Several days of bitter sectarian fighting in the south of Syria has brought the fledgling government in Damascus dangerously close to direct conflict with Israel, after Israeli warplanes launched strikes against government buildings in the Syrian capital, Damascus, on July 16.
The United Nations and a number of countries condemned the attacks, which the UN secretary general, Antonio Guterres, said were “escalatory airstrikes”. Yet Israeli defence minister, Israel Katz, triumphantly used the social media site X to post a video of a Syrian news anchor diving for cover during the strikes.
Efforts to agree a ceasefire in the region have faltered and fighting between Druze and Bedouin militias in the southern Syrian province of Sweida is understood to have resumed. The BBC has reported that at least 600 people have been killed in the fighting so far.
The violence was seemingly sparked by a petty crime. On July 11, a Bedouin gang allegedly kidnapped and robbed a Druze merchant and the road between Sweida and Damascus. This prompted a series of tit-for-tat sectarian kidnappings and killings.
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On July 14, Syrian security forces entered the province to restore order, only to be ambushed by Druze fighters. Reports of these fighters executing government forces caused outrage throughout the country. Syria’s government then sent more troops, including tanks and heavy weapons.
But as these reinforcements arrived, they were met by a new challenge: more deadly and prolific Israeli airstrikes against government forces.
Weak central government
This cycle of violence exemplifies the underlying cause of the recent conflict. Syria’s interim central government lacks the credibility and capacity to exert its authority throughout the country.
This is particularly true in Sweida, which has been de facto autonomous for many years. The overstretched Assad regime largely withdrew from the province, during the decade of civil war. When his regime fell, many of the local militias which had served as Sweida’s de facto rulers were reluctant to surrender their weapons.
The recent violence exemplifies why this is a problem. Absent a strong local state, Druze militias took it upon themselves to exact justice, allegedly leading them to attack innocent Bedouins. This led the Bedouins to mobilise in self-defence. There are reports of violence and summary executions on both sides and also by government troops.
Syria’s Druze have good reason not to trust the new regime in Damascus, given the latter’s jihadist roots and history of anti-Druze violence during the civil war. The Sweida Military Council (SMC), a Druze militia led by the Venezualan-born cleric, Hikmet al-Hiji, were hostile to the new government almost from the outset. Other Druze militias in Sweida and elsewhere, however, were in tentative negotiations with Damascus to integrate into government control.
That would be a welcome and necessary step for creating trust in Syria’s new administration and increasing its capacity and capability to rule throughout the country.
But this process has now been derailed. Damascus’s mass mobilisation of troops, tanks and heavy weapons was condemned by all Sweida’s Druze factions, including those formerly close to the government. Some of these groups even fought the advancing security forces.
After government troops withdrew as part of the most recent ceasefire agreement, the province has quickly returned to the same chaotic militia rule that first caused the violence. Bedouin militias have already rejected the ceasefire and resumed hostilities against their Druze rivals.
Israel’s position
The recent violence has not only exacerbated sectarian tensions throughout Syria, it has also disrupted the tentative Israel-Syria peace process. Just one week ago, observers speculated that Israel and Syria might normalise relations. That now looks increasingly unlikely.
When the Assad regime fell in December 2024, Israel occupied swaths of Syrian territory and launched an unprecedented number of strikes throughout the country. Under heavy US pressure, though, Israel moderated its policies. It even began direct negotiations with Syria’s new government.
But as the conflict in southern Syria escalated, Jerusalem warned Damascus that a mass deployment of the state’s security forces within the province would cross a red line, because it would bring Syrian troops close to Israel’s borders. It would also endanger Syria’s Druze, a community that Israel’s government have sworn to protect.
But the fledgling Syrian government has said it aims to be an inclusive, centrally run – rather than a federal – state, so it has to bring Druze and other minorities, such as Syria’s Kurds, into the fold and put an end to the sectarian clashes.
By subsequently escalating its attacks, killing more members of the state security forces than since the Assad regime fell and humiliating the government by destroying its institutions in Damascus, Israel got the result it wanted.
It did so, according to Benjamin Netanyahu, through “forceful actions”. The Israel prime minister told journalists on July 17 that: “We have established a clear policy: the demilitarization of the area south of Damascus and the protection of our brothers, the Druze.”
Israel was faced with a choice: continue imposing its will on Syria militarily, or cooperate with the country’s new government. It has apparently chosen the former.
The fact is that in Sweida, and elsewhere in the fractured country, Syria remains a state with too many guns, gangs, militias and powerful external interests vying for control. Its heterogeneous population increasingly distrust one another and rely on their own ethno-religious groups to fulfil the responsibilities that a weak and distrusted central government cannot.
That distrust continues to flare into open violence in southern Syria. And it appears there is little the fragile central government can do about it.
Rob Geist Pinfold does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
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