lives. We seem not to have learned anything in nearly 40 years of IT systems deployment.
Reg Aldridge
Endon, Staffordshire
