While unprecedented in scale and horror, the Hamas terrorist attacks on 7 October that killed more than 1,400 people were tactically and geographically limited. They did not pose a strategic, let alone an existential threat. The state – and the idea – of Israel were not placed at immediate, serious risk.
That’s changing. Since that terrible day, Israel has been drawn with astonishing rapidity into a complex web of five interlinked crises that together pose the biggest challenge to national survival since the Yom Kippur war 50 years ago, perhaps even since its founding in 1948.
For belligerents on both sides, Israel’s war to eradicate Hamas, which vows to destroy Israel, has become a fight to the finish.
Who now will save Israel? In past moments of great strife, the Jewish people have always known the answer to that question. It will not be the US, for all its unmatched firepower. It will not be the legions of European diplomats, Arab mediators and certainly not the UN, angrily banished beyond the pale last week.
Paradoxically, the recent parade of visiting national leaders who come and quickly go, vowing undying solidarity as they head for the door – Britain’s Rishi Sunak was prominent among them – has served to remind Israelis of a long-established, fundamental truth. In the end, only Israel can save Israel.
The military-security crisis is the main focus at present, and it’s worsening. The relentless bombardment of Gaza has not stopped Hamas rocket attacks. A punitive ground invasion is coming, probably in stages, but has not yet materialised, delayed in part by concerns about the safety of more than 200 hostages.
Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his war cabinet are reportedly at odds with their generals about how best to proceed. The US is advising caution. Fears that an invasion may ignite a wider war were heightened by US air strikes on Iran-linked forces in eastern Syria.
Iran’s threats to activate its region-wide “axis of resistance”, the advance of allied Iraqi and Syrian Shia militias towards Israel’s borders, attacks launched from Yemen, rising violence in the West Bank and a deepening standoff with Lebanon’s Hezbollah intensify the sense of an Israel under siege on all sides.
Netanyahu vows to utterly eliminate Hamas militarily and politically. Analysts seriously doubt that is possible. Yet even if he succeeds, he has failed so far to answer US president Joe Biden’s basic question: what comes next?
Israel’s political crisis, bubbling all year, has meanwhile reached the acute phase. Netanyahu was deeply unpopular long before the war began. Now a majority of Jewish Israelis blame him and Itamar Ben-Gvir, his far-right security minister, among others, for dire security and intelligence failures.
“There is widespread agreement that Netanyahu is responsible for the country being left vulnerable,” noted author David Rothkopf. “Remarkably, the damage he and his government have done is much deeper and has left Israelis more at risk than they have been in decades.
“Not only has [Netanyahu] divided the country with the anti-democratic policies and abuse of power that sparked an unprecedented protest movement at home, but today the country faces the prospect of a long, costly, possibly escalating, potentially regional conflict.”
Netanyahu refuses to resign, apologise or accept that his previous policy of “managing” Hamas in Gaza, undermining the Palestinian Authority, encouraging annexation of the West Bank and spurning peace negotiations empowered Islamist hardliners, increased the risk of violence and has now backfired dismally.
Instead, Netanyahu styles himself as an irreplaceable, Churchillian wartime figure leading his country to victory. Israel was fighting the “worst monsters on the planet”, he told Sunak. “This is our darkest hour. It is the world’s darkest hour.” Opponents claim he is mainly concerned to save himself.
Doubts about Netanyahu’s fitness to lead are feeding a third, simultaneous crisis. This concerns the haemorrhaging of international public support after an initial post-attack global outpouring of sympathy. The principal cause is Israel’s lethal onslaught on Gaza which has so far killed more than 7,000 Palestinians, including many children.
The Israeli army last week screened bodycam footage of vile Hamas atrocities to remind the world how this war began. Yet unforgettable and unforgivable though they were, they no longer dominate the news. As ever, international media are focused on what’s happening today. Right now, it’s the daily toll of Israel’s bombs.
Israel’s refusal to allow adequate supplies of humanitarian aid and water or any fuel into Gaza, lack of help for the wounded, disputed tragedies like the Al-Ahli hospital blast and the widespread belief that Israel is breaking international law are all turning opinion hostile. In the eyes of many around the world, Israel has morphed from victim to aggressor.
Slightly hysterical criticism last week of UN chief Antonio Guterres’s attempt to set the conflict in context seemed unfair to many observers. Meanwhile, candid statements by a freed hostage, Yocheved Lifshitz, that she was well-treated by her captors dented Netanyahu’s preferred narrative of insensate hate and fear.
The hostage crisis facing Israel would be truly daunting at any time. Coming now, it’s a nightmare. Israel estimates 224 people aged from nine months to 85 years were seized. Four have since been freed. Hamas claims 50 have died in airstrikes. Qatari intermediaries speak of more releases soon but warn military escalation could wreck any agreement.
By abducting innocents, and using them as bargaining chips, Hamas is committing more war crimes and crimes against humanity to add to those it perpetrated on 7 October. Yet the pressure is on Netanyahu’s government. Desperate relatives and friends understandably fear a Gaza invasion may mean a death sentence for their loved ones.
These four interconnected crises – the intensifying war, domestic political strife, a losing global PR battle and the intractable hostage dilemma – are exacerbating a fifth: the long-term strategic, some would say existential crisis confronting Israel. This threatens to inflict permanent damage on its future standing, alliances and influence in the world.
The harm done is already considerable. The process of normalisation with Arab countries has been derailed. To Iran’s delight, a historic deal with Saudi Arabia, underwritten by US security guarantees, is now on ice amid anger in Riyadh and throughout Arab and Muslim countries.
In contrast, the war is boosting the regional profile of Iran, Israel’s sworn enemy which, like Hamas, seeks its destruction. Tehran has succeeded, so far, in cranking up pressure on Israel through armed proxies while avoiding direct involvement. The extent of its complicity on 7 October remains murky.
This strategic crisis is also straining ties with Israel’s western allies. Biden has been hugely supportive, but he and his advisers plainly do not trust Netanyahu’s judgment. They fear the US may be drawn into another globally destabilising Middle East war that could wreck Biden’s re-election hopes. They also fear a new wave of Islamist jihadist terrorism and antisemitic attacks.
The solidarity of European countries is being similarly tested. EU leaders (and the US) want a “humanitarian pause” to allow aid into Gaza and the exit of foreign nationals. UN agencies, along with China and Russia, want a full ceasefire. But Israel, isolated, says “no”, arguing any such measures would help Hamas.
Strikingly, the crisis has unexpectedly revived the 2002 Arab peace initiative for a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. All leading countries now say this is again a priority once the war is over. How ironic that the actions of Netanyahu and the religious-nationalist far right, viscerally opposed to an independent Palestinian state, may provide crucial impetus towards its creation.
The 7 October trauma has fundamentally shaken Israelis’ self-belief and national confidence. Whatever happens, many believe Israel will have to change. It will need a reset, a fresh start. New leadership, a security overhaul and a process of democratic renewal will be essential to repair the enervating divisions and hubris of the Netanyahu years.
Yet to be “normal”, to be safe – to save itself – modern-day Israel will also need to demonstrate to the world’s coming generations and their leaders, newly awakened and sensitised to this issue, that it understands and accepts the 75-year-old Palestinian question must be finally, fairly resolved.
After Hamas’s atrocities, after Gaza, after all this pain and suffering, at this moment of great national jeopardy, international opinion – and common sense – will demand nothing less. For Israel, as for the Palestinians, things cannot go back to the way they were.
