The Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, declared over the weekend that Israel had embarked on the “second stage” of its war against Hamas in Gaza. What did he mean – and is the Israeli government any closer to its objective of “wiping out” Hamas?
While the desire to destroy Hamas is still present, I believe that the goalposts have moved. A combination of American pressure and an Israeli recognition of the operational complexity of a fully fledged ground invasion has pushed the government to narrow its set of objectives, perhaps making them more achievable.
Instead of foolishly trying to uproot Hamas from its network of tunnels and hiding places around Gaza, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) will focus instead on substantially degrading its military capabilities. Reducing and ideally eliminating Hamas’s ability to produce and launch missiles, rockets and armed drones will be the number one priority.
In lieu of a massive ground incursion, the IDF will seek to encircle and bleed Hamas until the threat it poses to Israeli population centres becomes negligible or manageable. Israeli special forces will conduct raids to collect better intelligence on the enemy, and use it to target Hamas leadership and command and control centres. This will be repeated until the leadership is substantially weakened – it’s a sustained pressure campaign.
Assuming this is the strategy the IDF has adopted, it is a logical one, for four reasons. First, it is much less risky to the IDF soldiers than a comprehensive ground invasion. It’s true that the IDF is trained for both urban and subterranean warfare. It’s also true that it has specialised units for those distinct fights, in addition to specialised equipment, some locally produced, some provided by the United States. But if the IDF enters Hamas’s massive tunnel infrastructure in large numbers, it will automatically be on the defensive – because tunnel warfare typically favours the defender.
All that specialised subterranean equipment – for breathing, for seeing, for navigating, for shooting, for communicating – could very easily malfunction. You can bet that Hamas will have countermeasures, too, including booby traps and various explosive devices. Just like the IDF has prepared for such a fight, Hamas has prepared, too, and for many years. Hamas wants the IDF in those long, deep, tight and multiple-floor tunnels. It’s a trap.
Second, a more limited approach to taking on Hamas could reduce collateral damage, which is Washington’s chief concern right now. Joe Biden was clear with Netanyahu when he urged him to exercise restraint to limit the loss of innocent Palestinian life and prevent regional escalation. Israel simply cannot ignore America’s preferences, because it relies on it for military assistance and diplomatic cover – a senior US official has said that Israel restored internet connectivity to Gaza following pressure from the US. The last thing the US wants is a war with Iran that torpedoes its new China-centred priorities.
Third, a more surgical approach still leaves hope for diplomacy and the possibility of a prisoner swap, partial or full. It could also spare the lives of the dozens of international hostages in the hands of Hamas. So long as the IDF doesn’t enter the tunnels in full force, that bargaining space exists, which is consistent with America’s wishes.
Fourth, slowly weakening Hamas, as opposed to pounding it relentlessly and killing many more Palestinian civilians as a result, might reduce the chances of another front by Iran and Hezbollah opening up against the IDF in Lebanon or Syria. In theory, this approach is less escalatory. The IDF’s readiness level on the northern front is high, but avoiding a fight on two fronts would be most advisable. Hezbollah is a totally different and a lot more formidable foe than Hamas. The IDF has a healthy respect for its capabilities, and the lessons of the vicious 34-day war with the Lebanese group in 2006 are still fresh in the minds of the IDF leadership.
None of this means that the next phase will be easy for the IDF. A less forceful approach gives Hamas the chance to breathe, adjust and regroup. It also allows its main backers, Iran and Hezbollah, to think of smarter ways to aid their Palestinian partner and challenge Israel’s slower method. Escalation is still possible, too. We just don’t know whether the exchange of fire between the IDF and Hezbollah along the Israel-Lebanon border, which is getting deadlier by the hour, will stay contained.
Netanyahu won’t admit it publicly, but his government is reassessing its options against Hamas. For those who have been critical of Washington and its strong support of Israel in its military response, know that without Biden’s political pressure, Israel might have gone all-in against Hamas. It still might. All it takes is one errant or deliberate missile, from Hamas or Hezbollah, that leads to many Israeli casualties, and all bets are off.
Bilal Y Saab is an associate fellow with Chatham House and senior fellow and director of the Defence and Security Programme at the Middle East Institute
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